POLITICS AND PLUNDER:
Civil war and regional intervention in Africa

DEANNA GROSS

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DECLARATIONS

Candidate’s Declaration

‘I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made for text.

__________________________
Deanna Gross
26 November 2007

Supervisor’s Declaration

‘I believe that this thesis is properly presented, conforms to the specifications for the thesis and is of sufficient standard to be, prima facie, worthy of examination’.

__________________________
Dr Tanya Lyons
26 November 2007
SYNOPSIS

Over recent decades, civil wars in Africa have taken millions of lives and caused widespread destruction of whole states and regions. The living standards of peoples residing in such states in Africa which have been devastated by war are often deplorable, with violence, disease and poverty characterising life there. Lawlessness is another feature of such wars, making these states optimal places for international terrorist groups to operate in, and from. For both the above reasons, the West should not turn a blind eye to this issue.

These wars that have occurred in a number of African states, including Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, have often become regionalised with surrounding states increasingly becoming involved. This is particularly the case when economic gain can be sought through involvement in the civil war. The introduction of regional actors into domestic civil wars frequently serves to intensify and prolong the conflict, through an increase of arms and troops entering the fighting. The surrounding state actors largely claim to be involved for political reasons, namely to provide security to their own state. However, numerous credible reports have shown that vast plundering of natural resources has been carried out in war-time by surrounding states in the war-torn state. Consequently, this thesis examines the motives of surrounding state actors when deciding to participate in domestic civil wars of their neighbours. To do this, I compile case studies on both Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo since both states had been ravaged by violent and drawn-out civil wars involving regional actors. Furthermore, the regional actors in both cases (Liberia in Sierra Leone, and particularly Rwanda,
Uganda, Zimbabwe in the DRC) have been accused of participating in the wars for economic gain.

The case studies showed that while political motivations largely drive the initial decision by regional actors to participate in civil wars in their region, it is subsequently economic gain that both allows and compels them to continue their involvement in the civil war. Henceforth, in the final chapter, I put investigate policy suggestions for the future including: prevention of resources being used to fuel warfare through controlling their access to legitimate channels; the use of aid to reduce the likelihood of those in poverty turning to war in pursuit of sustenance, including opportunities to target aid and use compliance with particular peace agreements as a prerequisite for attaining the funding; diversification of the economies of these weak states through development assistance to reduce risks produced by a high dependency on primary commodity exports for income and financial sanctions in the form of freezing of assets or asset blocking. These policy suggestions seek to address both the political and economic motivations of the surrounding state actors in participating in civil wars in Africa.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to sincerely thank Dr Martin Griffiths and Dr Tanya Lyons. Martin, for keeping me on track with this project, and for putting up with the drafts that I hand you (which aren’t always that great). Thank you Tanya, for all your knowledge on Africa, your ideas (which helped me develop my own), and your encouragement and support, especially in the later stages. Without you both, I could not have completed this piece of work.

Thank you to my parents (Rob and Jules) for supporting me throughout this venture, especially to Mum, who had to read and edit yet another thesis.

Thank you also to all my friends for your support, friendship and ability to make me laugh, and particularly for giving me a reason to get away from the computer. Thank you to Simon who gave me confidence and support to keep going through to the end.
GLOSSARY

ADF - Allied Democratic Forces
ADFL - Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo
ANC - Armée Nationale Congo laïse
APC – All People’s Congress
AFRC - Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
ARB - African Reserve Bank
ASADHO - African Association for Human Rights
AU - African Union
CHDC - Congo Holding Development Company
DSP - Special Presidential Division
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo (Formerly Zaire)
ECOMOG - Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States Economic Community of West Africa
FAA – Angolan Armed Forces
FAR – Forces Armees Rwandaises
FAZ - Forces armées zairoises
FDD - Forces for the Defense of Democracy/Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (Burundi)
FLC - Front de Liberation du Congo
FNLA - National Liberation Front (Burundi)
FNLA – National Liberation Front of Angola
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GNP – Gross National Product
GOC - Government of Congo (DRC)
IFRCS - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IRC – International Rescue Committee
JMC - Joint Military Commission
LPA - Lusaka Peace Accords
LRA – Lords Resistance Army
LURD - Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MLC - Movement for the Liberation of the Congo/ Mouvement de Liberation du Congo
MONUC - Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo
MNC - Congolese National Movement/ Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo
MPLA - Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola/ Popular Movement of the Liberation of Angola
NEPAD - New Partnership for African Development
NPFL - National Patriot Front of Liberia
NPRC - National Provisional Ruling Council
NRA - National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NRM – National Resistance Movement (Uganda)
OAU - Organisation of African Unity
PAC - Partnership Africa Canada
RCD - Rally for Congolese Democracy/ Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie
RCD-G – Rally for Congolese Democracy (Goma)
RCD-K – Rally for Congolese Democracy (Kisangani)
RCD-ML - RCD-Mouvement de Liberation
RPA - Rwandan Patriotic Army
RUF – Revolutionary United Front
SADC - Southern African Development Community
SIEROMCO - Sierra Leone Iron Ore and Metal Co. Ltd
SANDF - South African National Defence Force
SOCEBO - Société congolaise d’exploitation du bois
SLPP - Sierra Leone People’s Party
SNEL - Congo's Societe Nationale d'Electricite (DRC)
TPVM - Third Party Verification Mechanism
UK – United Kingdom
ULIMO - United Liberation Front of Liberia
UN – United Nations
UNAMSIL - United Nations peacekeeping force
UPC - Union for Congolese Patriots
UPDF - Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Force
UPNA – Union of Peoples of Northern Angola
WNBF - West Nile Bank Front
XEU – Euros (currency)
ZDF - Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZDI - Zimbabwe Defence Industry
Zanu-PF – Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front Party
ZESA - Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority
Figure 1.1

Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas online accessed at http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa.html
 CHAPTER ONE: REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA

The civil wars that have plagued many African states, such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and Sudan, over the past few decades have resulted in a huge number of casualties and deplorable living standards for peoples residing in these states. Extreme acts of violence, along with actors profiting from these horrific situations are just some of the features that have characterised these wars. Another facet of a number of these wars is that they rapidly become a regional issue, with neighbouring states involving themselves to varying extents. Involvement by neighbouring states in such wars has, in more than one case, led to both the prolonging and intensification of conflict. Henceforth, the focus of this thesis is to examine the role of these neighbouring states in African civil wars, and more importantly, to show what motivates them to do so. Through case studies of Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), I argue that a combination of political and economic factors appear to motivate surrounding states to intervene in such domestic wars. This first chapter will give a brief introduction into the sort of wars that have been prevalent in Africa over the past few decades. Following this, chapter two and three are case studies on Sierra Leone and the DRC respectively. The final chapter will look at the implications of these findings for developing policy towards conflict-ridden states in Africa, particularly when neighbouring states become involved.
**WARS OF THE THIRD KIND**

Since the end of the cold war in the early 1990s, the phenomenon of ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ states, which began to manifest itself in the 1960s, has attracted increasing academic (if not diplomatic) attention. The alleged failure of a growing number of states, and the wars associated with them, has produced a large number of casualties and refugees fleeing to safe havens.¹ This was not the new world order that some observers had envisaged. Although collapsed states are a worldwide and historic phenomenon,² contemporary Africa displays far more examples than anywhere else. Looking back, with the exception of the Congo,³ Africa saw a generally peaceful transition from colonial rule to independence between the late 1950s to the mid 1970s. By the late 1970s the first round of state collapse had begun. Regimes that had replaced the original nationalist generation were themselves overthrown in states such as Chad, Uganda and Ghana. In all three cases, established but inadequately functioning regimes had been replaced by a military regime that concentrated power but was unable to exercise it successfully or legitimately.

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¹ Holsti, K. *The state, war and the state of war*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pg. 123. Henderson points out that Africa has been the place of some of the world’s most deadly conflicts in the last few decades with those in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda each resulting in the deaths through battlefield casualties or war-induced famine and disease of 500,000 to 1,000,000 persons. Henderson, E.A. ‘*When states implode: The correlates of Africa’s civil wars, 1950-92*’, Studies In Comparative International Development, 35:2, 2000, pp. 28-40. Furthermore, as Goldsmith maintains, from 1981 to 1996, nearly half the countries in Africa experienced significant outbreaks of violent conflict between government and opposition groups. These conflicts lasted as little as one month to more than twenty years (several started before 1981 and ten others were still ongoing as of 1998). By 1998, some four million lives were lost as a direct result of this political violence. A further three million people have become refugees. See, Goldsmith, A.A. ‘Foreign aid and statehood in Africa’, *International Organization*, 55:1, 2001, pp. 123-140.


³ In the Congo in 1960-1961, the state that collapsed was the colonial state, manifest by the refusal of state institutions (army, executives, local governments, and populations) to recognise each other’s authority. See Zartman, W. ‘Introduction: posing the problem of state collapse’, in Zartman, W. (ed.), *Collapsed states: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority*, Lynne Rienner Press, Boulder, 1995, pg. 2.
The second phase of state collapse in Africa occurred in the early 1990s, partly due to the demise of superpower support that followed the end of the cold war. In addition, poor governance had, over the first three decades of African independence, created circumstances that had become unbearable to the citizens of many African countries, which led to the emergence of popular movements for political and economic reform. This poor governance, commonly in the form of patronage politics, had produced states with weak institutions that were unresponsive to the needs of the populations in these states. In the absence of aid from the Soviet Union and the United States, governments were no longer able to repress such movements. The authoritarian successors of the nationalist generation were then overthrown by new successor regimes. This round of state collapse continued to persist into the 1990s in states such as Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Rwanda. For a variety of reasons, since the 1990s there has been a growing awareness of state failure and the wars associated with it (not the least of which is the end of the cold war itself), as attention shifted from the receding likelihood of war between states (especially the great powers) to violent conflict within failed states.

To understand a failed or failing state, one must look at what any ‘successful’ (or at least competent) state accomplishes. Buzan regards legitimacy as the core of any successful state. Legitimacy is divided into two kinds: vertical and horizontal. Vertical legitimacy is the ‘right to rule’ of political institutions and regimes over the community, and horizontal legitimacy expresses the degree of unity and cohesion in the community that is governed.
Buzan argues that states with high degrees of vertical and horizontal legitimacy are the strongest states, and those states with little or no legitimacy of either kind are failing or failed. Holsti also argues that vertical and horizontal legitimacy is of the utmost importance when assessing state strength and weakness:

At one extreme are strong states whose main features are strong linkages between the physical, attitudinal, and institutional components, all encompassed with high degrees of vertical and horizontal legitimacy... At the other extreme are failed states, political entities that have collapsed. There is little or no public order, leadership commands no authority or loyalty, and a variety of groups and factions are armed to resist those who might try to integrate the community or establish effective order.

However, the term ‘state failure’ is contentious. The word ‘failure’ implies that responsibility lies entirely with internal actors, such as the governments of these states and their people. However, Hans-Henrik Holm argues that weak states do not represent a problem that suddenly occurs due to bad leaders in Africa (though they share a considerable part of the responsibility). Weak states are in part a consequence of the way the international system has developed. And weak states may, if the circumstances are unfavourable, fail. Furthermore, Muchie claims that the problems of state failure are primarily a result of the functioning and logic of the international political economy and the peculiarities of Africa’s integration into it. I would argue that both the argument of Buzan, and Holm and Muchie are to some extent correct. Weak states do lack legitimacy in most cases, however as Muchie points out, the current international political economy...
helps create, as exacerbate, these situations. In weak states, it may well be the case that many leaders try to reap spoils from the breakdown of the systems, but the structural inadequacies also make it very difficult for well-meaning leaders to keep control and increase the state’s legitimacy and therefore strength. Nonetheless, for the purpose of this thesis the title of state failure will be used given the widespread use of the term in the academic literature on the subject.

One aspect which has also had a large effect on weak states in Africa and the wars in the region is globalisation. Literature on globalisation focuses mainly on developed nations where production integration, closing of distance and the increased information sharing are increasing. When looking globalisation and its relationship with developing nations, the focus is towards the growing Asian economies, with little attention paid to Africa. The focus on African states normally surrounds notions of bad leadership, brutality and corruption. However the current state of global neoliberalism actually has a huge affect on African states. 12 As Moore has stated:

In the already capitalist world globalisation is about the deepening of commodity relations, the privatisation of formerly public services, the search for cheaper and more productive labour, coping with crises of over-accumulation and under-consumption, and the collapse of space and time—all in an ideological world seemingly devoid of other options. Globalisation is different in Africa. There, the birth of capitalism and modernity is starting all over again. The continent is renewing its violence-laden movement through primitive accumulation, nation-state formation, and democratisation to capitalist modernity. 13

Since the end of the Cold War, the process of economic liberalisation has begun to replace the ‘rent-seeking’ and patron–client opportunities, and policies of industrial

and agricultural protection of the Cold War era. However, many problems have emerged from this transition. States are weaker as fewer funds from Cold War powers are available to support patronage politics, resulting in leaders losing control of areas that they once held through paying off local strongmen to retain their support.\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, leaders have also found it difficult to provide citizens with the economic prosperity or democratisation that is supposed to go hand-in-hand with neoliberalism, leaving the people in these states discontent and often desperate.

The collapse of states rarely occurs without internal warfare or collective violence of some description. As the state weakens due to dwindling sources of horizontal and vertical legitimacy, there is growing oppression from the government, which in turn results in further resistance. In addition, leaders become isolated and (perhaps with the exception of the capital city), government institutions fail to function. At this stage the tasks of governance, to the extent that they are carried out at all, are ‘up for grabs’ for whoever is willing to fight for them. Generally, power becomes divided between warlords, clan chiefs, religious figures and other locally based individuals or organisations that are adequately armed.\textsuperscript{15} Many have described these intra-state wars as ‘wars of the third kind’ (i.e. neither nuclear nor conventional). They are particularly bloody, with much of the violence aimed at citizens.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{EXTERNAL PLAYERS IN AFRICAN CIVIL WARS}

Many external players often become involved in these wars, for a number of different reasons. Such external players include: great powers, such as the United States,
France or Britain; supra-national entities such as the United Nations; great powers in the region, such as South Africa or Nigeria; multi-national regional entities, such as the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (ECOMOG); private military companies; and surrounding states to where the war is being played out. The motives and capabilities amongst these actors are by no means identical, and therefore the involvement, and the outcomes produced from it, differs substantially between each case.\textsuperscript{17}

The response of the international community to these wars, to the extent that it has responded at all, has largely been misguided and ineffective. Such is the need for greater understanding of these conflicts.\textsuperscript{18} One area that the international community has lacked understanding of, and the ability to apply appropriate policies to, is the role of neighbouring states in domestic African wars. Neighbouring states become involved in these conflicts in a number of ways. They are obliged to provide shelter for refugees; they present transit routes for economic necessities, and they can facilitate or deny arms supplies. Furthermore, where ethnic links transcend colonial boundaries, the spread of instability to neighbours, and potentially the region, is highly likely.\textsuperscript{19}

Surrounding state involvement, as will be shown in the case studies of Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), has been seen to both lengthen and


intensify domestic conflicts in weak states. This is due to a number of factors including increased arms entering into these conflicts and through the integration and ease of access to international markets that help finance the efforts of particular parties. In regards to the war in the DRC, Afoaku points out that the “Congo’s weakness may be a permissive condition, but was scarcely an efficient cause”. As he suggests, the Congo’s relative weakness in comparison to its neighbours, even including its inability to prevent insurgency groups from operating from its territory, cannot alone explain the current war. One therefore must look to the surrounding states to explain the Congo war. Little research has been specifically aimed towards analysing the roles and motives of neighbouring actors that participate in African civil wars. Consequently, this thesis is primarily concerned with the role of surrounding states in the wars associated with state failure.

**MOTIVES FOR INTERVENTION BY SURROUNDING STATES IN AFRICAN CIVIL WARS**

In particular, this thesis is interested in the motives for intervention of these surrounding states in domestic wars in Africa. Determining the motives of particular actors, in this case neighbouring states, for initiating war, and persisting with it, is

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important in terms of developing suitable policies aimed towards peace.\textsuperscript{25} While in the past, ethnicity and primordial based loyalties were largely seen as the main driving factors for involvement in war in Africa, economic motives are now argued to be the most important factor in determining participation in conflict in the region.\textsuperscript{26}

While the literature on economic motives for warfare in weak states has largely been focused on domestic actors in civil wars, the same can be said for neighbouring states intervening in African domestic civil wars. However, while this thesis will argue (through the use of case studies on Sierra Leone and the Congo), that economic motives did play a large role in the continued involvement of neighbouring states in these wars, it concludes that it was a combination of political and economic motives that ensured the initial intervention.

In the cold war context, many students of conflict in Africa presented it as a clash between two sides, generally an insurrection met by a counter-insurgency. This framework appeared suitable to describe conflicts between the 1950s and 1980s, where anti-colonial wars and revolutionary struggles were frequent and which concentrated largely on what the war was about and whom it was ‘between’. Seeing war simply as two sides going into battle over control of a particular state proved insufficient when attempting to explain a number of the wars that were ignited in the 1990s such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These wars, which have been described as irrational and unpredictable have been analysed under a kind of ‘chaos theory’. Authors such as Robert Kaplan have

described the post-Cold War wars in third world states as situations of anarchy borne of stresses such as disease, over population, scarcity of resources and refugee migrations.\textsuperscript{27} Such chaos theory suggests that with the end of the cold war, and the subsequent disintegration of strong regimes once supported by cold war superpowers, tribal, ethnic and national rivalries came to a head, resulting in conflict.\textsuperscript{28}

Kaplan has also focussed on the idea of ‘ancient hatreds’ to explain the post-cold war outbreak of violence in less-developed states,\textsuperscript{29} other authors, such as Rothchild and Lake, suggest that intense ethnic conflict is most often caused by collective fears for the future. They assert that as groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas appear. These strategic dilemmas contain within them the potential for immense violence. Rothchild and Lake argue that as information fails, and problems of credible commitment and the security dilemma take hold, groups become apprehensive, the state weakens, and conflict becomes more likely. Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, operating within groups, often exploit these fears of insecurity and polarise society. Political memories and emotions also amplify these anxieties, driving groups further apart. Together, these ‘between-group’ and ‘within-group’ strategic interactions produce distrust and suspicion that can explode into extreme violence.\textsuperscript{30}

However, as Keen has alluded to, where no clear ideological division can be discerned, how can we explain the motivation of those who allow – even cause – a

\textsuperscript{27} Kaplan, D. \textit{The coming anarchy}, Random House, New York, 2000, pg. 7.
\textsuperscript{29} Kaplan, D. 2000, pp. 3-58.
disastrous conflict? How can the ‘ancient hatreds’ analysis explain why conflict should suddenly erupt between peoples who have lived peacefully together for long periods? Keen suggests that internal conflicts have persisted in many states not so much despite the intentions of rational people, but because of them. He argues that, the apparent ‘chaos’ of civil war can be used to further local and short-term interests. These are frequently economic.\(^{31}\)

Since the 1990s many other experts have also begun citing greed as the primary motive for a number of the wars in the region. For example, authors such as Reno, Berdal and Malone, and Musah have written works focusing on the pertinence of the ‘rogue regime’, and the clandestine political economy of predatory violence.\(^{32}\) Such authors point out that Africa’s vast natural and mineral resources have not been used to improve the human condition or to promote poverty reduction through programs and investments in human capital. Instead, the provision of basic health and social welfare has frequently been absent in African states. Wars over the control and exploitation of Africa’s raw minerals have provoked violent deaths, displacements, loss of human dignity and the decimation of populations in these regions. As Orogun points out,

\begin{quote}
Diamonds, gold, cobalt, petroleum, timber, and other precious minerals and gemstones have become the primary cause of misery, calamity, impoverishment and collective insecurity on an unusually unprecedented scale and magnitude.\(^{33}\)
\end{quote}


\(^{33}\) Orogun, P. 2003, pg. 295.
However, the presence of economic motives and commercial agendas in wars is not a particularly new phenomenon; it is a theme that has occurred frequently in the history of warfare. As Anderson has noted, in the war-ravaged and politically fragmented German lands of the Thirty Years War, warfare was in fact an extensive “private and profit-making enterprise” with Walenstein’s imperial army at one point “the greatest business enterprise of the age”.34 Some of Napoleon’s popular marshals, such as Massena, Soult, and Brune, showed skills in private plundering and accumulation that matched their skills in warfare itself.35

Clausewitz’s recognition of war as an extension of politics in the early nineteenth century has been widely quoted. Clausewitz described war “as a kind of business competition on a great scale”.36 In his original theory of war, Clausewitz subsumes private interests of business under the larger rubric of “the interests generally of the whole community”, though he recognises that “policy may take a false direction” and “promote unfairly the ambitious ends” of “private interests”.37 Joseph Heller captures this propensity of some to benefit from warfare perfectly in his novel Catch 22, through the character of Milo Minderbinder. Milo, a conscripted officer in the US army fighting in the Second World War extends his role of Mess Officer to include a food supplies money-making syndicate. Under his syndicate, he not only uses the mess funds to scout the globe for profitable food supplies, he involves German officers and uses German planes to transport the goods.38

Various groups within a conflict may take advantage of war and the fruits that it provides, through a number of methods. One way is through pillage, which has long been used to supplement the wages of soldiers and other officials. Another method of exploiting a situation of war is through extracting protection money. Warlords, mafias and security personnel offer protection to civilians from violence for payment. Belligerents may also be able to benefit through the monopolisation of markets in a particular area, or by charging levies and or taxes for operation of business within the area which they control.\textsuperscript{39}

Keen has also pointed out that economic interests have rarely fuelled \textit{unlimited} violence. Many contemporary conflicts have been carefully contained, with only \textit{limited} fighting, if not cooperation, between opposing parties. Instead there has been a heavier emphasis on controlling production and trade. This cooperation must also be taken into consideration when examining these conflicts as it serves as a serious impediment to peace. Furthermore, the distinction between peace and war is also often hazy, and this cooperation may be beneficial in peacetime if that can be achieved.\textsuperscript{40}

Paul Collier has investigated statistically the global pattern of large-scale civil conflict since 1965, and finds that conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance. Collier suggests that if economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely that some groups are benefitting from conflict and that these

\textsuperscript{39} Keen, D. 1998, pg. 15-17.
\textsuperscript{40} Keen, D. 1998, pg. 9-14.
groups have some interest in igniting and prolonging it. As Collier suggests, civil wars create economic opportunities for a minority of actors.\footnote{Collier, P. 2000, pg. 91.}

As Collier and others have suggested, it is useful when trying to understand motivations for participation in civil wars to distinguish between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’. At one end of this spectrum actors may engage in conflict in an attempt to build wealth by capturing resources extra-legally. At the other end of the spectrum, actors may participate in conflict because they aspire to achieve a change in regime. These two reasons for involvement in conflict require extremely different forms of policy intervention if the international community wishes to bring war to an end.\footnote{Collier, P. 2000, pg. 92.}

As Collier has pointed out, the most obvious way to discover why a particular group is acting in a particular manner is to ask them. However, those organisations that are sufficiently successful to get noticed are not likely to be negligent enough to admit to greed as a motive. Narratives of grievance are much more accepted by the international community than narratives of greed.\footnote{Collier, P. 2000, pg. 92.} For example Rwanda and Uganda were not likely to want to admit greed as a motive for their intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as they desired continued funding from the World Bank and other Western donors. Mwanasali also points out that in wartime there exists a problem when it comes to capturing the full extent of economic transactions, as the majority of them are carried out informally.\footnote{Mwanasali, M. ‘The view from below’, in Berdal, M. and Malone, D. (eds.) 2000, pp. 137-152. Whereas traditional viewpoints of International Relations categorise internal forces as being separate from external forces, authors such as Callaghy, Kassimir and Latham have brought to attention the role of ‘transboundary formations’ as a useful tool for understanding conditions in Africa. These transboundary formations are essentially the intersections between local and global, which then effect local and global entities separately, and order and authority within them. It is due to this transboundary nature of transactions that they are hard to account for. See Callaghy, T. et. Al, 2001, pp. 1-22.}
Narratives of grievance as opposed to greed are also more functional internally for recruiting members to the organisation or when attempting to ensure troop loyalty. Therefore, even when greed is the primary motive for conflict, the actual discourse may be solely dominated by grievance. Given this, when such groups use the narrative of grievance it doesn’t always necessarily mean that this is their only or even their primary motivation for conflict. Collier suggests that a better way of determining motives is by looking predominantly at patterns of observed behaviour. Collier undertook research which attempted to determine patterns in the origins of civil war, distinguishing between those causal factors that are generally consistent with economic motivation and those that are more consistent with grievance.\(^\text{45}\)

Characteristics used by Collier to capture the notion of an economic agenda included the share of primary commodity exports as a percentage of GDP. A comparatively high percentage of primary commodity exports can be linked to economic motives for war as they are easily ‘lootable’, heavily taxed, and don’t require complex and delicate networks for their production and marketing. Another important factor that Collier has identified is the cost of attracting recruits to join the rebellion. He points out that overwhelmingly, the people who join rebellions are young men, therefore the greater the proportion of young men in society, the easier it is to recruit rebels. He then suggests that the “…willingness of young men to join a rebellion might (emphasis added) be influenced by their income-earning opportunities”.\(^\text{46}\) He also

\(^{45}\) Collier, P. 2000, pg. 92.
\(^{46}\) Collier, P. 2000, pg. 94.
takes into account the level of education reached by the population using the average number of years of education the society has received.\textsuperscript{47}

Specifically, Collier’s report found, with all other things equal, a country that is heavily dependent upon primary commodity exports, with a quarter of income coming from them, has a risk of conflict four times greater than one without primary commodity exports. The report did find that a prior period of rapid economic decline increased the risk of conflict. Collier suggests that,

\begin{quote}
Each 5 percent of annual growth rate has about the same effect as a year of education for the population in reducing the effect of conflict. Thus, a society in which the economy is growing by 5 percent is around 40 percent safer than one that is declining by 5 percent, other things being equal.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

However, this was the sole determinant that supported the grievance motive for conflict in Collier’s report. Collier argues that the grievance motive for conflict rarely works due to the ‘free-rider’ problem, whereby people are hesitant to get involved as they assume other people will do it instead. He goes on to suggest that rebel leaders therefore rely on greed to attract participants to carry out a rebellion and to engage in conflict. In this way, grievance-motivated rebellions that actually take hold do so by combining some material payoff with grievance.\textsuperscript{49}

Collier goes on to suggest that rebellions that cannot impose authority over an area may well fade out. In a situation where some actors are doing well out of war it is not surprising that these actors may not be interested in restoring peace. However, as

\textsuperscript{47} Collier, P. 2000, pg. 94.
\textsuperscript{48} Collier, P. 2000, pg. 97.
\textsuperscript{49} Collier, P. 2000, pp. 91-111.
these actors are gaining power and wealth, even more members of society are losing out and to an even greater degree. While this situation looks to provide the potential for a mutually beneficial peace settlement to be attained, this idea has problems in that those gaining from conflict are often more powerful than those proponents of peace, and the rebel groups often suffer less from the free-rider problem as the groups are smaller and each member has something tangible to lose.\textsuperscript{50}

Research favouring the abundance perspective, such as that of Collier has mainly been based on a measure of primary commodity exports as a proxy for greed-motivated violence. De Soysa has conducted further research, testing the competing hypotheses with a more specific measure of scarcity and abundance, with per capita stock of natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, and finds that an abundance of natural mineral wealth is positively and significantly related to armed conflict. The result therefore reaffirms the proposition that countries with an abundance of mineral wealth are likely to suffer greed-motivated rebellion. De Soysa’s research also showed that there is evidence suggesting that a scarcity of renewable resources is a considerable predictor of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{51}

De Soysa also puts forward the idea that states with an abundance of natural resources are more likely to suffer from greed-motivated violence as resource-rich countries tend to become dependent on resource wealth and therefore fail to innovate. This proposition, known as the ‘Dutch Disease’, also effects state-society relations as the government knows it can use natural resources to earn revenue and is not forced to

\textsuperscript{50} Collier, P. 2000, pp. 91-111.
bargain with the public. It is not surprising when a government acts in such a fashion that grievances are likely to come into play if the government is not providing the society with basic needs. As Keen suggests, one needs to investigate how greed generates grievances and rebellion, legitimising further greed.

Analysts such as Collier have associated the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis with domestic actors in civil wars; however the ‘resource curse’ hypothesis can similarly be applied to external actors from surrounding states intervening in domestic wars. Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi gave military support to the various rebel factions opposed to the Congo’s unelected government, while Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia supported the government throughout the country’s nine-year war. A report compiled by the UN on the war and the role of neighbouring states in the conflict showed that exploitation of the Congo's natural resources by foreign armies “has become systematic and systemic”. It claimed that the Presidents of Uganda and Rwanda, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame, were accomplices by failing to prevent associates from enriching themselves and “are on the verge of becoming godfathers of the illegal exploitation of natural resources”. And as Hill has stated in regards to the ten-year war in Sierra Leone,

Taylor spread war, carnage, theft and murder throughout Liberia and into neighboring Sierra Leone and Guinea. Natural resources,
especially diamonds, were used to finance his criminal pursuits… The problem of gangster warlords like Taylor and Saddam Hussein who gain control of a state poses a challenge to the international system. Such "fake states" can no longer be allowed to endanger the system from within… Peace in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and Guinea is interlinked.\(^{58}\)  

In regards to the conflict in the Congo, the think-tank Global Witness has gone as far as to suggest that the actions of Zimbabwe in particular can be described as a ‘new colonialism’. It likens the behaviour of Zimbabwe to European colonial powers given the large scale exploitation of the Congo’s natural resources that was set to occur in payment for the Zimbabwean Defence Force’s support of the Congo’s President Laurent Kabila in the war. In payment for their role in the DRC war, a Zimbabwean company whose board comprises senior Zimbabwean ruling party (Zanu-PF) members and military figures effectively created the world’s largest logging concession by gaining rights to exploit 33 million hectares of forests in the DRC. This comprises 15 per cent of total land area or one and a half times the size of the UK.\(^{59}\)  

Given the behaviour of the neighbouring states in these wars it appears highly likely that economic motivations played at least some role. However, are economic motivations the primary driving force behind surrounding state intervention? Or is it more a combination of factors – political/grievance and economic/greed that results in both the initial and prolonged intervention by neighbouring states?

David Keen argues that civil wars are not static, instead they have often “mutated into wars where immediate agendas assume an increasingly important role”. 60 As a result these agendas may significantly prolong continued conflict, as parties have a vested interest in continued conflict. 61 Mwanasali has also pointed out that civil wars tend to produce a multiplicity of autonomous power centers and agendas along with a continuous shift in the identity of key actors. When substantial economic interests are involved, the decision to start, prolong, or end a civil war is also made possible by the nature of the economic system and the sort of economic gains and incentives it offers belligerents in their pursuit of their political agenda. 62

Paul Orogun has also examined the resource curse hypothesis through a case study of Liberia, which showed how the war in Liberia, which subsequently spread to Sierra Leone, was predicated on and sustained by the exploitation of natural resources. Orogun points out that while economic forces do play an important role in the initiation and perpetuation of conflict in many weak state wars, it should be highlighted that most modern African wars do in fact display crucial elements associated with the politicisation of ethnicity, tribalism, religious-sectarian as well as ethnocommunal, and regional-provincial facets. However, Orogun, like Collier, suggests that many of the organisations fighting in weak state wars under the pretences of ethnic hatreds are not solely focused on political issues, with economic motives playing a large part. The fact that Liberia’s Taylor was participating in the war in Sierra Leone in order to sustain his position makes his motive largely political – the economic concerns are only a means of achieving this. This does not, however,

62 Mwanasali, 2000, pp. 137-152.
make them unimportant; limiting Taylor’s ability to gain access to such resources would have inhibited his capacity for warfare.\textsuperscript{63} Clausewitz claimed that, “[i]t is clear, consequently, that war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means”.\textsuperscript{64} Keen summed this situation up well, suggesting that “[i]ncreasingly, civil wars that appear to have begun with political aims have mutated into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits are paramount. While ideology and identity remain important in understanding conflict, they may not tell the whole story”.\textsuperscript{65}

There is much evidence to suggest that the failure of account for the existence of economic agendas in conflict has, at times, been detrimental to international efforts to secure fragile peace agreements. A better understanding of the political economy of civil wars will help to effectively assist transitions from protracted conflict to more durable peace.\textsuperscript{66} However, the importance of factors such as politics, ethnicity and tribalism also cannot be ignored when attempting to understand the motives of actors in African wars, and particularly for this thesis, surrounding states actors.\textsuperscript{67}

From a theoretical standpoint, Liberal views around the early 1990s predicted a decrease in inter-state wars as international trade and cooperation based on this. While this may have (initially) been the case, the Liberal view has not been able to account for the increase of weak-State wars that have ignited since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, as critical theory would suggest, the international economy and

\textsuperscript{63} Orogun, P. 2003, pp. 295-310.
\textsuperscript{65} Keen, D. 1998, pg. 12.
\textsuperscript{67} Orogun, P. 2003, pg. 295.
economic liberalism has actually produced a situation where resources extracted clandestinely from these wars can be readily sold on international markets. Being able to reap such profits from these wars provides funds for the continuation and intensification of war efforts, therefore increasing their severity and length. This also causes when attempting to apply realist theory to these wars. Given their position in the international political economy, instead of these wars being played out to the end as realists suggest is the road to lasting peace, these wars continue unabated as actors are often benefiting from the situation, or at least able to continue warfare due to the continual availability of fund from the plunder and selling of natural resources.

This thesis will argue, through the use of case studies on Sierra Leone and the Congo, that surrounding states tend to be motivated by a combination of political and economic factors, with the political motivations driving the initial involvement and economic gain providing the means to continue the participation. Given these findings the final chapter will suggest the need for policies that address both the political and economic reasons for participation.

Research and policy promoting peace in Africa is important not just because of the devastation and tragedy that it causes in Africa. As the events of 11 September 2001 have shown with the case of Afghanistan, failed states can be a threat to international stability and security.⁶⁸ A political vacuum in the heart of Africa is a perfect setting not only for various state and non-state actors to replenish themselves and rebuild their strength, but an attractive venue for other groups with aims that directly threaten

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US or other Western interests. In fact, in 2002 the United States government and its European allies began investigating Zimbabwean and Congolese army generals who were accused of exploiting Congo's mineral resources and selling them to radical Islamic organisations and terrorist groups during the Congolese war.70

Furthermore, with the continuation of unrest in oil-rich Sudan which borders nine states, all of which will be affected by the war to some degree, research on the role and motives of surrounding states intervening in African civil wars could play a useful role in developing responses to this conflict, and those like it in the future. 71

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Figure 2.1

SIERRA LEONE

Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas online accessed at www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/sierra_leone.html
CHAPTER TWO: THE SIERRA LEONE WAR

INTRODUCTION

After ten years of civil war, Sierra Leone finally entered a period of peace, maintained largely through the efforts of the UN and Britain in 2001. The war began in 1991 with insurgencies by a rebel group – the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) who claimed to fight for those who had suffered under the rule of the governing group, the All People’s Congress (APC). The tactics used by the RUF, and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) that later joined the RUF, were extremely violent and destructive leaving Sierra Leone ungovernable. Armed self-defence groups formed across the state in response to the predatory acts being carried out by the RUF. The appearance of such groups increased the level of fighting and contributed to the war spreading through most of the Sierra Leonean society. Nearly every household contained a victim and/or perpetrator of violence. The growth of such self-armed groups is important in understanding the dynamics of the war in Sierra Leone.

Also of importance was the role played by external actors, namely Liberia. From the outset, Charles Taylor acted as mentor, trainer, banker and weapons supplier for the RUF. Even though the former warlord denies such accusations, reports suggest he

was still supporting the rebel group in 2001, ten years after the start of the war.\textsuperscript{76} It has been widely reported that participation by Liberia in Sierra Leone’s war significantly lengthened and intensified the conflict there.\textsuperscript{77} In attempting to develop policy towards domestic wars where neighbouring states intervene and are therefore implicit in worsening and lengthening the situation, one must question what drives these neighbouring states to participate in these conflicts.

Political motives have been argued to have played a large part in Liberia’s role in the Sierra Leone war. Some reporters, such as Charles Onunaiju, suggest that Taylor was simply looking to protect his regime at home.\textsuperscript{78} Taylor saw the Momoh government as a hostile neighbour. The Sierra Leone government actively supported the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which was attempting to remove Taylor from power.\textsuperscript{79} However, it has also been suggested on many occasions that Taylor’s willingness to involve Liberia in the Sierra Leone conflict stemmed mainly from the potential economic gain he saw that could be reaped from intervention.\textsuperscript{80} In particular, it has been argued that one of the main reasons Taylor sided with the RUF on one side of the war was so that he could share in the spoils of controlling various diamond mining areas that the RUF were targeting.\textsuperscript{81} Some even suggest that Taylor


\textsuperscript{78} Onunaiju, C. ‘In defence of Charles Taylor’, Africa News Service, 12 February 2004, pg. NA.


\textsuperscript{80} Africa News Service, ‘Sierra Leone’s TRC report: preliminary comments’, 20 October 2004, pg. NA.

was the one who actually gave the idea and means to the RUF to begin and carry on with their insurgencies.\textsuperscript{82}

\textbf{Figure 2.2}

![Charles Taylor](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2963086.stm)

Chapter three will examine Liberia’s role in the war, and show that Taylor was driven to participate in Sierra Leone’s war by both political and economic motives. But first, the following sections of this chapter will give a brief introduction of the political history of Sierra Leone, and Sierra Leone’s war.

**HISTORY**

European contact with Sierra Leone was one of the earliest in West Africa. Sierra Leone was the first West African British colony and is regarded as the first ‘modern state’ in sub-Saharan Africa.\(^3\) Foreign settlement did not occur until 1787, when a group of British arranged for the settlement of hundreds of freed slaves from London to what is now Sierra Leone. The 1790s saw the formation of the Sierra Leone Company by the British government with Sierra Leonean land purchased from local tribal leaders. In 1808 the British Government acquired the land governed by the Sierra Leone Company, making Sierra Leone formally a British Colony.\(^4\) Disease and hostility from the indigenous people eliminated almost the entire first group of returnees. In fact, by and large, the colonial history of Sierra Leone was not placid. The majority indigenous group mounted numerous unsuccessful revolts against British rule and Creole (ethnic group of the freed slaves) domination. Most of the twentieth century history of the colony was peaceful, however, and independence was achieved without violence. In 1951 a constitution was implemented, providing a framework for decolonisation.\(^5\)

Local ministerial responsibility was introduced in 1953, when Sir Milton Margai was appointed chief minister. He became prime minister after successful completion of constitutional talks in London in 1960. Independence came in April 1961, and Sierra Leone opted for a parliamentary system within the British Commonwealth. Sir Milton’s Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) led the country to independence and the

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first general election under universal adult franchise in May 1962. Just before Sir Milton died in 1964, he called for his half-brother, Sir Albert Margai, to replace him as prime minister. Sir Albert soon turned increasingly authoritarian, attempting to establish a one-party political system. However, he met strong resistance from the opposition, the All Peoples Congress (APC), and subsequently abandoned the idea.

In closely contested elections in March 1967, the APC under Siaka Stevens won a majority of the parliamentary seats. Between 1968 and 1985 Stevens destroyed all forms of competitive politics in Sierra Leone. 1973 saw the beginning of a global oil crisis, whilst a simultaneous dip in diamond and iron ore prices was occurring. This allowed for a large deficit in external payments to occur, which should have been countered by cuts in public spending, devaluation of the currency, and export diversification. The Steven’s government, however, continued spending and borrowing unabated, whilst expanding state control over the economy. Inflation reached 50 percent in the 1980s and real wages fell, with public servants, including the security forces, turning to theft of government supplies.

Stevens retired as head of government in November 1985, although he continued his role as chairman of the ruling APC party. In August 1985, the APC named military
commander Joseph Saidu Momoh as party candidate to succeed Stevens, chosen by Stevens himself. Momoh was elected president in a one-party referendum on 1 October 1985.\footnote{Countrywatch.com, ‘Sierra Leone: Political conditions’, online accessed at http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.aspx?type=text&vcountry=153&topic=POPCO on 18 March 2005.} By the time Momoh came to power, the state had already lost legitimacy.\footnote{Chege, M. 2002, pg. 153.} On taking office, Momoh tried to improve the state’s poor political and economic position, as the 1970s and early 1980s had seen steep economic decline and political stagnation. He replaced many of the aging cronies from the Stevens era and set up measures which attempted to promote political liberalisation in the 1990s.\footnote{Riley, S. 1996, pg. 5.}

Nonetheless, the public could not see legitimacy in their government. As public educational and health services deteriorated corruption and illegality became a way of life in Sierra Leone. Transparency was lacking with the Momoh government selling mineral prospecting rights without the knowledge of the other government members or the public. Profits from the sale of these rights were used to ensure the support of factions within the government needed to keep him in power. Disoriented young people turned to violence and often drugs with a number of armed gangs of youths formed to protect and get their own piece of the diamond riches from illicit diamond mining sites that were scattered around Sierra Leone. Other armed groups also rose, some linked to the RUF and some were rogue parts of the army, such as the West Side Boys.\footnote{Reno, W. ‘The Collapse of Sierra Leone and the Emergence of Multiple States-Within-States’, in Kingston, P. and Spears, States within States, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, pp. 49-51.} At the same time political opportunists in Liberia, Libya, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Russia, Lebanon, and Afghanistan were waiting to exploit these youths for their own gain. They looked to ally themselves with the groups that controlled the
diamond areas, knowing they would need a way to get diamonds out for cash or arms.\textsuperscript{97} It is this situation that gave rise to the civil war in Sierra Leone that began in 1991.

**SIERRA LEONE’S CIVIL WAR**

In 1991, civil war broke out in Sierra Leone, resulting in large-scale fatalities throughout the country. It began when the rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), claimed it was going to fight on behalf of those aggrieved by years of nepotism, violence and exclusionary politics practiced under the All People’s Congress (APC) since 1968.\textsuperscript{98} Under the APC and the one-party state system it endorsed, Sierra Leone was characterised by oppressive and predatory rule, an increasingly centralised system of government, and the concentration of power in the capital.\textsuperscript{99} As one author put it,

They behaved as if that country was their fiefdom and that they and only they had the right to govern, even though they were conscious that their attitude was sending Sierra Leone to the gutters. For them power was everlastingly theirs. Many will thus subscribe to the notion that the desperation caused by such deliberate programme of plunder found ready expression in Foday Sankoh's war, which has been blamed for tens of thousands of deaths and injuries. The rebels could be unforgivable for their heinous brutalities on innocent people, but before them another kind of brutality was being committed not with guns and machetes but with power.\textsuperscript{100}

Despite its claims, the RUF was not unlike those it was trying to remove from power.

Its behaviour mirrored that of the APC with acts of plunder, thuggery and systematic

\textsuperscript{97} Chege, M. 2002, pp 154-155.  
\textsuperscript{99} Bangura, Y. ‘Understanding the political and cultural dynamics of the Sierra Leone war: A critique of Paul Richard’s fighting for the rain forest’, *Africa Development*, 22, 1997, pp. 3-4.  
\textsuperscript{100} Momoh, A. ‘Years of nationhood - where does it leave Freetown?’, *The Independent*, Banjul, 29 April 2002, pg. NA.
violence. The RUF committed awful atrocities against the people it claimed to be fighting for, and like the APC, the RUF used disorder and fear in order to secure support.  

The APC government, at the time lead by Joseph Momoh, tried boosting the army’s strength to combat the insurgency, but with little success, especially with diminishing funds to support the expansion of troop numbers. Soldiers went unpaid and on 29 April 1992, Captain Valentine Strasser and several other officers, calling themselves the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), marched to the capital Freetown and overthrew Joseph Momoh in a military coup. However, the NPRC had even greater problems than Momoh in controlling its army and the state as the war continued to take its toll. By 1994, not only had the war extended from the border with Liberia to central parts of the country; but key mining areas such as the diamond-rich Kono District were overrun by rebels. In early 1995, the country’s finance minister estimated that battling the rebels consumed 75 per cent of government spending. The rebels had also cut off Strasser’s regime from its only remaining domestic source of revenue by early 1995 when they attacked foreigners at Sierra Rutile’s titanium oxide mine and at Sierra Leone Iron Ore and Metal Co. Ltd (SIEROMCO), a Swiss-owned bauxite mine. These attacks ended production at both mines, which provided 15 per cent of GNP and in 1994 supplied 57 per cent of the country’s official earnings. A combination of RUF fighters, rogue military commanders, and strongmen controlled a clandestine diamond and agricultural trade worth around $200 million dollars, while government revenue totalled a mere $60

million in 1994 and 1995.\textsuperscript{104} In April 1995 Captain Strasser hired the forces of Executive Outcomes, a private military force. They deployed 100 mercenaries to the conflict, which reached 300 at the height of the conflict, along with 2 helicopters. Executive Outcomes also trained Kamajor fighters, and together with them were able to regain control over all the major mining operation that had been captured by the RUF. However, it was Brigadier Julius Maada Bio that worked more closely with Executive Outcomes as his brother was linked to the company.\textsuperscript{105}

In January 1996, a coup removed Strasser from leadership of the NPRC. The coup leader, Bio, asserted that the major goal of the coup was to establish peace and return the country to civilian rule. Strasser had facilitated some progress towards democratic elections. However, the war continued to devastate the country under his leadership.\textsuperscript{106} Bio arranged for elections in March 1996 in an attempt to return Sierra Leone to civilian rule and negotiated a ceasefire with RUF. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was victorious in the March 1996 elections.\textsuperscript{107} Kabbah was supported by an element of the Civil Defence Force, one of the most powerful groups, called the Kamajors who were of Mende ethnic group.\textsuperscript{108} The RUF’s worst extremes – decapitation, cutting off the hands of civilians and burning villages – followed its denunciation of this election.\textsuperscript{109} Richards has argued that those who joined the RUF and carried out such atrocities were generally members of the Sierra Leone society who were poor and who struggled for survival. He goes on to suggest they never benefited from natural

\textsuperscript{109}Ero, C. 2003, pp. 237-240.
resources riches of the Sierra Leonean state, nor were they given opportunities to better themselves, under the APC government.\footnote{Richards, P. Fighting for the rain forest: War, youth and resources in Sierra Leone, James Currey, Oxford, 1996, pp. 25-26.} However there are other arguments, such as that by Gberie in 2005, that attest that the idea of a ‘rebellion’ from the underprivileged in Sierra Leone society at the time is not an accurate depiction of the situation that produced the rise of the RUF. Gberie suggests that the RUF was more a form of criminal ‘warlordism’ or “organised mass delinquency”\footnote{Gberie, L. A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone, Hurst & Company, London, 2005, pp. 7-8.} given its main aim was plunder and looting of resources, not social protest.\footnote{Gberie, L. 2005, pp. 7-8.} As will be seen in this thesis, even if the RUF’s initial basis was that of social protest, they soon became primarily interested in plunder and the potential gain from attaining and selling natural resources gained through warfare.

In 1996, a peace agreement was reached between President Kabbah and the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, stipulating a promise to disarm and demobilise. In practice, the accord never took effect. Sankoh continued the RUF insurgency campaign and less than a year later, in March 1997, he was arrested on arms charges in Nigeria. His arrest effectively derailed the peace process.\footnote{Countrywatch.com, ‘Sierra Leone: Political conditions’, online accessed at http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=153&SECTION=SUB&TOPIC=POP&TYPE=TEXT on 15 October 2003.}

The RUF joined with a group of disaffected soldiers called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). This cooperation, headed by Johnny Paul Koroma, led to the overthrow of President Kabbah on 25 May 1997.\footnote{Ero, C. 2003, pg. 237.} The international community did not approve of the new government and by June 1997, Sierra Leone
had been diplomatically isolated.\textsuperscript{115} With the assistance of the Nigerian-led ECOWAS, the AFRC/RUF were eventually pushed from Freetown and on 10 March 1998, Kabbah's former administration was restored to power and all international sanctions against Sierra Leone were lifted.\textsuperscript{116}

Meanwhile, a peace accord was prepared providing for the reinstatement of the Kabbah government, as well as a process of disarmament and demilitarisation by the AFRC/RUF. In spite of this, however, conflict continued between the AFRC/RUF and the governmental forces loyal to Kabbah. In December 1998, the AFRC/RUF initiated an offensive from Liberia, acquiring the diamond rich Kono district and the regional capital, Makeni. The earnings allowed the AFRC/RUF to build up its resources. As a result of these events, on 6 January 1999 the rebels invaded Freetown. Heavy fighting followed between AFRC/RUF forces and pro-Kabbah forces; the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops took up arms in support of President Kabbah. In three weeks they had removed the rebels from Freetown, although fighting was uninterrupted elsewhere.\textsuperscript{117}

Despite progress made towards implementing a peace agreement that the government and RUF rebels signed in July 1999 in Lome, human rights abuses and other violations continued.\textsuperscript{118} Due to this, ECOMOG forces withdrew, replaced with an 11,100 strong United Nations peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) headed by the British.

\textsuperscript{116} Ero, C. 2003, pg. 238.
A fragile peace was sustained until early May 2000 when 500 peacekeepers were taken hostage by Sankoh’s forces. Just prior to this event, the RUF and AFRC split as Koroma grew tired of Sankoh’s attempts to single-handedly control the movements of the alliance. Subsequently, the AFRC joined the Sierra Leone government and United Nations forces in working towards his capture.\textsuperscript{119}

Sankoh was eventually caught on 17 May 2000 by Mustafa Kamara, a former militia soldier, who captured him after a brief gun battle. Kamara originally took Sankoh to the headquarters of Koroma. After that, he was then turned over to British soldiers, who were in Freetown as part of an 800-man contingent sent to support the UN peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{120}

In November 2000, after Sankoh’s capture, the RUF signed a new cease-fire agreement with the government of Sierra Leone. Under this agreement, the RUF had undertaken to stop obstructing the work of UNAMSIL, and to give it access to areas under its control. It also arranged to return weapons stolen from UNAMSIL. However, the RUF stopped short of the United Nations demands by refusing to surrender the mines, disarm or demobilise. In the absence of Sankoh's leadership, the RUF seemed to follow the line that “\textit{Tifman noh lehk in kohmpin}” (a thief dislikes his fellow thief). In November, the RUF split into two factions, making enforcement of the new cease-fire virtually untenable and renegotiating the agreement very


\textsuperscript{120} Fennell, T. and Fofana, L. ‘Snaring the lion: In Sierra Leone, the capture of rebel leader Foday Sankoh triggered dancing in the streets of Freetown’, \textit{Maclean's}, 29 May 2000, pg. 34.
difficult. Furthermore, UNAMSIL suffered from a continued lack of support, with decisions by Nigeria, India and Jordan to withdraw their contingents from the peacekeeping force.

The British, who sustained a peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone alongside, but separate from, the UNAMSIL mission, strengthened their troop numbers by 500 in November 2000. By the end of 2000, it began to look like the end of the civil war might be near. Throughout 2001, the United Nations mobilised what was, at the time, the largest peacekeeping force in the world in Sierra Leone. Although fighting occurred, mostly along the border and in diamond-rich regions, the government, the United Nations peacekeeping and British forces were able to secure the majority of the country. By May 2001, the largest RUF faction agreed to a disarmament program and the release of child soldiers, along with demobilising and reintegrating into society.

On 18 January 2002, the head of the United Nations Military Mission in Sierra Leone, General Daniel Opande, declared the civil war in the West African state to be over. The statement followed the return of weapons by eleven senior officers of the RUF and the government-backed Kamajors. 45 000 fighters of the RUF, Kamajors and the AFRC had also disarmed prior to Opande’s announcement. May 2002 saw the re-election of Sierra Leonean President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who received 70.6 per

cent of the votes cast, and was sworn into office for another five years. The former rebel RUF was unsuccessful, not winning any seats, but received 1.7 per cent of the votes cast. 125

Ten years of war in Sierra Leone left the small country battered and impoverished, with over 50,000 killed, half the population displaced and more than two thirds of its already extremely limited infrastructure destroyed. 126 In the years following the war, efforts in the country focused towards reconstruction, rehabilitation and reintegration, though thousands of internally displaced people and returnees from neighbouring countries remained unable to resettle. While the task was huge, and the challenge daunting; public facilities are slowly being restored. In 2001 Britain offered assistance to the Sierra Leone government in the rebuilding of government offices, court houses, police stations and houses for all the 148 paramount chiefs in the country. A ‘new’ Sierra Leone army and a police force has been developed with international funding and the British Army provided training, equipment, ammunition, vehicles, uniforms, technical support and other logistics. With this external support the Sierra Leone Police Force, previously well-known for its corruption and exploitation, began to turn around its bad image. 127

However, a number of officials in the government elected in 2002 were reported to still have links to their dubious pasts in 2005. For example, some still were still involved with militia that committed atrocities during wartime, which makes one question their motives. Corruption is still rampant and entrenched social problems

continue to exist. Many government ministers and senior officials rarely left Freetown, where they lived under much better living conditions than the majority of the population. For the victims and veterans of Sierra Leone's vicious wars little has changed. As Ellis has noted, “Some former fighters say they would pick up arms again at the first opportunity; at least the militias provided them with jobs. If the UN and the British leave Sierra Leone in the near future, there is every reason to believe the state will once again collapse”. 128

So apart from all of the internal strife, the other major aspect of Sierra Leone’s civil war was the external actors that became entangled in the war. The most dangerous actor in Sierra Leone was the neighbouring state of Liberia. The following chapter will examine the role played by Liberia in the Sierra Leone war, and more importantly, Liberia’s motive for intervening in the war.

CHAPTER THREE: LIBERIA’S ROLE IN THE SIERRA LEONE WAR

Under its leader, former rebel Charles Taylor, Liberia’s role was that of a predatory state. Liberia’s support of the RUF, has been well documented, going back before the RUF’s first insurgency.¹²⁹ By and large, analysts conclude that Taylor played an active role in initiating and sustaining the RUF war effort by providing it with a significant military capacity. However, there are mixed reports in regards to the extent of Taylor’s involvement. Some analysts argue that Taylor only supported the RUF in its initial stages.¹³⁰ However, others contend that he was still involved in the Sierra Leone war after the placement of the UN embargoes on Liberia in May 2001, which banned sales of diamonds from Liberia and prohibited travel by many Liberian officials.¹³¹ These embargoes were introduced as strong evidence suggested that Taylor was benefiting from his support of the RUF as he was earning revenue from Sierra Leone diamonds from areas that the RUF controlled.¹³² The following sections will examine the extent of Liberia’s involvement in Sierra’s Leone’s war through its support of the RUF; what affect this had on the conflict; and what exactly drove Taylor to initiate and continue Liberia’s involvement in Sierra Leone’s civil war.


While Taylor later denied his involvement in the war in Sierra Leone\textsuperscript{133}, in 1991 he stated that Sierra Leone would “taste war” for supporting ECOMOG, and openly bragged that his own fighters were operating “15 miles inside Sierra Leone”.\textsuperscript{134} It has also been reported that RUF communication declaring the war on the BBC came through Taylor’s satellite telephone link in Gbanga (Liberia), suggesting further that the initial RUF rebellion was launched from within Liberian territory.\textsuperscript{135}

The reaction to the initial RUF invasion in 1991 by the Momoh government was one of uncertainty over its causes and implications. Taylor’s influence was apparent from the start; however, it was not entirely clear as to why Liberia was involved. By and large, the Sierra Leone Government did not take seriously the BBC announcement made by Foday Sankoh that this marked the start of the liberation of Sierra Leone, and neither did many outsiders. Officials claimed that the voice that they heard was Liberian, not Sierra Leonean. Militarily the attack was treated as an incursion controlled by Taylor and the NPFL,\textsuperscript{136} and this is not surprising as, at this stage there were approximately 1500 NPFL soldiers in Sierra Leone working together with the RUF.\textsuperscript{137}

While in the early stages it is widely acknowledged that Taylor was supporting the RUF in their attempts to destabilise the leadership in Sierra Leone, by late 1992 there were rumours of a split between the RUF and Taylor’s Liberia. A common

\textsuperscript{135} Richards, P. 1996, pg. 19.
interpretation of the situation was that there was a fall-out between Sankoh and Taylor over a mining deal that had gone bad.\textsuperscript{138}

West African journalist Ankomah claimed in 1995 that while Taylor did support Sankoh in the initial stages, from August 1992 when Liberia’s two provinces on the border with Sierra Leone were seized by the anti-Taylor (and anti-RUF), ULIMO forces, Taylor’s supply lines to Sankoh were cut. Ankomah suggested that there was no way Taylor could reach Sankoh through territory held by ULIMO. And geographically, Ankomah added, Burkina Faso and Libya could only supply Sankoh through Guinea which was even more anti-RUF.\textsuperscript{139}

Rake and Saccoh reiterated in 1995 that

\begin{quote}
Originally the RUF were supplied militarily from the same sources as Charles Taylor – from Libya, the Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. But their hit-and-run guerrilla tactics have been so successful of late and their connections with different factions in the army so well established that an increasing number of weapons now come from internal sources.\textsuperscript{140}
\end{quote}

The Africa Contemporary Record (1992-94) stated that most of the NPFL and its Burkina Faso auxiliaries pulled out of the RUF insurgency in 1993.\textsuperscript{141} Richards also claimed that the Liberians were withdrawn after arguments between Sankoh and Taylor over the amount to be paid to them for the capture of the two main urban centres in the south and the east, Bo and Kenema.\textsuperscript{142}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item 140 Rake, A. and Saccoh, S. July/August, 1995, pg. 15
\item 142 Richards, P. 1996, pg. 8.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In a RUF policy statement put out in February 1993 RUF leader, Sankoh, said, “We admire Mr Taylor and the many Liberians who stood against [Liberia’s] Samuel Doe’s despotic rule”. 143 In the same article Sankoh asserted that the war in Sierra Leone was the people’s war. However, as reporter Addai-Sebo wrote at the time, Sankoh’s biggest problem with the ‘people’s war’ was his relationship with Charles Taylor across the border. At that time, the official Freetown version was that Sankoh helped Taylor in his war against Doe, so Taylor was using the RUF to fight a proxy-war in Sierra Leone. 144

ECOWAS, whose peacekeeping arm ECOMOG was engaged in a struggle with Taylor’s NPFL in Liberia in that period, said that Taylor used the RUF to pressurise Joseph Momoh to remove the ECOMOG supply base in Freetown. Both Sankoh and Taylor refuted this. The RUF said in February 1993 that it had “never knowingly recruited or deployed Liberians or any foreign nationals to fight alongside the RUF as government sources have often made the international community to believe”. 145

Sankoh rejected the notion that his ‘struggle’ as being a spillover of the Liberian war. “Believe it or not, we have our own aims and objectives,” he stated. 146

When asked whether he knew Charles Taylor, Sankoh said, “[i]t’s just like asking if Lumumba, Cabral or Mugabe knew Kwame Nkrumah. The nature of our struggle determines the alliances that can be forged in our self-interest.” 147 He went onto say that,

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144 Addai-Sebo, K. 1993, pp. 12-14.
… initially we made several approaches to those whom we felt would be able to assist us. Some, including Charles Taylor, were sympathetic but were limited in what they could do. Nevertheless we went ahead because our reading of the situation on the ground was correct.\textsuperscript{148}

He also suggested that,

> Strasser had issued orders for foreign troops to leave Sierra Leone. But later he went to see Rawlings in Accra and Babangida in Lagos, and changed his mind. We have maintained that the problem is purely an internal problem. We are executing a self-reliant struggle. We, Sierra Leoneans picked up arms to free ourselves from a rotten system. Why should the credit be given to Charles Taylor? Eh, why should he get the credit … Strasser & Co say some of my fighters speak Liberian English? Yes, some of them have been to Liberia to earn a decent living. They have come from the Ivory Coast, Guinea, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia. When many heard about us and our objectives they decided to join us to liberate our country. They are not Liberians!\textsuperscript{149}

And there was this statement in 1995 by analyst, Ankomah,

> While it is true that the RUF received initial encouragement and support from Charles Taylor’s NPFL across the border, it soon became clear that Foday was his own man and had planned the insurgency for years. He was only biding his time to strike at the right time.\textsuperscript{150}

\textbf{CONTINUATION OF INVOLVEMENT 1994-2001}

Despite the claims by some actors in, and analysts of, the Sierra Leone war that Taylor’s support to the RUF was discontinued in 1992, many others argued in the years after right up until the end of the war in Sierra Leone in 2002, that his support for the RUF was continual.

\textsuperscript{148} Addai-Sebo, K. 1993, pp. 12-14.
\textsuperscript{149} Addai-Sebo, K. 1993, pp. 12-14.
For example, a later edition of the *Africa Contemporary Record* suggested that the RUF became an arduous military opponent during 1994-96 mainly due to external support, the collusion of armed regulars and the unpopularity of the NPRC. External support for the RUF, it argued, came primarily from President Taylor in Liberia, Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso, Muammar Qadhafi in Libya and some parts of the elite from Cote d’Ivoire. After assisting in the launch of the RUF, it wrote, Taylor became its chief external patron through whom the movement regularly traded diamonds for weapons. In fact, it claimed, that Taylor and Compaore’s interest was the most important factor that kept the conflict from ending.\(^{151}\)

The *African Confidential* claimed in 1997 that many recruits spoke Liberian-style pidgin English, suggesting the RUF's links with Charles Taylor's fighters are still active.\(^{152}\) ECOMOG Commander of the 26th Infantry Brigade Colonel Buhari Musa, who was in charge of the centres of Bo and Kenema, said in 1998 that Charles Taylor's government in Liberia was aiding the former Armed Forces Revolutionary Council junta in carrying out armed attacks in several parts of the (Sierra Leone) country.

> Junta forces are receiving support from Liberia, where they are being trained and armed,” Colonel Musa said, he went on to add, “fifteen Kamajors (members of a pro-government militia made up of traditional hunters) who were recently abducted by the rebels are currently being held in Liberia.\(^{153}\)

> “Charles Taylor is the man who bankrolled the rebel war in this country, and he seems not to be satisfied yet”, said former civil servant Sia Jatta of Freetown in


1998. ECOMOG officials also confirmed the reports. “We don't know their casualty figures, but what we are sure about is that a good number of them (Liberian soldiers) are currently in the net as war prisoners”, an ECOMOG official said. Furthermore, the same article pointed out that President Taylor of Liberia was one of the main campaigners for the release of the RUF leader, Corporal Foday Sankoh, from a Nigerian jail, where he has was briefly imprisoned when he was captured by Nigerian soldiers as a part of the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone. In 1999, the Sierra Leone government continued to accuse neighbouring Liberia of supporting the destabilisation campaign of former junta forces, the AFRC, which was, at the time, linked to Taylor’s other ally the RUF.

In June 2000 the Financial Times reported that Sierra Leone government officials in Freetown found documents which they believed proved the long-held suspicion that Sankoh's rebels sold illicit gems to buy guns - and that they were helped by Charles Taylor. As the article stated, “The book entry shows that 220 diamonds worth about $2.5m locally were mined in a single day on 9 January 1999 at [Kono]. Between October 30 1998 and January 1 2000, the RUF sold 10,137 Kono diamonds through the murky channels of the world's illicit diamond market”.

The documents suggested that the RUF continued trading in illicit diamonds even after the controversial peace deal was signed in July 1999. This deal gave Sankoh a

role in the government as head of a proposed commission responsible for marketing the country's diamonds. According to a confidential RUF report dated 27 September 1999, one of the movement’s commanders describes how he was instructed to take diamonds to a “business associate” of Sankoh for the “procurement of military equipment”.  

In June 1998 the UN Security Council banned the provision of “arms and related material” to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone, including the RUF. Western intelligence officials, at the time of one article in 2000, were convinced that Liberia was the RUF’s principal weapons supplier as well as a sanctuary for the movement. “Taylor is an integral part of the RUF,” said a western intelligence official. “There is no interest in stability in Sierra Leone”.  

The *Financial Times* also reported in 2000 that Burkina Faso provided end-user certificates for arms and served as a conduit for weapons destined for the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front. These were channeled through Liberia, they suggested, where President Charles Taylor was confirmed as a significant beneficiary from the conflict in his neighbouring state. It was also reported that arms-buying was funded by sales of diamonds worth between $25m (£17m) and $125m a year, with Gambia, Guinea and Ivory Coast as well as Liberia acting as transit centres.  

The European law enforcement investigations that commenced soon after September 11 2001 also reported that millions of dollars worth of West African diamonds had been bought by al Qaeda through channels set up by Taylor and Burkina Faso’s President Blaise

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Compaore. It claimed that Taylor was paid $1 million for facilitating the deals, with the majority of the diamonds coming from the RUF in Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{163}

Overall, while Liberia under Taylor occasionally showed signs of disengaging itself from the Sierra Leone conflict, its actions overwhelmingly pointed towards continued involvement in the war. Ero pointed out in 2003 that, RUF leader, Sankoh, and Taylor were inextricably allied through the diamond fields that the RUF controlled in the eastern district of Kono, and which Taylor used to maintain his international and regional business contacts.\textsuperscript{164} As Ero suggests,

Taylor not only sustained warfare in the country, but shaped Sierra Leone’s rebel forces and by implication, the internal violence that plagued the country. Moreover, Taylor exported the internal security dilemmas confronting his leadership in Liberia to Sierra Leone and also Guinea.\textsuperscript{165}

The most damning evidence that Taylor was still actively participating in Sierra Leone through his support of the RUF came in 2000 and 2001. The initial catalyst to the exposure of Taylor’s role in the Sierra Leone war was the report ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security’ by Partnership Africa Canada.\textsuperscript{166} This report, which documented the role diamonds and the Liberian government were playing in fuelling the war in Sierra Leone compelled the UN

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{164} This has also been pronounced by the PAC and the UN in the following documents, Smillie, I. Gberie, L. and Hazleton, R. ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security’, Partnership Africa Canada, Jan 2000; UN, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000)’, paragraph 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, December 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Ero, C. 2003, pg. 243.
\end{itemize}
Security Council to respond on the issue. Assessments of the Sierra Leone conflict were consequently carried out by a number of bodies such as the EU and the UN. The European Union agreed on 13 June 2000 to halt the allocation of 50m Euros ($47.5m) of aid to Liberia because of the West African country’s support for rebels in Sierra Leone. Foreign ministers, meeting in Luxembourg, expressed “deep concern” that Charles Taylor had failed to act to prevent arms reaching the rebels and that illicit diamond trade continued through Liberia. The EU called on Liberia to behave in a “responsible and consistent way” over Sierra Leone and suggested its failure to do so could threaten its membership of the Lome convention, through which aid was channelled.167

The UN employed a Panel of Experts to assess the Sierra Leone war and in particular Liberia’s role in it under the leadership of Taylor. The Panel was established in 2000 after concern was expressed over the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transited neighbouring countries, including the territory of Liberia.168 The Panel found strong evidence suggesting that Taylor was still heavily involved in the Sierra Leone war at the time the report was compiled. In particular, it found that diamonds represented a major and primary source of income for the RUF and that the bulk of RUF diamonds left Sierra Leone through Liberia. Furthermore, it found that such illicit trade could not be conducted without the permission and involvement of Liberian government officials at the highest levels.169

President Charles Taylor is actively involved in fueling the violence in Sierra Leone, and many businessmen close to his inner circle operate on an international scale, sourcing their weaponry mainly in Eastern Europe... Liberia has been actively supporting the RUF at all levels, in providing training, weapons and related material, logistical support, a staging ground for attacks and a safe haven for retreat and recuperation, and for public relations activities.\textsuperscript{170}

The Panel also found that several Liberian-registered planes outside the formal controls of the Liberian government were being used by arms dealers. It recommended that planes bearing Liberian registration be grounded wherever they were found unless they could provide correct documentation and meet other requirements. Arms dealers from Africa and the Middle East were using Liberian registration to ship illicit goods, the Panel suggested. Among dealers the Panel cited was Sanjivan Ruprah of Kenya and Victor Bout, who was said to operate from Sharja in the United Arab Emirates. Another businessman described as close to Mr. Taylor was Talal el-Ndine, whom the Panel described as a wealthy Lebanese who acted as paymaster for the Revolutionary United Front.\textsuperscript{171}

The Panel presented by the panel claimed it provided unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that the Government of Liberia was actively supporting the RUF at all levels. In December 2000, one of the Panel's experts, Ian Smillie of Canada, told reporters that the evidence against Mr. Taylor was “100 per cent” solid.\textsuperscript{172}


Overall, the Panel, found that Security Council sanctions on both weapons and diamonds were being broken with impunity. The Panel also made wide-ranging recommendations, calling for, among other things: a global certification scheme for diamonds; an embargo on weapons exports from specific producer countries; a travel ban on senior officials from Liberia; and the creation within the United Nations Secretariat of the capacity for the ongoing monitoring of Security Council sanctions. Twenty-six speakers addressed the Council in the daylong discussion, with many calling for the imposition of new measures that would stem the illicit trade in Sierra Leone diamonds, as well as the flow of illegal weapons into that country. They also stressed the need to effectively address the role of Liberia and other countries in fuelling the conflict. The UN Secretary-General said he agreed with the experts that, based on unequivocal and overwhelming evidence, Liberia had been actively supporting the RUF at all levels in providing training, weapons and related material, logistic support, a staging ground for attacks and a safe haven for retreat and recuperation.173

**AFTER THE 2001 EMBARGO**

Following the Panel’s recommendations in 2000, the Security Council adopted resolution 1343 of 7 March 2001, which saw an arms embargo on Liberia (788 - 1992) reapplied and a Panel of Experts created with a mandate for a period of six months. Furthermore, the resolution indicated that if the Government of Liberia did not meet the demands specified by the Security Council within two months, all States would be mandated to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct import of all

rough diamonds from Liberia. The demands included that the Government of Liberia immediately cease its support of the RUF in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region; expel all RUF members from Liberia; cease all financial support and in accordance with resolution 1171 (1998), military support to the RUF, including all transfers of arms and ammunition, all military training and the provision of logistical and communications support; cease all direct or indirect importing of Sierra Leone diamonds which are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the Government of Sierra Leone, in accordance with resolution 1306 (2000). A selective travel ban on a number of senior Liberian Government officials was also imposed.

The Liberian government contested the UN report compiled by the Panel of Experts on conflict diamonds which recommended the sanctions be imposed. In a press statement signed by deputy minister of state for public affairs and press secretary to the president, the government fiercely denied any involvement in the illicit diamond trade that had been influential in the prolonging and severity of Sierra Leone’s civil war.

The government of Liberia… views this move as a deliberate attempt by the outgoing Clinton Administration and the British government to destabilise the Liberian government and cause the imminent overthrow of its President… The government of Liberia has been aware of a campaign on the part of those governments to unduly influence the outcome of the UN report, and to sway international public opinion through unilateral actions and the release of unsubstantiated information to the international press.

176 Flomoku, P. ‘We are no scapegoats’, New African, 393, February 2001, pg. 9.
177 Flomoku, P. ‘We are no scapegoats’, New African, 393, February 2001, pg. 9.
The statement also said Liberia was disappointed that the UN report failed to mention that the UK had no known diamond deposit, and yet it is the largest exporter of rough diamonds to Belgium.\(^{178}\) Taylor went on to suggest that the sanctions renewed on Liberia were a ploy by these powerful nations to interfere in the democratic process of Liberia. He claimed that the support for the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) by powerful nations was an attempt to keep this country engaged in crisis management over an extended period of time.\(^{179}\) Taylor’s government began battling the LURD in 1999, when the LURD began to attack key mining areas and towns close to the capital. The LURD was a group of rebels made up of Liberian dissidents and mercenaries left over from the 1989-96 civil war who appeared to lack a clear political leader or ideology,\(^ {180}\) but appeared to have the support of the US and Britain.\(^ {181}\) Taylor argued that the sanctions were a part of fulfilling the West’s desire that eventually his government would lose control, anarchy would enter, and then they (the powerful nations) would come to install their own government.\(^ {182}\)

The Panel of Experts’ report of 2000, however, found unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia was actively supporting the RUF at all levels. This included providing training, weapons and related materials, logistical support, a ground from which to stage attacks and safe havens for recuperation. Evidence that RUF troops were being trained in Liberia at Gbatala, Gbanga and elsewhere was confirmed in both oral testimony and in the form of written reports of RUF commanders to Foday Sankoh. The Panel detailed innumerable accounts through police and military

\(^{178}\) Flomoku, P. ‘We are no scapegoats’, *New African*, 393, February 2001, pg. 9.


\(^ {180}\) *The Economist* (US), ‘Charles Taylor's new-found land Liberia's mini-war’, March 2, 2002, pg., NA.


intercepts of high-level meetings between the RUF and President Taylor, RUF travel to Monrovia and the appearance of RUF camps on Liberian territory. There were also numerous eyewitness accounts of RUF fighters being treated in Liberian hospitals. As the RUF had no access to the sea, weapons had to be arriving through another state's airstrip. It was found that weapons used by the RUF came, by and large through air to Liberia and then via truck or helicopter to Sierra Leone.\(^{183}\)

Under pressure from other West African countries, the UN gave Liberia two months to show it had ended its support for the RUF. The deadline expired on 7 May 2001, a few days after Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, reported that Liberia had failed to cut its ties with the rebels.\(^{184}\) When sanctions were revisited in November 2001, Expert Panel member, Jagdish Koonjal of Mauritius, stated on the matter that the good news was that the Government had taken some encouraging measures to execute some of the demands of Security Council resolution 1343. It had grounded all the Liberian registered aircraft, and the civil aviation authorities in Liberia were working towards identifying and localising the registered aircraft. Also, there had been no recorded export of diamonds since the embargo was imposed on Liberian diamonds in May. The travel ban, which the Panel deemed to be the most efficient sanction, was seen to be working well.

However, there were still strong concerns over the persistent relationship between the Government of Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone. Regardless of the promises


\(^{184}\) The Economist (US), ‘Diamonds are a war's best friend; West Africa's three-country war; the Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea mess’, 12 May 2001, pg. 5.
made by the Government of Liberia that it had curtailed its ties with the RUF, the Panel reported that was not the case. RUF units were implicated in the sustained fighting in Lofa County in Liberia. The operative section of Security Council resolution 1343 was based on measures that would break down the relationship and support that the Government had been providing to the RUF. The main direction of the Security Council's action had been towards putting an end to the destabilising role President Charles Taylor had been playing in the region.\(^\text{185}\)

Another Expert Panel member Gerard Corr of Ireland said the report was crucially balanced. It acknowledged areas where the Liberian authorities made legitimate efforts to comply with the demands of resolution 1343 (2001), whilst also highlighting blatant and systematic breaches of the arms embargo by the same authorities. Mr. Corr said the Council did not accept that, because there had been progress, the Council should not consider additional sanctions measures. He also pointed out that the Council demanded in March 2001 that the Government of Liberia cease its support for the RUF, and the Council had not seen any indication of a demonstrable change in the attitude of the Monrovia authorities in that regard. Mr Corr suggested that if the 2002 January summit produced tangible results, that would be welcomed heartily.\(^\text{186}\) However, even by mid 2002, no conclusive evidence suggesting that Taylor had ceased supporting RUF combatants was found, even as

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\(^{185}\) *UN (M2 Presswire)*, ‘Expert panel on Liberia presents report to Security Council, with proposals for furthering peace in Mano River Region; violations of bans on arms, diamond export, official travel investigated; Liberia's Foreign Minister says report does not address government's compliance - Part 2 of 2’, 6 November 2001, pg. 1.

\(^{186}\) *UN (M2 Presswire)*, ‘Expert panel on Liberia presents report to Security Council, with proposals for furthering peace in Mano River Region; Violations of bans on arms, diamond export, official travel investigated; Liberia's Foreign Minister says report does not address government's compliance - Part 2 of 2’, 6 November 2001, pg. 1
Sierra Leone attempted to build its fragile peace by demobilising and reintegrating the fighters.187

“None of the figures match with each other, and they show significant discrepancies, illustrating the urgent need for independent auditing and oversight,” 188 a report presented by the Panel in April 2002 said. It also called for an extension of the arms embargo, saying it had found “credible evidence” that Liberia was still buying arms and providing new weaponry to its soldiers in violation of the embargo, even as Sierra Leone moved toward peace after a decade of civil war. The panel favoured keeping the travel ban, which it said a few officials had been able to flout by obtaining passports with false names and travelling through Abidjan, where Ivory Coast officials turned a blind eye. As for the ban on diamond exports, the panel said rough diamonds originating in Liberia had disappeared from official markets and production had declined as a result of the sanctions, although some black market trade most likely continued.189 Subsequently, the UN Security Council reinstated sanctions in May 2002, sustaining the previously emplaced arms embargo, ban on selling diamonds, and travel restrictions on top government officials and their families.190

Nineteen months after its eleven-year civil war was declared over, Sierra Leone began attempting to bring to justice “those who bear the greatest responsibility for war

crimes and crimes against humanity”.

On 10 March 2003, under the codename, Operation Justice, the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued its first public indictments and carried out its first arrests, targeting top commanders of armed groups, including the prominent cabinet minister and national commander of the civil defence forces Chief Sam Hinga Norman of the SLPP. On 4 June 2003, it took a more dramatic step, one that upset a number of capitals, including Washington, and brought it into the global spotlight. As President Charles Taylor of Liberia travelled to Ghana for peace talks, Prosecutor David Crane unsealed an indictment originally issued against him on 3 March 2003, served an arrest warrant on Ghanaian authorities, and transmitted the warrant to Interpol. Taylor resigned on 11 August 2003, under pressure from Liberian rebels and international leaders, including US President George Bush Jnr. Taylor lived in exile in Nigeria until 2006, which gave him asylum in exchange for resigning.

The above section shows the early and continued role that Liberia played in the Sierra Leone war. The additional arms and troops that Liberia brought to the Sierra Leone conflict undoubtedly contributed to the prolonging and worsening of the war. But what exactly drove Taylor to involve Liberia in this war? The following section seeks to answer this question.

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Liberia’s Motives

While there is much evidence to suggest that Taylor was involved in the Sierra Leone war at least up until the embargos were established in 2001, and even after that, contention abounds the question of what Taylor had to gain from his part in the war and therefore what his exact motive was for the involvement. Taylor and his government are yet to admit to their role in the Sierra Leone war after 1993. Subsequently, they are unforthcoming with explanations as to what their motive was for their (alleged) doing so. One only has Taylor’s initial threat that Sierra Leone would ‘taste bitterness’ for its earlier support of the ECOMOG intervention (under the Momoh government) that Taylor felt in the beginning prohibited his rise to power. Some analysts such as Onunaiju suggest that Taylor’s motive was entirely political, based on retribution for Sierra Leone’s support of ECOMOG and also the idea that if his ally, RUF leader Sankoh, was in power as opposed to a NPRC/ACP leader, Taylor may be able to prevent anti-NPFL Liberian dissidents from gathering in Sierra Leone and planning attacks on Liberia from there.\(^{194}\) However, many analysts, such as Nanka and Koroma, suggest that while there may have been some political motivations, Taylor was largely involved in the war for economic gain through the RUF gaining control of resource-rich areas.\(^{195}\) The next section will look at both of the main sets of reasons, political and economic, in an attempt to gain an understanding of what drove Taylor to be involved in, and hence play a role in prolonging, the Sierra Leone war.

\(^{194}\) *Africa News Service*, ‘In defence of Charles Taylor’, 12 February 2004, pg. NA.

POLITICAL MOTIVES

As mentioned above, it has been suggested that Taylor’s involvement in the Sierra Leone war was primarily in retaliation for then President of Sierra Leone Joseph Momoh’s decision to send peacekeepers to support ECOMOG in Liberia. This was a move that Taylor felt had prevented him from taking the Liberian presidency earlier. RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, who had problems with the Sierra Leone leadership for years, fought alongside Taylor against Samuel Doe in the struggle for control of Liberia. The alliance between the RUF and Taylor provided Sankoh and the RUF with financial and logistical support to carry out their goal of destabilising the Sierra Leone government. The widespread belief in Monrovia was that the alliance allowed Taylor an opportunity to ‘invade’ Sierra Leone with an aim to putting pressure on Sierra Leone to remove the ECOMOG supply base in Freetown.\textsuperscript{196}

However, in Sierra Leone on 29 April 1992, soldiers led by Captain Valentine Strasser overthrew President Joseph Saidu Momoh, after his soldiers abandoned the battlefront in the south where they had been fending off the Liberian guerrillas supported by Charles Taylor. Momoh then fled to neighbouring Guinea and Strasser appointed himself military ruler. In spite of this Taylor continued his support of the RUF, which leads one to suggest that Taylor’s vendetta against Momoh was not the only driving factor in his involvement in the Sierra Leone war.\textsuperscript{197} As one analyst suggested, Momoh’s government ignored the threat made by Taylor for them to cease their support for ECOMOG, and Sierra Leone paid the price, yet is unclear whether

giving into Taylor would have produced a different result in regards to his involvement in Sierra Leone’s war.\footnote{198}{Legum, C. (ed) \textit{Africa Contemporary Record 1992-94}, 23, Africana Publishing Company, New York, 2000, pg. B174.}

Taylor’s position in regards to ECOWAS and its military arm ECOMOG also changed in the mid-1990s. In 1996, a peace agreement was signed by the warring factions in Liberia, including Taylor’s NPFL at an ECOWAS conference, thus showing signs of cooperation. A disarmament program was also initiated under this 1996 peace agreement.\footnote{199}{Countrywatch.com, ‘Liberia: Political conditions’, online accessed at http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=99&SECTION=SUB&TOPIC=POP&TYPE=TEXT on 27 February, 2004.} Furthermore, in late 1995, Taylor was reconciled with Sani Abacha, Nigeria’s military ruler and subsequently ECOWAS supported Taylor in the 1997 presidential elections that brought him to power.\footnote{200}{The Economist (US), ‘Vacant possession: Liberia. (possible 1997 elections)’, 342:8013, 19 April 1997, pg. 45.} ECOWAS continued its support for Taylor in a range of capacities until his departure.\footnote{201}{Africa News Service, ‘Government against new peace Initiative - Taylor tells ECOWAS military mission’, 13 June 2002, pg. 1008164u2049.}

After this, however, it seems that Taylor still saw political reasons for supporting the RUF in Sierra Leone and subsequently prolonging the war there. For as one rebel loyal to Taylor suggested,

\ldots I think the old man (Charles Taylor), the Liberian President wants his buddy (Foday Sankoh) to be in power in that country so that no one can infiltrate into Liberia using that country. I am sure he may do the same thing to Guinea to have all the neighbouring countries on his side since he already has Cote d'Ivore on his side.\footnote{202}{Africa News Service, ‘Liberia shouting peace while whispering war?’ 25 January 2000, pg. 1008021u7387.}
This is important as the Sierra Leone government under Momoh supported the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO). ULIMO was a coalition of anti-Doe Krahn and Mandingo elements that brought its war against Taylor from bases in neighboring Sierra Leone to the very outskirts of Monrovia, was also armed and in the absence of a buffer zone at the porous northeastern frontier it continued to sneak in guns. Under Strasser and for a short period, Kabbah, ULIMO still managed to use Sierra Leonean soil to threaten Taylor’s regime in Liberia, quite likely made possible with support that ECOMOG provided for them.

In the long run, the presence of Liberian refugee fighters in Sierra Leone tended to hinder a resolution of the conflict because they brought the Liberian civil war to Sierra Leone. Taylor’s NPFL, ULIMO, and other factions in the Liberian civil war operated freely in the Sierra Leone countryside after the 1991 invasion. The presence of ULIMO forces, which were closely allied to former President Doe, further complicated matters. By allowing ULIMO combatants to rearm or bring their weapons into Sierra Leone, the Momoh government transformed Sierra Leone into a battleground in the Liberian civil war.

Sierra Leone justified its support of ULIMO on Taylor’s continued support for the Sierra Leonean rebel group, the RUF. Taylor’s support of the RUF started long before the Sierra Leone government began supporting ULIMO, and may have been just as strong even without Sierra Leone’s support of ULIMO. However, Momoh and

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203 Executive Mansion by The Press & Public Affairs Department, ‘We know them well!’ online accessed at http://www.theperspective.org/mansion.html on 03 January 2005.
206 Ankomah ,B. 1992, pg. 15.
the following governments in Sierra Leone that sided with ULIMO may also have exacerbated tensions in the region and contributed to the unwillingness of Taylor to want to cease supporting the RUF.

However, in 1998 Taylor appealed to the then Sierra Leone President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, in a set of meetings which Taylor was said to have organised to discuss the volatile security situation in the sub-region, and especially along the Mano River which borders Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. Liberia's delegation was led by Senator Kekura Kpoto who told President Kabbah that

The Liberian President and indeed, the entire government is prepared to work closely with President Kabaah to ensure peace and stability in the two countries… President Taylor's fears are that dissident Liberians are reportedly regrouping in Sierra Leone to destabilise Liberia.  

The delegation also acknowledged that former NPFL fighters were, up until that time, helping the rebels of the ousted Armed Forces Revolutionary Council who continually caused insecurity in Sierra Leone's eastern districts. “President Taylor's government will do all in its power to stop Liberian mercenaries from crossing the border into Sierra Leone to aid the junta troops,” Kpoto said. This admission by Taylor's government of former NPFL fighters inside Sierra Leone was a complete turn around from past denials by Taylor and his Defence Minister, Daniel Cheah, that Liberian fighters were helping the ousted junta troops.

“The tables have turned”, said Bockarie Sillah, a war correspondent for a local newspaper. “Mr Taylor is now trying to woo President Kabbah, so that dissidents may

208 Fofana, L. 1998. pg. 1
209 Fofana, L. 1998. pg. 1
210 Sillah, B. quoted in Fofana, L. 1998. pg. 1
not invade Liberia and unseat him”. President Kabbah assured the Liberian delegation that his government would not tolerate any dissident group using Sierra Leone's territory as a launching pad for attacks on Liberia. “My government will arrest and extradite any Liberian dissidents who may want to use Sierra Leone as a base to destabilise Liberia,” the President told Kpoto and his delegation. At a similar meeting two weeks earlier in Freetown, the Liberian delegation stressed the need for a bilateral military pact between Liberia and Sierra Leone. President Taylor earlier also approved the deployment of ECOMOG troops alongside UN monitors on the Sierra Leone/Liberia border.

Despite the later cooperation between Taylor and Kabbah, the political motivations of Taylor at least up until 1998 played a role in prolonging the Sierra Leone war. As one author suggested, West Africa now bears most of the traits of Central Africa, which has been devastated by a regional war, and which will be examined in the following chapter. To address the regional dimension, ECOWAS and the wider international community must deal with the growing tendency of leaders in West Africa to sponsor rebellions abroad to protect their positions at home. Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire have all employed rebel groups either to get rid of their domestic enemies or to remove neighbouring leaders they do not like.

However, as the Panel showed in late 2000, Taylor’s support of the RUF continued even after Kabbah ceased to allow any Liberian dissident groups to regroup in Sierra

211 Sillah, B. quoted in Fofana, L. 1998. pg. 1
212 President Kabbah quoted in Fofana, L. 1998. pg. 1
213 Fofana, L. 1998. pg. 1
Leone.\textsuperscript{215} Such behaviour tends to suggest that Taylor was not only trying to protect his position in Liberia through promoting a leader to power in Sierra Leone who would support his cause, but also suggests there were other motivations. This leads us to the next section which will examine the theory that Taylor was driven to both start and continue supporting the RUF by the prospect of economic gain.

**ECONOMIC MOTIVES**

Taylor’s persistent support of the RUF even after he began cooperation with ECOMOG and Kabbah, coupled with his particular interest in the diamond-rich areas and credible reports that he was benefiting from Sierra Leone’s resources, suggests that economic motive may well have influenced his decision to initially take part, and continue taking part, in the war.\textsuperscript{216}

In the Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) report released in 2000, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security’, it was reported that during the 1990s, diamonds were imported into Belgium from Liberia on a large scale, even though Liberia possessed very few diamond mines itself. As stated in the report:

\begin{quote}
In 1988, before Liberia erupted, the country exported US $8.4 million worth of diamonds, including a great many smuggled Sierra Leonean diamonds. In 1995, when Liberia lay in ruins and economic activity was almost non-existent, it exported US $500 million worth of diamonds, according to HRD statistics. This is more or less supported by IMF trade returns
\end{quote}


which show estimates of Belgian imports from Liberia at US $309 million in 1994 and $371 million in 1995.217

Taylor’s intricate links with the RUF who controlled some of the primary diamond producing areas in Sierra Leone led the report to suggest that Sierra Leone’s diamonds were being extracted by the RUF and sent to Liberia for sale through illicit channels, with both large and small companies playing a part in the laundering of the stolen diamonds.218

As the report goes on to say:

In conclusion, there is little doubt that Liberia has become a major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity, with connections to smuggling and theft throughout Africa and considerably further afield. In return for weapons, it has provided the RUF with an outlet for diamonds, and has done the same for other diamond producing countries, fuelling war and providing a safe haven for organized crime.219

Masland, Bartholet, Dickey, and Lorch suggested that the diamond trade in Sierra Leone did not just benefit RUF leader Sankoh and those loyal to him in Sierra Leone. The leaders of Burkina Faso and Liberia, together with Sankoh, effectively formed a diamond-smuggling cartel. Charles Taylor first helped Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaore to take power in a coup in 1987. Taylor successfully used his country’s historical role as a regional hub for smuggled diamonds. Liberia became a “major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity, with connections to guns, drugs

and money laundering throughout Africa”. 220 In a UN hearing on the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone in 2000, the United States and Britain openly accused Burkina Faso and Liberia of supporting the RUF by trading arms for diamonds – both countries strongly denied the allegations. 221

Illicit trade in Sierra Leone was estimated to be worth as much as US$70 million per year, nearly 90 per cent of diamonds mined in Sierra Leone were believed to be smuggled out by RUF rebels, mainly via Liberia and Burkina Faso. Liberia has a domestic diamond mining capacity of 150,000 carats per year. In 1999, Liberia exported 6 million carats to Belgium alone. 222 Facts such as this paint a relatively clear picture of Liberia’s role in the Sierra Leone war and, in particular, its role in the extraction and theft of Sierra Leone’s diamonds. Liberian President Charles Taylor's regime in Monrovia, the main beneficiary of the RUF's smuggled diamonds, kept up plentiful supplies of arms and material to both wings of the RUF. Any UN strategy needed to take into account the continued sponsorship by both Taylor and his ally, Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré. 223

On 13 June 2000 at a European Union meeting, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook produced a new intelligence dossier on Taylor's military support for the RUF. This showed in detail how Taylor benefited from the smuggled Sierra Leone diamonds passing through Monrovia and concluded that the Liberian leader's strategy was to maintain his influence over eastern Sierra Leone through the RUF, amid the breakdown of all state authority in the area. The Cook report was convincing enough

221 Rutch, H. ‘Diamonds are the heart of the matter’ UN Chronical, 37:3, 2000, pg. 64.
222 Rutch, H. 2000, pg. 64.
to persuade the other EU ministers to agree to freeze a two-year, 48 million Euro (US$47 million.) development aid programme for Liberia.\textsuperscript{224}

Taylor’s sponsorship of the RUF rebellion in Sierra Leone infuriated Western powers. On 17 July 2000, after meeting Taylor, US Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering expressed deep concern about Liberia’s negative role in diamond and arms smuggling in Sierra Leone, adding that unless Taylor cut ties with the RUF, Washington would further downgrade its relations with Monrovia and might impose sanctions.\textsuperscript{225} Further evidence was found in 2000 when a western intelligence official said Liberian bank accounts under observation showed payments from Liberia to Libya. These funds were suspected to have been acquired by Liberia through the sale of stolen Sierra Leonean diamonds and were believed to be payment for arms from Libya.\textsuperscript{226}

Overall, as has been shown in this chapter there is significant evidence that Taylor wanted to control the diamond rich areas in Sierra Leone through his support of the RUF for the purpose of self-enrichment. There is also strong evidence to suggest that the arms he purchased were then used to both protect Taylor’s position at home, but also to sustain the RUF position of control over the main diamond producing areas in Sierra Leone, therefore perpetuating and prolonging the Sierra Leone war.

\textsuperscript{224} \textit{Africa Confidential}, ‘Sierra Leone: Godfather to the rebels’, 41:13, 2000.
\textsuperscript{225} \textit{Africa Confidential}, ‘Cross-border crisis’, 41:15, 2000.
CONCLUSION

The regional aspect of the Sierra Leone war was an extremely important factor in the way the war was played out, its length and its severity. Without Taylor’s meddling in the war it is possible, if not likely, that the war would have been shorter, causing potentially less devastation to the Sierra Leone population. From this case study it can be seen that political motivations, in this case Taylor’s bitterness in regards to the Momoh government supporting ECOMOG in Liberia and Taylor’s wanting to control surrounding states so that his position was protected at home, can be extremely important in a leader’s decision to get involved in a surrounding state’s war. However, while this may be the initial reason for involvement, in this case the support of the RUF, it could be seen later that the economic motive, the potential to gain from the war by way of extracting diamonds from Sierra Leone, began to play a primary role in sustaining the war effort. Taylor had come to an agreement with the Kabbah government, to disallow Liberian dissidents from grouping in Sierra Leone and causing potential problems for Taylor from there. Despite this agreement Taylor continued to contribute to the destabilisation of Sierra Leone with his support of the RUF, whilst also profiting from the sale of the illicit diamonds channeled out of Sierra Leone with the help of the RUF.

Therefore one can see that while political motives may drive the initial intervention by the neighbouring state, it is the promise of economic gain that sustains it. This trail of events was devastating for the people of Sierra Leone, whose country was not only ravaged by war and extreme violence, but who also lost a huge source of income that could have been used to better the livelihood of the average person in Sierra Leone.
Sierra Leone is not the only case in Africa where a domestic war has taken on a regional aspect, with surrounding states becoming involved for both political and economic reasons. Central Africa has seen the same process occur there, in fact to an even greater extent, with more states involved in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and to a lesser extent Angola and Namibia, involved in the conflict. The next chapter will examine the war in the DRC and how surrounding states prolonged and intensified the conflict there. Like Sierra Leone, the following chapter will show that neighbouring states are motivated to participate in domestic civil wars in weak states by both political and economic reasons.
Figure 3.1

Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

CHAPTER FOUR: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO WAR

INTRODUCTION

Since August 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been home to a multi-state war so extensive that it has been depicted as ‘Africa’s first world war’. By April 2003, the war in the DRC had taken more lives than any other since World War II in what was described as the deadliest documented conflict in African history. A mortality study released at that time by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimated that since the war erupted, through to November 2002 when the survey was completed, at least 3.3 million people died in excess of what would normally be expected during this time. The worst mortality projections even in the event of a lengthy war in Iraq, and the death toll from all the recent wars in the Balkans, do not come close to these figures. Nonetheless, the crisis has received scarce attention from international donors and the media.

The war erupted in 1998 after the late President Laurent Kabila, disassociated himself and his government from the two neighbouring states that had assisted in bringing him to power in 1996, Rwanda and Uganda, after President Mobutu Sese Seku’s 32 years of kleptic state's actions, supported the discontent rebel group, the

Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), which seized much of the eastern Congo, however within months the group began to fracture.

In November 1998 the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) was formed. Supported solely by the Ugandans, the MLC was based in, and therefore controlled, the North-Western Equateur Province. Furthermore, as relations between Rwanda and Uganda soured and cracks in the RCD widened, the RCD split into RCD-Goma (RCD-G), aided by Rwanda alone, and RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K) supported entirely by Uganda. These groups fought not only against Kabila’s Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) but against each other for control of regions and therefore resources as well. Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and to a lesser extent, Sudan and Chad, came to the Congolese President’s aid, producing a scenario involving the armies of eight African states. While the involved surrounding states generally intervened to support their own political motives at home, it is also likely that economic reasons for participation also existed. For the Congo boasts many precious resources, including Coltan (Columbium-tantalite), gold, diamonds and timber, and there is substantial evidence of surrounding state actors benefiting from the spoils of the Congolese war. It has

234 Weinstein, J. M. Summer 2000, pg. 11.
been suggested, with significant data to verify it, that the intervening states’ propensity to continue fighting in the Congolese war made possible by the economic rewards reaped through participation in the conflict. Henceforth, the economic rewards gained through activity in the Congo war significantly prolonged and intensified the conflict.\footnote{238}

Historically, Congo has been at the centre of successive scrambles for Africa.\footnote{239} However in the recent war, those with economic and political plans for the Congo come not from Europe but from within the African continent itself.\footnote{240} This chapter will give a brief introduction into Congolese history leading up to the war and will then take a look into the war itself. Chapter five will then examine the role played by surrounding states in both the initiation and the prolonging of the war, and will also assess what motivated the regional actors to participate in the Congolese conflict. It will suggest that while political motivations initially led the surrounding states to participate in the Congolese war, in multiple cases the economic spoils gained from doing so have resulted in an unwillingness of external actors to disengage from the conflict. As with the case of Sierra Leone, this behaviour by the intervening states has resulted in a prolonging of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the loss of many Congolese lives that could otherwise have been avoided.

\begin{footnotes}
\item 240 \textit{Africa News Service}, ‘Rice briefs Senate Africa Subcommittee on Congo war’, 11 June 1999, pg. 1008161u4551.
\end{footnotes}
**HISTORY**

While one would expect that an abundance of natural resources would be a positive characteristic for any state, the DRC and its peoples, since the beginning appear to have suffered due to its resource endowment. External actors, going back as far as the Congo’s colonisation by Belgium, have consistently sought to maximise their own profits, as opposed to acting in the Congo’s best interest.\(^{241}\) The absence of democracy and popular will through Mobutu’s usurpation of power in 1960, 1965 and 1992, and through Kabila’s self proclamation in 1997, were made possible by the external backing and/or endorsement that these actions attained in the international community. For those external forces with a vested interest in the Congo’s enormous size, geographical location and abundant resource endowment, it is preferable to deal with rulers which can be influenced and manipulated, rather than democratically elected leaders who are accountable to their national constituencies. Overall, in 40 years of existence as an independent state, the Congo has only known two democratically elected heads of government, Patrice Emery Lumumba and Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba. They each held effective power as prime minister only briefly, Lumumba from 30 June to 13 September 1960, and Tsheikedi from 30 August to 30 November 1992. Both tenures were ended by a military takeover by Mobutu, on 14 September 1960 and 1 December 1992, respectively.\(^{242}\) With democracy absent for numerous decades the Congolese state by the early 1990s was weak to the point of failure, and it is from this situation that the Great Lakes war broke out in 1998.\(^{243}\) This section will examine the Congo’s history leading up to the war in an attempt to explain, in part, the break out of conflict in 1998.

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\(^{241}\) Moore, D. April 2001, pg. 36.
In 1885 King Leopold of Belgium set up his personal rule in the Congo.\textsuperscript{244} He carved his own private colony out of 100 square kilometres of Central African rainforest.\textsuperscript{245} The Congo was considered Leopold’s property, under Belgian’s constitution he was unable to use state monies to fund his colonial endeavour, so he proceed to make funds by exploiting the Congo’s resources. Of the resources that were immediately available, including rubber and ivory, villagers were forced to produce and hand over to Leopold’s government a certain amount or they would risk punishment. Soon there was not enough rubber, people were unable to make their quotas and the punishments became harsher with many Congolese being killed.\textsuperscript{246} Between 1900 and 1945 peasant uprisings and urban rebellions regularly took place, which by 1956 had developed into mass nationalism and an immediate call for independence by a coalition name Alliance of the Kongo People (Abako).\textsuperscript{247} In May 1960 elections were held and to the surprise of the Belgians the electoral contest was won by the radical nationalists including Patrice Lumumba, Christophe Gbenye, Antoine Gizenga and Pierre Mulele. The Belgian government was unable to prevent the appointment of Lumumba to Prime Minister and of Joseph Kasa Vubu, the veteran Congolese nationalist, to the position of president.\textsuperscript{248}

The Congo gained independence from Belgium in June 1960. During the 80 years of colonial control under Belgium, the Congolese people were never prepared for self-

\textsuperscript{244} Hochschild, A. \textit{King Leopold’s ghost}, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1998, pg. 86.
\textsuperscript{247} Nzogola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pp. 13-89.
rule. Owing to this was a lack of political and administrative experience that became evident during the initial five years of sovereignty. Indigenous skill and experience in managing cultural diversity, nation-building, civil-military relations, development administration and international relations were largely absent.\textsuperscript{249}

Only a few days after independence, the mineral-rich Katanga Province took up arms to defend its own ‘independence’ under the leadership of the wealthy and politically powerful, Moise Tshombe. The attempted secession by Katanga was supported by decision makers in Belgium, along with the majority of Europeans that still resided in the Province.\textsuperscript{250} With as much as 80 per cent of the Congo’s export wealth located in Katanga, Belgian corporate interests such as the Union Miniere unsurprisingly wanted to retain power there.\textsuperscript{251} The Katanga secession movement was instigated by the Belgians and was the strongest due to the involvement of Belgian troops, mercenaries and financial support from Western mining interests.\textsuperscript{252}

However, Katanga was not the only region where moves toward secession were being made. In South Kasai another strong push towards secession was under way, and it was during this situation of army mutiny and multiple drives for secession that President Kasa Vubu attempted to extricate Lumumba against popular will, and Mobutu staged his first military coup in September 1960 with the support of the US.\textsuperscript{253} Although Mobutu actually only controlled Leopoldville with Kasa Vubu still technically in power, with Stanleyville still under Lumumba’s grasp, Kalonji in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{249} Kibasomba, R. 2003, pg. 254
\item \textsuperscript{250} Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pp. 94-95.
\item \textsuperscript{251} Edgerton, R.,2002, pp. 185-190.
\item \textsuperscript{252} Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pp. 94-95.
\item \textsuperscript{253} Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pg. 108.
\end{itemize}
control of Kasai and Tshombe still in power in Katanga, Mobutu behaved as if he were the leader of the entire Congo.\(^{254}\)

Despite his removal from power by Kasa Vubu, Lumumba and the Congolese nationalists continued their plight to gain their rightful leadership over the Congolese state. Mobutu ordered the capture of Lumumba, however Lumumba eluded capture and went under UN protection, yet was later arrested trying to leave the UN guard.\(^{255}\)

The war against the Congolese nationalists met its peak when, on 17 January 1961, Lumumba and two of his closest associates were assassinated in Katanga, which was then being propped up by Belgian military and government personnel.\(^{256}\)

The exact details of who ordered Lumumba’s execution, and which actors were involved, remains shrouded in controversy. However it is generally agreed that both internal and external actors were involved. It is suspected that the move was agreed upon by Mobutu, Kasa Vubu, Tshombe and their Belgium advisors, however some have implied the US was also involved.\(^{257}\) Credible research by De Witte established that Belgium's African Affairs minister at the time of Congo's independence, Harold d’Aspremont Lynden, called for Lumumba’s ‘definitive elimination’ in a memo written on 5 October 1960. “It was Belgian advice, Belgian orders and finally Belgian hands that killed Lumumba on the 17 January 1961”,\(^ {258}\) he states. He goes on to point


\(^{258}\) De Witte, L. 1999, pg. xx.
out that the CIA had already abandoned its plans against Lumumba by the beginning of December 1960. 259

In January 1963 after two unsuccessful earlier attempts, the Katangese secession was brought to an end with the UN Indian Brigade under the direction of U Thant, taking Jadotville and Kolwesi. The overall effect of the ending of the Katanga secession was unfortunate in that the interest shown in the Congo quickly waned thereafter. For although the Katanga secession was a problem, an even larger problem loomed and that was the breakdown of law and order throughout the country and the inability of the central government to do anything effective about it. It should have been the overriding concern of the UN to address itself to this problem. 260

Despite Mobutu’s first coup, between 1960 and 1965 Kasa Vubu remained precariously in power with the support of the UN until Mobutu placed him under house arrest in 1965. 261 After Lumumba’s death, except for Pierre Mulele, who led the insurrection in Kwilu, the top leaders of the movement were neither revolutionaries nor democrats. They were largely politicians whose foremost interest was to regain the power they had lost after Lumumba’s assassination. Their inability to apply good governance in the liberated areas, their tendency to turn to the divisive politics of ethnicity to hold on to power, and their consistent politics of nepotism, corruption and repression could only prevent democracy from thriving in the Congo.

259 De Witte, L. 1999, pg. xx. Note: De Witte’s expose produced a further inquiry that re-examined the role played by the US in Lumumba’s death.


and laid the foundation for Mobutu’s second coup attempt and taking of power in November 1965.\textsuperscript{262}

**MOBUTU’S SECOND COUP**

In 1965 Mobutu seized power over the Congolese state, which he renamed ‘Zaire’ in 1971. Mobutu acquired continued US backing by giving the US access to Soviet-backed Angola, which shared borders with the South-west of the Congo.\textsuperscript{263} As noted by scholar Michela Wrong, Mobutu inherited the Belgian Congo, and treated it similarly.\textsuperscript{264} “Zaire under Mobutu has become almost a caricature of an African dictatorship”,\textsuperscript{265} Chris Simpson wrote in 1990. He also described it as “autocratic to a fault”, with its resources “shamelessly squandered”.\textsuperscript{266} Mobutu Sese Seko oversaw a kleptocracy of the highest order for 32 years. Once the ruling elite and their transnational corporation allies had taken their slice of Zaire’s mineral wealth, barely any of these profits found their way back to civil society. As Thompson points out, “…in Mobutu’s pirate state, self-interested extraction became both an art form and an end in itself”.\textsuperscript{267}

Initially, however, Mobutu’s role proved successful. With the state territorially re-united after multiple attempts at secession, and a military ‘strongman’ replacing the squabbling politicians, Zaire could look forward to economic development. Good relations existed with external powers and the high price of copper on the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{262} Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pg. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Africa News Service, ‘RDC: High hopes’, 7 February 2004, pg. NA.
\item \textsuperscript{264} Wrong, M. *In the footsteps of Mr Kurtz: Living on the brink of disaster in Mobutu’s Congo*, Perennial, New York, 2002, pp. 113-130.
\item \textsuperscript{266} Simpson, C. ‘Africa’s absolutist’, *West Africa*, 3793:752, 1990, pg. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{267} Thompson, A. *An introduction to African politics*, Routledge, London, 2000, pg. 205.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
international commodity markets also helped. Yet within ten years Zaire had commenced its slide towards state collapse. Mobutu’s political decisions propelled the Zairian state into a crisis of both accumulation and governance. Zaire’s crisis of accumulation was created by a combination of bad policies and blatant corruption. Development mistakes and unproductive investment ruined both the industrial and rural sectors. At the top of government and of corruption therein was Mobutu himself. He accumulated between $US5 billion and $US8 billion worth of assets, much of it deposited into Swiss bank accounts.

By the 1990s the patronage systems Mobutu had employed for decades to consolidate his power over the state began to collapse due to a combination of external and internal factors. These patronage systems that Mobutu developed to cement his power base in the 1970s and 1980s have been referred to by Thomas Callaghy as “Zairian absolutism of effective patrimonial control”.

It was this collapse of the patronage systems in the 1990s that led to Mobutu’s overthrow by Laurent Kabila in 1996.

Zaire followed a familiar path to other African countries in the post-colonial period, with Mobutu overseeing the centralisation of the state and a personalisation of power. Mobutu himself dominated the legislature and judiciary as well as the executive roles of the state. Sources of opposition were systematically removed by co-option.

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harassment, imprisonment, exile and assassination. It was also made clear to all those in positions of power that they owed their status specifically to Mobutu’s patronage.\textsuperscript{273}

While the political elite enjoyed the spoils of the Zairian state that access to state institutions brought, most individuals within Zaire gained little from their government. Members of civil society were the victims of a declining economy, public services were diminishing, and they were often treated badly by corrupt officials. However, there was no constitutional way of removing Mobutu and his kleptocratic elite. Challenges to Mobutu’s regimes were brutally repressed; therefore opposition parties were non-existent. Until the final days, this violence was unchallengeable by civil society and civilians reacted by disengaging from the state.\textsuperscript{274}

Mobutu’s eventual downfall was precipitated not by a civilian uprising, but largely by internal economic constraints; and external circumstances made possible by a change in both the global political and economic climate, starting in the 1980s and coming to a head in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{275} Mobutu’s politics of patronage had left him heavily reliant on the availability of external wealth, which up until 1990 was readily at his disposal as Mobutu allowed Zaire to be used by the US as a base for attacking its Soviet-backed neighbour, Angola. With the end of the Cold War, the United States also no longer needed to support Mobutu in order to keep Zaire as an anti-Soviet pawn. It subsequently revoked its support after 32 years and more than US$400 million in

\textsuperscript{273} Thompson, A. 2000, pg. 208.
\textsuperscript{274} Thompson, A. 2000, pg. 208.
\textsuperscript{275} Wrong, M. 2002, pp. 250-267.
weapons and training.\textsuperscript{276} Not only this, but some foreign powers, such as Belgium, began to openly back his rivals.\textsuperscript{277} Furthermore, after the conclusion of the Cold War, creditors’ impatience with Mobutu’s failure to keep to his promises lead them to decide to withhold any further loans until Mobutu produced results in the area of economic reform. By 1994 Zaire was expelled from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).\textsuperscript{278} A lack of progress towards democratisation and clear cases of appropriation of funds by Mobutu also saw aid from both the United States government and the World Bank withdrawn. With the economy in this state and external support dwindling, Mobutu was increasingly unable to reward local strongmen for their loyalty to his regime.\textsuperscript{279}

Nonetheless, Mobutu’s remarkable success at co-opting and balancing different political factions previously financed with external sources of income, encouraged him to persist in past practices even when these external resources suddenly declined around the end of the cold war. Mobutu’s first response was to intensify old strategies. His clear monopoly over the distribution of resources to a single patronage network dissuaded him from innovating even as the pace of change quickened in the late 1980s. However, strongmen soon found that changing conditions afforded them new opportunities to profit on their own, and enterprising politicians used old positions of privilege to take advantage of new opportunities and resources offered by defection from the president’s networks.\textsuperscript{280}

\textsuperscript{277} Braeckman, C. ‘Le dinosaure, Quelles sanction contre Mobutu?’, \textit{La Cite}, 11 Feb 1993, pp. 279-315 in Reno, W. pg. 157.
The weak economic base of the state meant irregular pay, inadequate training and a lack of trained officers and non-commissioned officers for the Zairian military. A direct result of this was rampant undisciplined behaviour by the regular military. For the rest of his rule, Mobutu had to rely on a good intelligence service and his elite Special Presidential Division (DSP) soldiers. He provided better pay and equipment for these two forces, to secure their continued backing of the regime. He also prevented military action against his regime through other methods of divide and control. For example, the DSP was predominately of Ngwandi origin, Mobutu's own ethnic group. He also continuously promoted and transferred divisional and brigade commanders of the regular military in an attempt to undermine any support base they may otherwise develop. These moves by Mobutu were simply a band-aid response to the problem and by 1996 the Zairian army could hardly be considered a national army, but rather a collection of armed factions. These factions reflected different social interests and were only nominally subject to military discipline and hierarchical command.

Overall, the neo-patrimonial state became unable to fulfil basic state functions, including its function as security guarantor and service provider, particularly for the eastern region and its diverse groups. Discontent among those within the Congolese population excluded from Mobutu’s system of patronage was intense. In order to upkeep his politics of patronage, despite funds available to do so shrinking, Mobutu had preceded to cut the already small amount allocated to providing public

services further. This produced a decline in living standards for the average Congolese person from an already extremely low situation.\textsuperscript{284}

With dwindling funds to reward military and local strongman support of his regime and growing displeasure among the Congolese population after the Cold War, the situation was ripe for Laurent Kabila’s ADFL with the support of Rwanda and Uganda to orchestrate the overthrow of Mobutu. The Zairian forces had already responded to rebellions in the Katanga region in the 1960s and insurgencies in the same area in 1977 and 1978. There was also minor unrest in northern Shaba during 1984-1985, and the northeastern Kivu and Haute-Zaïre regions bordering Uganda and Sudan experienced several insurgencies throughout the 1980s and the 1990s.\textsuperscript{285} However, against the insurgency by Laurent Kabila’s ADFL, and particularly due to Rwandan and Ugandan support the ADFL received, the fragmented Zairian forces were ill-equipped and unprepared to prevent the overthrow.\textsuperscript{286} Mobutu employed a contingent of European mercenaries, however, they were unable to make a decisive difference to the outcome of the conflict. As the ADFL forces acquired territory, foreign firms and informal businesses became sources of income to them. The ADFL could henceforth deny resources and territory to the Mobutu regime, while recruiting youths and maintaining ADFL structures. Under military pressure from the ADFL, senior officers of Zaire forced Mobutu to accept defeat and allowed for Kabila’s attainment of power in a military capacity.\textsuperscript{287}


\textsuperscript{286} Bratton, M. 1997, pg. 88.

\textsuperscript{287} Matthee, H. 1999, pp. 88-104.
KABILA’S RISE TO POWER

In late 1996, with strong support from Rwanda and some assistance from Uganda, the army of guerrilla leader, Laurent Kabila, attacked Congolese forces in the Northeast – straight across the Rwandan border. Mobutu had angered the Tutsi leaders in the neighbouring states of Rwanda and Uganda by allowing Hutu militia in exile after 1994 genocide in Rwanda to relocate, remilitarise and regroup on Congolese territory. This concerned the Tutsi leaders, as they feared their regrouping close to Rwanda’s borders would allow the Hutu to continue on their way to conquering Rwanda and completing their genocidal plan of wiping out the entire Tutsi population. Mobutu did nothing about them for two and half years whilst they used refugee camps in Kivu to raid Rwanda on a continuous basis and to organise the slaughter of Tutsi citizens and residents in the Congo. Uganda and Rwanda thus had strong security concerns driving their involvement in the Congo.

While it was initially a localised rebellion, as Congolese troops went into a full retreat, Kabila pushed to overthrow the fragile Mobutu government. Kabila’s rebels, who were predominantly Tutsi, were then backed up by even more Rwandan troops, who by and large came to control the war effort. For Rwanda the war had two purposes: to eliminate the Rwandan Hutu warriors who had fled to the Congo in 1994 after massacring more than 800 000 Tutsi and who continued to cause problems in Rwanda by way of cross-border military excursions; and to remove Mobutu from power, as it was he who had harbouried the criminals. As Rwanda clandestinely provided troops for the battle, the Rwanda/Kabila combatants quickly moved east

toward the capital, Kinshasa, slaughtering tens of thousands of exiled Rwandan Hutu as they scrambled to flee on foot across the country. Cities, towns and villages fell to the advancing forces, and soon the army of Mobutu began to deteriorate and flee, but not before stripping local villages on their way through. In May 1997, seven months after the war had begun; Mobutu departed the country and escaped to Morocco where he died.²⁹⁰

Although it is unlikely that Kabila’s seizure of power in May 1997 would have been successful without external support,²⁹¹ the removal of Mobutu was widely regarded as a revolution. In fact, the internal, regional and international consensus against Mobutu’s regime gave the movement a degree of approval and legitimacy in spite of it undermining the democratisation process initiated by the National Conference that was in process at the time.²⁹² However, soon after Kabila declared himself President, he came under increasing pressure from his own people. Accused of being a puppet of Rwanda, Kabila eventually dismissed Tutsi commanders from the army command,²⁹³ and allied himself with the now Congo-based genocide leaders of the Hutu exile community.²⁹⁴ He then proceeded to order all Rwandan troops out of the country. Angered by Kabila’s actions, the Rwandan government withdrew its military, but within one month it had returned, only this time on the side of a rebellion aimed at

²⁹² Kibasomba, R. 2003, pg. 257.
removing Kabila from power. Both Rwanda and Uganda were fixed on placing the Congo within their spheres of influence.

Not only this, but in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of Congo as Kabila renamed it, the war evolved as a product of state collapse in the face of the continued ‘privatisation’ of the national budget. There were large discrepancies between the expectations that Kabila would transform the Congolese political arena and the reality that he continued to plunder the country as his predecessor had done. In Goma and some Eastern parts of the country, the conflict involved ethnic tensions. And in Kantanga and some Eastern parts of the country it was a nationalist war of secession. The Congolese war also began as a conflict among strongmen vying for power. And lastly, it was a war of plunder, with local powers standing to profit from Congolese diamond and natural resource wealth as will be shown in this chapter.

To fend off Rwanda’s increasing political and military control – which was seen as the best-organised and most efficient army in the region – Angola and Zimbabwe joined the war to support Kabila. Uganda then sent in additional battalions in support of Rwanda, bringing the total number of its soldiers to 10 000, while Burundi’s army, under Tutsi control and sympathetic to Rwanda came into play also. Chad and Namibia also sent their forces to back up Kabila.

295 Shearer, D. 1999, pg. 94.
Overall, the states supportive of Kabila seem to have been driven mostly, in the initial stages at least, by the ideology of sovereignty. If Rwanda and Uganda were able to begin controlling areas and political conditions in the Congo, what was stopping them from doing so in other nearby African states? For Uganda and Rwanda, their security concerns which had driven the initial intervention in support of Kabila actually worsened under his leadership, despite the fact that security arrangements were signed by the Kabila regime with Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Kabila was unable to prevent rebel Hutu groups from Rwanda and Uganda from carrying out attacks from the Congo, while concerns of ‘Tutsi hegemony’ amongst the Congolese population continued to grow, making the situation even harder to control. Economic incentives also played a major role in some surrounding states’ decisions to involve themselves in the Congolese war, namely Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and to some extent Namibia. In particular, the economic rewards reaped from involvement in the Congolese war appear to have prevented disengagement from the war by a number of those intervening states. As stated in the New African Magazine,

The regional conflict that drew the armies of seven African states into Congo has diminished in intensity, but the overlapping micro-conflicts that it provoked continue. These conflicts are fought over minerals, arm produce, land and even tax revenues. Criminal groups linked to the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the government of Congo have benefited from the micro-conflicts. Those groups will not disband voluntarily even as the foreign military forces continue their withdrawals. They have built up a self-financing war economy centred on mineral exploitation. The governments of Rwanda and Zimbabwe, as well as powerful individuals in Uganda, have adopted other strategies for maintaining the mechanisms for revenue generation,

many of which involve criminal activities, once their troops have departed.302

The overall result of the domestic situation in the Congo and the meddling in this situation by surrounding states was a complicated and entangled war which lasted for more than three years, involving seven African nations.303 The next section will provide a brief outline of the Congolese war.

**THE CONGO’S CIVIL WAR**

In August 1998, rebellion broke out again in eastern Congo, yet, as mentioned previously, this time Kabila’s opponents were aided by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. The Congolese rebel group Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) was the initial recipient of Rwandan and Ugandan support, originally led by Wamba dia Wamba. In response to Rwanda and Uganda’s involvement in his country, Kabila sought assistance from the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Several countries, including Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe sent troops to defend Kabila’s government.304 In most cases, the motives for the multiple involvements were initially for their own political reasons such as border security and in some cases, as in Sierra Leone, the grabbing of diamonds and other valuable minerals and commodities for personal and political benefit.305

As the violence between pro-government forces and pro-rebel forces persisted, the conditions were complicated further by divisions among the rebels and their foreign backers. In May 1999, the RCD broke into two factions: one backed by Rwanda, and the other by Uganda. Uganda also began supporting another rebel group known as the Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC), made up of Mai-mai militia. Then, in August 1999, tensions reached a peak when Rwandan and Ugandan troops fought for four days over control of the Congolese city of Kisangani. 306

While fighting between the various rebel groups and Kabila’s government continued unabated, yet with varying degrees of intensity, 307 numerous attempts at a ‘negotiated peace’ were made, including meetings in Paris (November 1998); Libya (December 1998, April 1999); and Windhoek, Namibia (January 1999). 308 Prompted by the large scale of human tragedy and security problems was the Lusaka Peace Accords (LPA), signed by the Congolese government and the governments of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia on 10 July 1999. Shortly after the two main rebel movements operating at that time, the MLC and the RCD also became signatories to the Accords. 309 The signing was arbitrated by Zambian president, Frederick Chiluba, and was witnessed by the UN, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the South African Development Community (SADC). The LPA gave rise to the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC), a UN Security Council-

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307 The Economist (US), ‘Daring to hope, again; Congo; hope for the heart of Africa’, 2 June 2001, pg. 3.
mandated peacekeeping operation set up to implement the LPA comprised of representatives from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.\footnote{Kibasombo, R. 2003, pg. 260}

The Lusaka Accord included conditions for a cease-fire within 24 hours, disengagement within two weeks with eventual disarmament the goal. UN-OAU peacekeepers were to arrive within four months. These peace-keepers would locate and disarm Hutu militias, in particular the Interahamwe who were notorious during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. All Angolan, Namibian, Rwandan, Ugandan, and Zimbabwean forces were to pull out of the DRC within six months, hostages would be released, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCS) would be allowed access to all areas of the DRC, and a dialogue between Kabila and the rebel forces would be initiated.\footnote{Countrywatch.com, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: Political conditions’, online accessed at http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_topic.asp?vCOUNTRY=40&SECTION=SUB&TOPIC=POPCO&TYPE=TEXT on 11 March 2004.}

The ceasefire left Congo split between the government, the rebels and the outside powers that supported one or the other: Zimbabwe and Angola backing the government, Uganda and Rwanda backing the rebels. The goal was that, after the ceasefire, the outsiders, who were in the DRC for their own political, military or commercial reasons, would act in unison to restrain their respective clients.\footnote{The Economist (US), ‘Congo: Fighting over the carcass’, 353:8146, 1999, pg. 50.}

The potential success of the Accords was thrown into question early as Laurent Kabila, desperate to hold on to power, had a lot to lose from peaceful politics. His government signed the ceasefire under pressure after suffering a series of crippling military defeats. These left his own forces in disarray and its allies, Zimbabwe,
Angola and Namibia, discouraged. Initially obliged to accept the ceasefire, Kabila and his government likely saw the military standstill as little more than a chance to re-equip and reorganise their forces. Although the president signed the Lusaka agreements in 1999, he directly after concluded that the deal did not suit him. From then on he backtracked, calling for the Lusaka accords to be revised. Kabila was also accused of rearming his troops with weapons bought from China, even after the ceasefire. Kabila concluded that the peace agreement would never unite Congo under his sole control and subsequently decided to go after the rebels and tried to unite the country by force.

Unsurprisingly then, despite the above parties committing themselves to the ceasefire in July 1999, a few weeks later, fighting resumed between government forces of Kabila, and the different rebel factions. In March 2000 it was reported that the accords had been repeatedly breached. In mid-March 2000 the RCD-Goma captured the economically and strategically vital Idumbe. Kabila’s military alliance in March 2000 had also been enjoying military success of its own, pushing eastwards hoping to combine with the Rwandan Interahamwe and the Congolese Mai-Mai militias who were still reportedly causing widespread destruction in the eastern provinces. Furthermore, when a UN Security Council delegation visited the country in mid 2000,

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316 Mthembu-Salter, G. ‘Peace Still eludes embattled Congo, Africa News Service, 3 April 2000, pg. 1008091u7314. Note: The Mai-Mai militia are a anti-foreigner movement with membership which cuts across ethnic groups who reside in areas from North Kivu to South Kivu.

The Lusaka Accords have also been criticised by some analysts from the outset, for example Nzongola-Ntalaja suggested that,

\ldots the Agreement itself is flawed in several respects. The true nature of the war as an external aggression is not acknowledged, and the external actors are treated equally, whether they came to commit aggression or to Kabila’s rescue. Burundi, a major belligerent, is not a signatory to the Agreement. Even more shocking is the fact that rebels from Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are outlaws who must be disarmed, while Congolese rebels are interlocuteurs valables with a seat at the negotiating table. The Agreement seems to legitimize the de facto partition of the country by inviting the signatories themselves, the states involved minus Burundi plus the Congolese rebels, to disarm the illegal militias.\footnote{318 Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pg. 234.}

As the war persisted, it continued to take a heavy toll on the Congolese population with the Congo's economy the world's worst performer in 2000, shrinking by 11.4 per cent. For example, official coffee production in 2000 was down ten per cent what it was a decade before that; cobalt production was down a third. The state-owned copper mining company earned the Central Bank US$800 million in 1989. In 2000 it brought in only US$40 million. “Our economy is bankrupt”, \footnote{319 Mabi Mulumba quoted in Time International, ‘Desperate lives: The war in Congo has hit the already sick economy hard, driving people deeper into poverty and illness’, 157:16, 2001, pg. 41.} claimed economics professor Mabi Mulumba in 2001.

Furthermore, after one failed coup attempt in October 2000, on 16 January 2001 President Laurent Kabila was shot to death at the age of sixty one. After initially
denying that he had been killed, the Kinshasa government confirmed that he had been shot to death by a lone gunman, one of his bodyguards, who had immediately been shot by other security officers. However, in March 2001 the French newspaper *Le Monde* asserted that his killer was one of the *kidogo* who had marched with him in the Alliance forces four years earlier.

Joseph Kabila undertook the role of President of the DRC after the murder of his father on 16 January 2001. While he was initially brought in as caretaker for the position of President, he was supported to continue in this position to provide stability for the situation there. States such as Britain suggested that the leader should be there to restore stability in the country and facilitate conditions that would allow UN peacekeepers to be deployed. Following this, outside observers thought they could see a window for peace. Unlike his father, Joseph claimed to want the Lusaka accord implemented and welcomed the UN and its observers, and on 12 March Joseph Kabila met Roberto Garreton, the UN rapporteur on human rights, and encouraged him to investigate alleged brutalities. However, while some hopes stayed alive, soon after his arrival to power, Joseph Kabila showed signs of lacking legitimacy and power.

In May 2001 the conflict could still be seen. According to an RCD statement, received by Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), the movement's secretary-general, Ruberwa Azarias, announced

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323 *The Economist (US)*, ‘Congo’s new president meets the world; can Congo's new ruler end its war?’, 17 March 2001, pg.1.
Kinshasa...is transferring the war to the eastern provinces from the front lines...There are daily infiltrations and the intensity is increasing since Joseph Kabila came to power... The Kinshasa regime is bringing hell to the eastern provinces... If Kinshasa does not end its support [for those fighting in the east]...we will resume the war and return it to Kinshasa... Kinshasa must end this adventure, which poses a real threat to the Lusaka process [He asserted that the RCD would not go along with] a false ceasefire on the front line while the negative forces conduct a war pretty much in all parts of the Kivu, Rutshuru, Masisi, Fizi, Shabunda, Mwenga, Walikale, Kalemie, Moba, Tembwe and other areas.324

Some positive signs could be seen when the UN returned in mid-2001, as it found that the Congolese government had lifted its ban on political parties. Uganda also claimed it would pull its troops out of Congo except for those in a few areas near its border. The rebel group Uganda supported said it would extricate its frontline forces by 1 June 2001. Zimbabwe had gone from saying that its troops would begin to leave only after the Rwandans and Ugandans have gone, to saying that its last troops would leave only after the others have departed. Further confidence in these developments was confirmed by the opening of the Congo River to traffic coming from the sea to Kisangani, a city deep in rebel territory. All parties had also agreed that a ‘national dialogue’ between the government and the armed and unarmed opposition would begin under the chairmanship of Botswana's ex-president, Ketumile Masire, on 16 July 2001.325 However, in October 2001, the UN Security Council announced that Rwanda and Uganda had been reinforcing troop numbers in eastern Congo, not withdrawing them as the Accord required. In spite of UN protests, these troops continued to stay in the Congo, and heavy fighting was reported.326

325 The Economist (US), ‘Daring to hope, again; Congo; hope for the heart of Africa’, 2 June 2001, pg.3.
In mid-2002, with South African encouragement, Joseph Kabila’s government reached agreements with Rwanda and Uganda. By mid-2003 some reports stated that the two states had withdrawn most of their troops. A peace deal with the primary rebel groups in December 2002 called for the creation of an interim power-sharing government and elections within two years. Despite this, infighting among the rebel groups continued to threaten the Congo’s stability.\(^ {327}\) However, in May 2003 in northeastern Congo, the towns of Beni and Bunia and surrounding areas, and the Ituri forest region, it was clear that Rwanda and Uganda were in no hurry to leave Congo.

In an article by the Bafalikike it was stated that,

> The Roman Catholic bishop of Beni-Butembo, Melchisedek Sikuli, and two Brussels-based NGOs have all reported the movement of large numbers of Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundian troops in eastern Congo… this had been confirmed by the Third Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM) set up by the July 2002 peace agreement between Rwanda and Congo.\(^ {328}\)

In November 2003 the UN Security Council reported that fighting and conflict continued in Ituri and in the eastern part of the DRC, necessitating the full deployment of United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The UN report described the situation as particularly serious with approximately 420 civilians killed in Bunia in fighting between Lendu and Hema militias since the departure of Ugandan troops in May 2003.\(^ {329}\)

Also in late 2003, in a report compiled by the UN there was still evidence that troops from Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe had not entirely withdrawn from the Congo, in

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\(^ {328}\) Bafalikike., L. ‘4.7 million dead, and nobody cares? (Around Africa DR Congo)’, New African, May 2003, pg. 21
some cases staying behind out of uniform or posing as Congolese army members in
order to continue benefiting from the economic networks they created while operating
in the Congo under their respective militaries. Governmental ministers from each
of the accused states refuted the claims, in most cases arguing that their presence in
the Congo was merely in defense of their own territories or political interests.

By 2004, progress had been made, albeit slow, towards the implementation of key
provisions of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition initiated in
December 2002. However, ICG reported in May 2005 that 8,000 to 10,000
Rwandan Hutu rebels continue to use Congolese territory as a base for their
movement, which threatened to provoke threats and interference in the Congo by
Rwanda. While the Rwandan and Ugandan elements which were operating in the
Congo had officially returned home, reoccurring instability in a number of regions
persists, which often involves militia left there from surrounding states.

In December 2006 Joseph Kabila became the first democratically elected President of
the DRC in its post-independence history, defeating the main challenger, Jean-Pierre
Bemba. The electoral process was largely peaceful and the successful democratic

330 UN Website, ‘Security Council discusses report of illegal exploitation of DR of Congo’s resources’, online accessed at
331 UN Website, ‘Report on exploitation of resources of Democratic Republic of Congo is challenged in Security Council,
neighbouring countries, denying allegations by expert panel, call for more evidence; others stress serious effects on peace
process’, 05/11/2002 Security Council 4642nd Meeting online accessed at
332 UN Website, ‘Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of Congo’, March 2004, online accessed at http://dds-dds-
333 International Crisis Group, ‘The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for All’, Africa Briefing N°25,
334 UN Website, ‘Twentieth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo’, 28 December 2005 online accessed at
elections are expected to promote peacebuilding and a strengthening of the Congo state; however institutions and the state framework are still incredibly weak. For peace and stability to remain in the state it is important for Joseph Kabila to allow other political groups to have a voice and involve other party members to be involved in decision making.335 The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) of 17000 is still needed to keep the peace there, however it is unknown to what extent they will continue their work there when MONUC’s mandate is up for review in February 2007.336

After years of conflict the Congolese population is war-weary and has suffered immensely. The role played by surrounding states in the conflict has served to increase the war in both length and intensity. The next chapter seeks to examine the role played by each of the actors in the Congo war, analysing both the reasons for their involvement and how each states’ participation contributed to the prolonging of the war.

CHAPTER FIVE: REGIONAL ACTORS IN THE DRC WAR

All foreign forces contend that they were present in the DRC for border security and/or humanitarian reasons. This was probably the case when Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe first sent troops to help the Congolese government protect its sovereignty and the liberties and rights of its defenceless peoples. In particular, Angola’s teaming with Kabila allowed the Angolan government an opportunity to attempt to shut down UNITA by closing off their links to the global economy which had been fostered through the Mobutu government. As stated by Human Rights Watch, “Large numbers of diamonds mined in UNITA-held areas have passed through the buying offices in Mbuji-Mayi and Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”337 However, even with Kabila’s support for the Angolan government against UNITA, Kinshasa still remains one of the main ports for channelling diamonds to Europe.338 Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda also had security concerns related to the Congo’s lack of capability to neutralise dissidents or rebels left over from the Hutu-Tutsi war of 1994. More than 2 million refugees fled Rwanda at the end of the war in 1994, mostly of Hutu ethnicity and mainly to Congolese territory. In fact, 1.2 million fled to the Congolese border town of Goma alone. It has been suggested they largely fled in fear of retribution by the Tutsi rebels who had taken control of the Rwandan government. However the refugees also contained a significant number of Hutu Interahamwe militia who fled to avoid persecution for their war crimes and to attempt to regroup in

opposition to the Tutsi leadership in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.\textsuperscript{339} But later, particularly in the case of Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe, the need to finance these military and political activities meant that economic interests became increasingly important.\textsuperscript{340}

The Congo’s land, as mentioned previously, is rich in resources such as tin ore, Coltan (columbium-tantalite) and other precious minerals. The war provided intervening states and their armies with access to these resources, which a number of them have subsequently plundered for their own gain.\textsuperscript{341} At the height of the political chaos in the former Zaire, some neighbours became exporters of raw materials that they did not naturally possess; much like the large number of diamonds that were exported from Liberia in the years that Taylor supported the RUF. Looted from Zaire and exported ‘fraudulently’ through the black market, timber, palm oil, coffee, elephant tusks, and precious minerals became the main source of foreign exchange for Congo’s resource-deprived neighbours.\textsuperscript{342} Reports issued by Congolese human rights organisations, such as the African Association for Human Rights (ASADHO), stated that during the war some Nande traders had been harassed and or arrested for conniving with the ‘enemy’ by both rebels and the government. In other rebel-controlled areas, peasants were forced to sell produce only to specific rebel groups.\textsuperscript{343}

\textsuperscript{340} Kibosomba, R. 2003, pg. 259.
\textsuperscript{343} ASADHO cited in Mwanasali, M. 2000, pp.140-147.
Together with their rebel allies, Rwanda and Uganda acquired raw materials from DRC territory and looted money from DRC banks through their military personnel on the ground in the Congo. The two states also set up colonial-style systems of governance, appointing local authorities to administer their regions in the DRC. Meanwhile, high-ranking members of the Rwandan and Uganda military (including relatives of Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda, Paul Kagame and Yoweri Museveni) maintained considerable control over illegal mineral exploitation. Local Congolese,
including children, were forced to work in the mines for little or no pay, under the supervision of Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Rwandan prisoners were also engaged in mining in the DRC. To transport weapons to the rebels in the DRC, and to fly resources out of the DRC to Rwanda and Uganda, the authorities relied on private companies owned or controlled by Kagame's and Museveni's friends and relatives. They also employed international connections made whilst fighting on the side of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL), in the first part of the Congo war that initially brought Laurent Kabila to power. Montague has also pointed out the role played by multinationals in the Congo war. As he states:

> Western corporations and financial institutions have encouraged the exploitation. For example, in 1999, RCD-Goma's financial arm -- known as SONEX -- received $5 million in loans from Citibank New York. Additionally, a member of the U.S. Ambassador to the DRC's honorary council in Bukavu has been promoting deals between U.S. companies and coltan dealers in the eastern region. He is also acting chair of a group of coltan-exporting companies based in Bukavu (Bukavu is located in RCD-held territory).

Although troops of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) were a primary guarantor of the security of the government of Congo against regional rivals, its senior officers enriched themselves from the country's mineral assets under the pretext of arrangements set up to repay Zimbabwe for military services. The ZDF established several companies and contractual arrangements to defend its economic interests in the longer term in the case of a complete withdrawal of ZDF troops. In particular, late in August 2002, just before the announcement of the departure of Zimbabwe troops

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from the diamond centre of Mbuji Mayi, new trade and service agreements were signed between Congo and Zimbabwe.  

However, the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo actually brought mixed effects on the economies of several central African countries. Countries that depended on foreign aid experienced a negative fallout and currency pressures from the crisis. In addition, the International Monetary Fund decided to stop disbursements of support funds for a number of nations participating in the war. In this sense the economic exploitation of the Congo’s resources by intervening states in the war did not always mean that the intervening states’ wealth increased. Rather, it was often particular figures or groups involved in the war that benefited from the conflict. Furthermore, a substantial percentage of the economic gains afforded by the war were actually used to continue the war effort of the intervening states in the conflict, subsequently prolonging the conflict.  

As Mwanasali points out,

Civil wars tend to generate a multiplicity of autonomous power centres and agendas as well as a continuous shift in the identity of the key actors. When significant economic interests are involved, the decision to start, prolong or end a civil war is also made possible by the nature of the economic system and the kind of economic gains and incentives it offers the belligerents in their pursuit of their political agenda.

As a report compiled by the Panel of Experts in 2000 stated, “[t]op military commanders from various countries needed and continue to need this conflict for its lucrative nature and for temporarily solving some internal problems in those countries

348 Mwanasali, M. 2000, pp. 140-147.
as well as allowing access to wealth”. They also noted that the commanders realised that the war had the capacity to sustain itself, and subsequently developed or protected criminal networks that were likely to take over entirely if all foreign armies decided to leave the DRC.

While the economic motives for involvement in the Congolese war look to have influenced the surrounding state actors’ willingness to continue intervention, their initial motives for participation in the conflict appears to have been political. The Rwandan war in 1994, and the subsequent influx of Rwandan refugees into eastern Congo from it, was a major contributing factor in the outbreak of war in the DRC in 1996 and again in 1998. The fleeing of Hutu Interahamwe to the Congo after their perpetration of the genocide in Rwanda produced a significant security threat to the Tutsi governments in both Rwanda and Uganda leading them to take up arms in the DRC, especially as Mobutu, and later Kabila, failed to remove, and even supported the Hutus residing in the Congo.

Burundi and Angola also shared a political dilemma. These states were faced with rebel groups and armed militias that continued to use DRC territory as their operational bases to foment civil unrest and cross-border raids that threatened to destabilise their governments. Sudan, it has been suggested, also participated due to security concerns while Mugabe claims Zimbabwe’s involvement was merely “to

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351 Whitaker, B. August 2003, pp. 211-32.
353 Weinstein, J. 2000, pg. 11.
defend a sovereign government”. The following sections will examine the motives for intervention by surrounding states and will argue that, like in Sierra Leone, while political reasons provide the initial impetus for participation in neighbours’ wars, opportunities for economic gain are responsible for the continuation of involvement and therefore prolonging of the conflict.

**THE HUTU/TUTSI CONFLICT: AN INITIAL MOTIVE FOR PARTICIPATION**

One of the most significant variables of the historical background to the war in the Great Lakes region was the ethnically based Rwandan genocide of 1994. The Great Lakes region refers to the area that is home to the system of lakes and tributaries draining the central section of the Great Rift Valley of Africa. This region geographically is comprised of: the Congo (DRC), Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. However, the term is generally used to refer to only the centre of the region: Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. In the year 2000, the total population of the core group was estimated 124 million, with most inhabitants speaking Bantu languages, and Kiswahili, the national language of Tanzania, also being a prominent language in the region.

The Hutu-Tutsi conflict in the Great Lakes region in 1994 was largely a result of the insertion of colonial ideology of racism and paternalism on the precolonial system of both Rwanda and Burundi under French and Belgian/German rule respectively.

Rwanda and Burundi at the time had an interesting characteristic of both being

inhabited by three ethnic groups. The three groups were the Twa, the Hutu and the Tutsi. European colonisers noted differences between the groups that could be seen in both their appearance and in their occupation. The Twa were the thought to be the earliest inhabitants, short and dwarf-like in stature they were mainly hunters, however in some areas they also carried out metal work and pottery. Only accounting for approximately one percent of the population they were largely considered insignificant, but sometimes difficult. The Hutu were the next to move into the territory, stocky in build, they undertook the majority of the agricultural work in the country at the time. The Tusti arrived later, around the 15th Century. They were tall in stature and were predominantly breeders of cattle. As cattle symbolised power in the region, the Tutsi slowly attained power in Rwanda and Burundi.357

Although the distinctions in status and occupation tended to go in line with physical appearance, the social cleavages that this created were not entirely rigid, since they were not based on race, caste or religion. Furthermore, intermarriage was common between Tutsi and Hutu and Twa, therefore also making appearance an unreliable guide for distinguishing between Hutu and Tutsi. Nonetheless, with the intensification of oppression under colonialism ‘ethnic’ categories came to be more rigidly defined, while the disadvantages of being Hutu and the advantages of being Tutsi increased substantially.358

A similar process occurred when the Belgians colonised the Congo, with the colonial trinity imposing its power through paternalism, white supremacy and administratively enforced ethnic divisions among the population. Such views held regarding the ethnic

divisions in the Congo would have also influenced the Colonial powers view of the ethnic groups in Rwanda. In 1925, the Belgian authorities who administered the region as part of the Belgian Congo wrote:

We have in the Tutsi youth an incomparable element for progress. . . . Avid to learn, desirous of becoming acquainted with all that comes from Europe, wanting to imitate Europeans, enterprising, realizing well enough that traditional customs have lost their raison d'être, but nonetheless reserving the political sense of the old-timers and their race’s adroitness in the management of men, this youth is a force for the good and for the economic future of the country. If one asks the Bahutu if they prefer to be ruled by commoners or by nobles, there is no doubt in their response; their preference goes to the Batutsi; and for good reason. Born chiefs, these latter have a sense of command.

When Tutsi elite in Rwanda began to advocate self-determination in the 1950s, however, they soon became expendable even after serving as faithful auxiliaries for more than thirty years. The colonial power suddenly found it necessary to paint the Tutsi as an aristocracy of alien origins that should give up power to the oppressed Hutu indigenous majority. In doing so the colonial power condoned Hutu violence against Tutsi, and in November 1959 power was transferred to Hutu hands with an overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda. With the Hutu in control of Rwanda, the exodus of Tutsi from Rwanda to various parts of the Great Lakes region was vast, resulting in the dispersion of Tutsi in countries surrounding Rwanda, such as the DRC and Uganda.

361 Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pg. 221. The Monarchy was allowed to continue in Rwanda under Belgium rule, however the King was stripped of many responsibilities and duties he previously held. The King was also forced to support decisions made by the Colonial powers to keep the throne. Republic of Rwanda Office of the President of the Republic, ‘The Unity of Rwandans – Before the Colonial Period and under the Colonial rule under the first republic’, Kigali, August 1999 online accessed at http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2379.pdf on 20 May 2007.
In 1961 in a referendum monitored by the United Nations the Party of the Bahutu Emancipation Movement (PARMEBAHUTU) won power of the Rwandan state with Belgium allowing PARMEBAHUTU autonomous control of the state in 1962. The United Nations soon followed suit granting independence to Rwanda at late that year. The Hutu-dominated party was ruled under Gregoire Kayibanda until 1973, and in that time ethnicity was successfully polarised and politicised, with corruption and inefficiency also unbridled, despite its early claim to promote inclusive politics.362

In 1973, Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew President Kayibanda in Rwanda and established a one-party dictatorship. Over his twenty years of personal rule, Habyarimana consistently refused Tutsi the right to return home. By the late 1980s, the Tutsi Diaspora in Uganda had gained positions of responsibility and power in Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) after helping the NRA come to power in January 1986. At that time, Paul Kagame was the Acting Chief of Military Intelligence of the NRA.363

On 6 April 1994 President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, sparking the genocide in Rwanda that killed nearly 1 million people.364 However, the downing of Habyarimana’s plane was not only the flame which sparked the fire in Rwanda; it would soon also be a large contributor to the war in the Congo. As Michela Wrong articulated, “…the downing of that distant presidential jet in a tiny hilly country half a continent away represented the toppling of the first in a row of dominoes stretching..."
1000 miles, all the way from the cool hills of Rwanda’s capital to the torpid heat of Kinshasa.\footnote{Wrong, M. 2002, pp. 242-243.}

There are a number of wide-ranging theories as to who shot down President Habyarimana’s plane and for what reason. The two with most weight are that the plane was shot down by the Tutsi RPF in an attempt to seize power of the state, the other, more likely argument, is that the plane was shot down by extremists within the Hutu government.\footnote{Prunier, G. The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994 History of a Genocide, Hurst and Company, London, 1995, pp. 213-220.} This argument follows the line that they were angered by their leader’s attempts to come to some sort of power-sharing agreement with the Tutsi-dominated RPF and subsequently strove to eliminate him, with the situation also providing them with an excuse to crack down on the Tutsi minority.\footnote{Wrong, M. 2002, pg. 243.} As Prunier has noted:

\begin{quote}
First, it was not in the political interest of the RPF to kill President Habyarimana. It had obtained a good political settlement from the Arusha agreement and could not hope for anything better. The President was already a political corpse anyway and the problem for the RPF was not going to be with him rather with the ‘Power’ groups in the former opposition parties. Killing him meant renewed civil war, the possibility of direct French military intervention if the plot was uncovered, and a leap into the unknown. … Secondly, if the RPF had planned to kill President Habyarimana it would have been prepared to leap forward militarily. This was not at all the case.\footnote{Prunier, G. 1995, pg. 220.}
\end{quote}

Either way, the crash of President Habyarimana’s plane was essentially what kick-started the implementation of Hutu extremists’ long-nurtured plans for the massacre of the Tutsi community. Nevertheless, the government propaganda told Hutus their
President had been killed by Tutsis of the RPF. The plans of genocide against the Tutsi community, who had once constituted Rwanda’s aristocracy, were carried out by Hutu civilians as ordered. Hutu civilians were convinced by Hutu extremist leaders that if the plan to exterminate all Tutsis was not carried out the situation would once again become like it was in the colonial period – where the Hutu were considered inferior and where violence was used against them.

As one imprisoned member of the Hutu militia argued, “[i]n the past they subjected Hutus to constant beating; they made them farm for them. That is what the Hutus didn’t like... After our President died, Tutsis were hated. We didn't want to go back to the old days, so we had to kill every Tutsi wherever they were. That’s the truth”.

The killing by the Hutu extremists occurred almost as soon as the plane crashed. Guards searched houses for Tutsi and killed them on the spot. Militia roadblocks were set up across much of the country. All roadblocks were armed and each person was required to produce ID cards to confirm their ethnicity. Tutsi were killed in the thousands at these points, usually with machetes and with extreme brutality. The Interahamwe also used explosives to break down doors to buildings where Tutsis were thought to be hiding.

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374 Melvern, L.R. 2000, pg. 119.
Only three days into the war, the killing of the Tutsi in Rwanda had spread throughout the entirety of the country. Major General Paul Kagame, now commander of the RPF advised the UN who had done little to prevent the spread of violence that the RPF was going to act to protect its own people and threaten attack if the slaughter of the Tutsi did not stop.\textsuperscript{375}

The massacres had the opposite effect to what the Hutu extremists were aiming for. They had hoped to create a mono-ethnic state through the extermination of the Tutsi ‘Cockroaches’, as they labelled them. However, by July the Tutsi had won control of the capital Kigali and the Hutu extremists had fled to neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{376}

After the genocide of the Jewish people in World War Two, the international community attempted to put in place mechanisms to ensure such horrific violence towards one race was never carried out again. However the Rwandan genocide of 1994, where five times the amount of people were killed than were killed in World War Two, was not prevented by these mechanisms, or even lessened. In fact, funds being put into Rwanda around that time by various members of the international community, including the UN, the World Bank and the IMF, served to enable the atrocities being carried out by the Hutu extremists against the Tutsi of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{377}

However the massacre was a situation that could have been controlled by actors outside of the country, at least to some extent. Much of the arms were supplied by foreign countries such as China, France, South Africa and Egypt. As Melvern has stated:

\textsuperscript{375} Melvern, L.R. 2000, pp.128-130.
\textsuperscript{376} Wrong, M. 2002, pg. 243.
\textsuperscript{377} Melvern, L.R. A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda’s genocide, Zed Books, London, 2000, pg. 4.
The governments of both France and Egypt were intimately involved in the arms deals with the extremists in Rwanda. In order to pay for them, money was taken from funds supplied by the international financial institutions. In the year in which the genocide was planned, Rwanda, a country the size of Wales, became the third largest importer of weapons in Africa. World Bank officials were fully aware of the militarization of Rwanda, but failed to share their knowledge even with the UN Security Council.  

The RPF victory set off a huge exodus of Hutu from Rwanda. The rate and extent of the exodus had never been seen before: over two million crossed Rwanda’s borders in a week, dividing roughly between Congo and Tanzania. Over a million entered the Congo, primarily into North and South Kivu, a region that hosted most of the Kinyarwanda-speaking population in the Congo. As over one million crossed the Congo-Rwanda border in mid-1994, they brought with them the trauma of post-genocide Rwanda to the region of Kivu. The impact was explosive and its effects could still be seen almost a decade later. The growing crisis in Rwanda introduced a double tension to Kivu, both internal and external: between Kivu and those in power in Rwanda; and a tension within Kivu society itself. The problems were heightened as the Kinyarwanda-speaking refugee and exile population grew in size, increasing the weight of the refugee and exile population while obscuring the distinction between them and earlier immigrants. This in turn strengthened the tendency of ‘indigenous’ Congolese to refuse to distinguish between Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese and the mix of refugees and exiles from Rwanda. Overall, to understand the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of Congo in 1997, and their continued involvement there, one needs to comprehend citizenship predicament in the Great Lakes region brought about by the Rwandan genocide and previous ethnic tensions there.  

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378 Melvern, L.R. 2000, pg. 5.
The Rwandan genocide initially affected the Congo as the fall of Mobutu came as a result of the push by the new Kagame Government against Hutu extremists in the Congo. \(^{380}\) Mobutu had long supported the Hutu cause in the region. Throughout his entire career Mobutu befriended, sheltered or tolerated guerrilla groups dedicated to the toppling of fellow African leaders on his territory, and the Hutu extremists were no exception. The Hutu extremists subsequently developed strong friendships with Zairian army commanders, who allowed them the space to sabotage the RPF’s efforts to build a post-genocide society with a string of raids across the border. They also gained Zairian backing to ethnically cleanse the Masisi region in north Kivu and the Banyamulenge of South Kivu of local Tutsis. \(^{381}\) As reported by Human Rights Watch in 1996,

Zairian authorities have shown little interest in ending the violence. On the contrary, testimony from witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Africa and the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (Fidh) researchers indicates complicity in the violence against Tutsi on the part of Zairian government officials and military personnel at the local, regional, and national levels. Witnesses report that local Zairian officials and soldiers participated in recent militia attacks against Tutsi, and there is evidence of official involvement in attacks by Hutu and Hunde militia since the beginning of the conflict in 1993. National and regional politicians have been unwilling to take steps that might halt the attacks, including publicly denouncing the abuses and supporting a disciplined military presence in the region to protect civilians. \(^{382}\)

This therefore meant that Kagame and Museveni saw Mobutu’s removal from power as critical. The two leaders subsequently proposed the idea of replacing Mobutu with former guerrilla chief, Laurent Kabila, as the leader of an instant Congolese liberation


\(^{381}\) Wrong, M. 2002, pg. 247.

struggle. They put this idea forward to a coalition of African states, including, Angola, Eritrea, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The role of the coalition of states was supposed to legitimise the operation; however Kabila had neither an autonomous and credible organisation nor a coherent political foresight for the country. The ADFL was created on 18 October 1996 nearly two months after the beginning of the offensive from Rwanda. At the time Kabila and his new Congolese supporters did not have the sort of military organisation capable of beating even the weak and demoralised army of Mobutu, the only exception to this was one solid unit made up of the Tigres or mostly Katangan elements of the Angolan army. The rest of the military operations were the work of Rwandan soldiers and units of the Congolese Tutsi trained in Uganda and Rwanda.

General Kagame himself has boasted about the crucial role Rwanda played in the war in 1996-97. Mobutu desperately appealed to previous supporters of his regime; Belgium, the US, France and a few other regional friends. However, Belgium and the US couldn’t distance themselves from him enough, and France, while showing some willingness to support Mobutu’s cause, was not prepared to act solo. This was particularly due to their poor performance in Rwanda, plus a lack of back up from the UN or any other Western states. Nigeria offered limited support, but logistically it never came through. In a last ditch attempt to retain power, Mobutu hired private mercenary forces from France, yet it was continuously unclear who they answered to.

and there was little cooperation between them and Mobutu’s local soldiers, making any sort of operation highly unlikely to succeed.\textsuperscript{386}

With dwindling funds at his disposal and deteriorating health, Mobutu’s previously loyal supporters deserted him, allowing Kabila’s troops to take over. Kinshasa fell to Kabila’s army almost without a shot on 17 May 1997,\textsuperscript{387} however there were some reports of Hutu non-combatants being massacred in the RPF’s final drive.\textsuperscript{388} By this time Mobutu was near death from prostate cancer, and except for his real estate, worth only US$40-50 million, his wealth had apparently been exhausted. On September 17 1997 in Rabat Morocco, Mobutu passed away.\textsuperscript{389}

Rwanda and Uganda, and later Burundi, took advantage of the deterioration of the Congolese state and armed forces to build territorial spheres of interest. Along with serving their political interests, these states hoped to use and exploit the Congo’s riches, an issue that will be discussed further in the following section. Kabila, however, whom they had anticipated would play the role of an obedient puppet, was not to prove so, as he soon realised that being seen as a Rwandan puppet was not popular with the Congolese population and sought to distance himself from the surrounding states and their control.\textsuperscript{390}

Kabila’s actions resulted in tensions rising between himself and the Tutsi soldiers from Rwanda and Uganda who had brought him to power. Meanwhile, Kabila quickly

\textsuperscript{386} Wrong, M. 2002, pp. 265-266.
\textsuperscript{387} Edgerton, R. 2002, pg. 221.
\textsuperscript{388} The Economist (US), ‘Missing; Rwandan refugees; The tragedy of Rwanda's refugees’, 23 December 2000, pg. 4.
\textsuperscript{389} Edgerton, R. 2002, pg. 221.
\textsuperscript{390} Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pg. 227.
worked towards the creation of an army loyal to him personally. Furthermore, in an amazing back-flip, Kabila welcomed Rwanda’s genocidal killers, the same men his forces had just recently tried to wipe out, into a new Congolese army, allied against the Tutsis he began to suspect of plotting against him. Rwanda and Uganda strongly resented the presence and acceptance of the Interahamwe in the Congo. When Rwanda and Uganda realised that Kabila was not living up to their expectations they were forced to search elsewhere for other Congolese pawns to manipulate and pursue their goals in the Congo.

However, not only was Kabila not living up to expectations as their puppet in the Congo and allowing Hutu militia to regroup on Congolese territory, Kabila began to call on the people of Kinshasa, his main centre of power, to kill Tutsi ‘infiltrators’ in the region. Embracing these orders, many of them unleashed a bloody campaign on the Tutsi population in Kinshasa. Rwandan troops responded, pushing all the way to the outskirts of Kinshasa where they rescued the endangered Tutsi, with only repeated bombing attacks by Angolan warplanes and Zimbabwean troops pushing them back.

In early 1998 there was an inside attempt made to remove Kabila, masterminded by Bugera (the Tutsi leader of the Alliance Democratique des Peuples (ADP), one of the groups that came under the ADFL movement to initially remove Mobutu), however this was unsuccessful. Disappointed by the failure of the internal attempt to remove Kabila, masterminded by Bugera (the Tutsi leader of the Alliance Democratique des Peuples (ADP), one of the groups that came under the ADFL movement to initially remove Mobutu), however this was unsuccessful. Disappointed by the failure of the internal attempt to remove

\[\text{\textsuperscript{391} Edgerton, R. 2002, pg. 226.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{392} Wrong, M. 2002, pg. 297.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{393} Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pg. 227.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{394} Edgerton, R. 2002, pg. 229.}\]
Kabila, Rwanda and Uganda, who were determined to retain a sphere of control in the Congo, subsequently initiated the war that broke out on 2 August 1998; just prior to the establishment of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (RCD), the rebel movement. In addition to eye-witness reports of Rwandan troops crossing the border into the Congo on that day, Nzongola-Ntalaja reported that he gained confirmation of this project within two weeks of the war. He reported that the rebels were a disparate group who had nothing binding them beyond their mutual opposition to Kabila, with few prior relations between the different factions nor any articulated ideology and societal project. 396 However, it must be noted that Nzongola-Ntalaja is a Congolese political activist, therefore possibly making his views somewhat biased. Some have argued that Rwanda and Uganda intervened only in support of an internal rebellion. 397 However, other credible sources have also reported that it was Rwanda and Uganda that started up the second rebellion with the assistance of locals opposed to Kabila’s authoritarian and non-democratic policies. 398

Understandably then, the RCD rebels had little popular support in the country. Rebel subgroups within the RCD include Kabila’s former Tutsi allies, the majority of whom were close to the RPF regime in Rwanda; left-wing intellectuals aspiring to revolutionary change; members of the Mobutu clan hoping to return to power; mostly junior officers from Mobutu’s army, the Forces armées zairoises (FAZ) bent on

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avenging their embarrassment by Kabila; and some relatively unknown political figures looking for a path to power.\textsuperscript{399}  

The blatant aggression Rwanda and Uganda carried out was made possible due to three factors. First was their smart attempt to portray the war that broke out on 2 August 1998 as a civil war, in which they were simply providing support to Congolese rebels to ensure security on their own borders. Second was the lack of concern from the international community, within which Rwanda and Uganda seemed to have the backing of their superpower ally, the United States. The International Community and Western powers since the end of the Cold War have consistently supported those states willing to adhere to the neo-liberal economic policies implemented by groups such as the World Bank. Uganda in particular was seen as a World Bank success story for their compliance with the structural adjustment program put forward to them.\textsuperscript{400}  

The third factor was the new era of globalisation, which allows States; corrupt leaders, rebel groups, offshore banks and transnational mining companies to fund wars and even enrich themselves from crises.\textsuperscript{401}  Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increase in the number of illegal economic activities including illegal trade in diamonds, gold, coltan, timber, arms and drugs. The weak nature of many of the states in Africa, with the inability to sufficiently control their borders has allowed illicit

\textsuperscript{401} Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. 2002, pg. 227.
transactions to thrive.\textsuperscript{402} Such illegal economic behaviour and particularly the trade in illegal goods for arms, or to pay for arms, has certainly contributed to groups being able to wage war, and prolonged wars in Africa, with the war in the Congo being one of the clearest examples of this.

While Rwanda and Uganda originally worked in unison against the threat posed by the Hutu militia residing in the Congo, and Kabila’s later support of them, relations began to deteriorate less than half a year later. It has been suggested that the breakdown resulted from fights over two main issues: resources after the two states’ forces became extremely competitive about the mining of gold, diamonds, coltan, and other valuable minerals in the Congo;\textsuperscript{403} and different approaches to management.\textsuperscript{404}

In May 1999 the RCD broke into two factions after the leader of the RCD Wamba dia Wamba was removed. Subsequent to this, he set up separate operations backed by Uganda under the name of RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K), which was later changed to RCD-Mouvement de Liberation (RCD-ML).\textsuperscript{405} Emile Ilungu, the new leader of the RCD also formed a new faction named RCD-Goma (RCD-G), which retained the support of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{406} In 2000, as the RCD-ML deteriorated in strength, Museveni moved the majority of his support to a new rebel group formed under the leadership and support of millionaire Jean-Pierre Bemba named the Congo Liberation Movement

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{403} Breckman, C. ‘One Disaster After Another’, \textit{Index on Censorship} 1, 2001, pg. 148.
\bibitem{404} \textit{Africa News Service}, ‘Congo, Rwanda sabre rattling turns into PR war’, 6 April 2003, pg.1008096u2479.
\end{thebibliography}
(MLC), which was formed in November 1998. Bemba’s group captured Zongo and Gbadolite, the hometown of the late leader Mobutu Sese Seko.\(^{407}\)

The local members of the RCD and MLC groups were predominantly Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi), divided largely by locality and allegiance to particular leaders. However, involved in this ongoing conflict were also the indigenous Congolese groups, the Mai-Mai, Henda and Lendu. Many indigenous Congolese had become increasingly suspicious and felt threatened by the inflow of Kinyarwanda speakers (Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda) from surrounding states, which had been occurring since the 19th Century, and this was heightened again by the influx of more Kinyarwanda speakers (this time Hutu) that occurred after the Rwandan genocide in 1994 when the Tutsi took power. This was particularly the case in the North and South Kivu areas where disputes over land, power and resources between the indigenous Congolese and the Kinyarwanda speakers was intense.\(^{408}\)

Out of this tension grew the Mai-Mai, an indigenous Congolese group that formed around the time of the 1964 rebellions in the Congo. Cutting across various indigenous ethnic groups in the Kivu regions, their goal was to rid the Congo of the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda that had settled in the region over the past Century. In the late 1990s their goals included the removal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops from Congolese soil after they had in fact helped them to remove Mobutu, bringing Kabila to power, choosing to continue to support Kabila. The Mai Mai was made up largely of youth (15-20 years) and was integral to the ongoing fighting, mainly in the


Kivu areas. They represented popular resistance to the invasion of the Kivu areas by foreign powers and migrants from these states.409

In the Ituri region, Ugandan influences in the region also heightened ethnic schisms between the Hema and Lendu tribes. While pre-existing tensions surrounding ownership of land and resources did exist between the two groups, dating back to the colonial era, the groups had lived side by side largely peacefully for a decade before the war. When a dispute regarding landholdings broke out between the two groups in 1999, the RDC-Kisangani/ML were seen to have supported the Hema even though they appeared to be the instigators of the fighting. Such actions angered the Lendu, and fighting intensified between the two groups. As there was no working civilian administration the Ugandan soldiers were the only force to control the area. This was problematic, as even they couldn’t seem to follow a similar path, with some commanders backing Hema groups and some assisting backing Lendu groups. Either way, they brought an increase of weapons to the area in trying to control the situation, which only worsened it.410

The following sections will look at both Rwanda and Uganda’s involvement after the breakdown in relations and will examine the effect that this had on the war. The following sections will also show that economic motives played a large part in both states’ continuing participation in the Congo’s conflict. See figure 3.3 on the following page for the approximate deployment of forces in December 2000.

A BREAKDOWN OF RELATIONS: RWANDA AND UGANDA

In 1998 a breakdown developed between Rwanda and Uganda, relating to differing strategies on the management of the Congo war, regional leadership rivalries, and competition over Congo resources. The inability of Rwanda and Uganda to provide persuasive justification to the Congolese people for their intervention was also a contributing factor in the breakdown of the RCD and the disintegration of the alliance between Rwanda and Uganda.411

Meetings between Kagame and Museveni were held but failed to produce results in terms of ending the fighting between the two states in the Congo. For example, in mid-1999 a meeting was held in Mweya where the two leaders agreed on boundaries within the Congo not to be over-stepped by the two armies. However, this was extremely short-lived with controversy surrounding issues such as the continuing presence of particular Ugandan commanders in the Congo and complaints about the motive of Rwandese deployments in Kisangani. And so the relations deteriorated further, leading up to the events of the morning of 5 May 2000 when a unit of RPA

troops opened fire on a Ugandan Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) soldier who had gone there to inquire about the intentions of RPA at Tchopo Bridge. The UPDF soldiers retreated to their tactical base at Kapalata and replied in aggressive fashion, bringing to the conflict the Stalin Organ (BM 21-A 40 barreled multiple rocket launcher), 122mm & 82mm mortar guns, 37mm & 14mm anti-aircraft guns and numerous tanks. The UPDF claimed it was reacting to unwarranted provocation from RPA.\footnote{Africa News Service, ‘Big egos at war in the Congo fiasco’, 8 May 2000, pg. 1008128u2874.}

In June 2000, the Rwandan and Ugandan armies engaged in a six day battle in which sixty-five hundred shells fell on the working class areas of the city of Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville), killing and wounding thousands of civilians.\footnote{Braekman, C. ‘One disaster after another’, Index on Censorship 1, 2001, pg. 148.} Much of this conflict was due to the increased price of coltan on world markets, which, once it is refined as tantalum, became a key component in everything from mobile phones and computer chips, to stereos, VCRs and laptop computers.\footnote{Edgerton, R. 2002, pg. 230.} The increased price had come due to a huge increase in world demand. As the DRC was only one of a few countries producing the mineral, Coltan traders sought to makes deals with any military forces that controlled areas rich in the deposit. Henceforth, military controllers from Rwanda and Uganda saw the sale and production of Coltan as the key to economic viability and sought to retain control over areas boasting it at any cost, fuelling the war in June 2000.\footnote{Nest, M. Grignon, F. and Kisangani, E.F. 2006, pg. 37.} Both Rwanda and Uganda could not agree who had started the war in Kisangani, or who ended it.\footnote{The Economist (US), ‘Congo's hidden war. (fighting between Uganda and Rwanda)’, 355:8175, 2000, pg. 45.}
The three battles in the Congolese town of Kisangani, in August 1999, March 2000 and May 2000 resulted in widespread destruction and the deaths of more than 600 Congolese civilians. Rwanda blamed Uganda for harbouring its dissidents, while Uganda claimed Rwanda was being a ‘hostile state’ ahead of its March 2001 presidential elections, because it allegedly assisted President Museveni’s primary opponent, former UPDF officer Colonel, Kizza Besigye.417

Relations between the two former allies reached a crisis point in April 2003 when Rwanda accused Uganda of collaborating with everyone from the Kinshasa government and the renegade Hutu Interahamwe, to the remnants of armies loyal to the late Mobutu Sese Seko and Juvenal Habyarimana. Senior Rwandan government officials argued that such support posed a ‘direct security threat’ to Kigali and responded by deploying troops along its shared border with Uganda. Kampala’s reply was that Rwanda was supporting Thomas Lubanga’s rebel Union of Patriotic Congolese, as well as the PRA led by dissident UPDF officers Colonels Samson Mande and Anthony Kyakabale. The PRA, Uganda claimed, was the military front of exiled presidential candidate Dr Kizza Besigye who was attempting to topple the Museveni government. The actions of Rwanda and Uganda severely hampered many of the peace processes including the Ituri Pacification Commission aimed at ending the five-year conflict in Congo.418

418 Africa News Service, ‘Congo, Rwanda sabre rattling turns into PR War’, 6 April 2003, pg. 1008096u2479. The Ituri Pacification Commission was inaugurated in April 2003 in the Ituri district, northeastern DRC. The commission was made up of 177 members and was chaired by the UN Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative to the DRC. Members of the commission included representatives of the DRC, Uganda and Angola governments, and the UN mission to the DRC. It also included civil society body representatives, a member of the business people's association, members of political and military parties involved in the conflict in Ituri, and 90 representatives from grassroots communities. The groups’ aim was to set up a new administrative authority in Ituri, including an acceptable structure to maintain law and order; and assure the total withdrawal of
The fact that Rwanda and Uganda continued their involvement in the Congo after their alliance based on the proposed removal of Kabila had disintegrated, suggests there were multiple motives for each states’ intervention. The following sections will examine the participation in the war by these two states, along with Zimbabwe and Angola. Specifically, they will examine the motives for each states’ intervention in the DRC conflict.

**RWANDA’S MOTIVES**

**POLITICAL MOTIVES**

Multiple political reasons have been put forward to explain Rwanda’s involvement, and particularly its continued involvement, in the Congo’s war, some with more validity than others. These political motivations include both responses to actions by Kabila, Museveni and some which were products of domestic politics only. The following section will analyse and examine these motivations for Rwanda’s involvement in the Great Lakes war.

For several weeks the government of Rwanda denied any involvement in the second period of the Congo’s war, claiming that the dispute was essentially internal. However, throughout this period they spoke out in support of the RCD, suggesting that the rebel group was justified in its intervention due to Kabila’s corrupt and authoritarian tendencies. However, by late August 1998 Rwandan minister of state Patrick Mazimhaka, accused Kabila of launching genocide against Congolese Tutsi

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and warned that Rwanda could be “drawn into the war in neighboring Congo if the killing of Tutsis is not stopped”. 419 This brings us to Rwanda’s primary political reason for intervention: security of its own borders.

Whether Kabila actually developed an alliance with armed Hutu elements in Eastern Congo, as has been widely suggested and noted above, particularly by critics within Rwanda, 420 is difficult to determine. Nonetheless, it is clear that Kabila’s government was at the least unable to control its borders which compelled the Rwandan government to seek unorthodox military solutions to ensure its geopolitical security. Kabila refused to break up, disarm and expel the extremist Hutu Interahamwe, ex-Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR), and other rebel groups. In the Kivu provinces, in particular, the continued incursions by the Interahamwe meant that the ethnic conflicts from 1994 remained unresolved and were in fact exported to Congolese territory. 421

An escalation of attacks in Rwanda by armed Hutu elements in late 1997 and early 1998 raised concerns within the RPF over its ability to maintain control over the majority Hutu population in Rwanda. The most serious attacks occurred in the northwestern prefectures of Ginenyi and Ruhengeri, on the border with the Congo, where attacks by Hutu militia and counter-attacks by the RPA escalated into virtual civil war by early 1998. 422 As late as April 2004, the UN military mission in the DRC was forced to increase patrols in the state’s eastern Kivu provinces as a result of

reports that the Rwandan rebels launched attacks on Rwandan government troops in the territory of DRC in April.423

Such events suggest that the Rwandan government did in fact have legitimate security concerns, and its claims that the insurgents were using Congo as a base for operations appears to have been correct as it is clear that Hutu rebels used the Eastern regions of the Congo as a centre of operation.424

One must also point out that the humanitarian defence of Rwanda’s interventionist behaviour is often accompanied by a reminder of the international community’s failure to intervene in the 1994 genocide, implying that the RPA had a right to assume that no one else would defend the Tutsi population and that extraordinary circumstances justify extraordinary measures.425

However, there are some blatant problems with Rwanda’s security justification for intervention in the Congo war. First, although Rwanda claimed to be protecting Tutsi interests and populations within the Congo, their actions actually heightened anti-Tutsi feelings that existed before the war. One of the main reasons for this was that the Congolese Tutsi, along with the RPA and Banyarwanda elements behaved as if they were operating in occupied territory. Local populations were often treated

violently, with harassment and theft at the hands of these groups rife at this time. By 1996 large scale movements against ‘Tutsi hegemonism’ had begun to emerge.\textsuperscript{426}

Another issue with the security predicament justification used by Rwanda is that while attempting to control Hutu rebel activity could provide a reason for the invasion of North and South Kivu, it does not produce justification for the RPF carrying the rebellion into Katanga, Kasai and Orientale, where there was no evidence of Hutu militia activity.\textsuperscript{427} It can therefore be suggested that economic motives provided a strong driving factor in Rwanda’s continued involvement in the Congo, which will be examined in the next section.

Rwanda also claimed to intervene in order to produce democracy in the Congo, however given the RPF’s own authoritarian rule in Rwanda, this assertion was generally not taken seriously.\textsuperscript{428} And as Mamdani wrote “Foreign invasion cannot give us democracy as a turnkey project. This was true of Uganda in 1979 [when Tanzania invaded Uganda to remove Idi Amin] and of Congo in 1997. And it remains true of Congo in 1998”.\textsuperscript{429} Ethnic solidarity has also been put forward by Longman as a reason for Rwanda’s involvement. As he put it,

Many in the RPA have strong connections to the Tutsi Community in the Congo. The RPA’s leadership is comprised almost entirely of Tutsi who grew up as refugees outside Rwanda, and while the most powerful RPA officials come from Uganda, the Tutsi refugee community in Congo was large and contributed many troops to the RPA. The Rwandan Tutsi refugees became well integrated with the native Congolese Tutsi in Eastern Congo, and many Congolese Tutsi (as well as Congolese Hutu) actually joined the RPA during

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\item\textsuperscript{426} Reyntjens, F. 1999, pp. 242.
\item\textsuperscript{427} Longman, T. 2002, pg. 134.
\item\textsuperscript{428} Longman, T. 2002, pg. 131.
\end{itemize}
its 1990-94 war with Rwanda, though most of these returned to the Congo during the 1996-97 war.\footnote{Longman, T. 2002, pg. 131.}

It has also been suggested that the move to protect ethnic Tutsi in the Congo by way of intervention into the war was part of a move by the RPF government to unify a divided Tutsi population.\footnote{Longman, T. 2002, pg. 135.}

Longman also suggests that the phenomenon of political triumphalism may have played a role in Rwanda’s unrelenting part in the Congo’s war. He suggests that as the RPF had been extremely successful in its military operations a sense of entitlement amongst RPF leaders developed. Not only did it develop a sense of entitlement, the movement also became increasingly confident in their ability to intervene in situations of conflict. Furthermore, they carried with them a feeling of moral righteousness which propelled their drive to free all Tutsi in the region from persecution after the 1994 genocide.\footnote{Longman, T. 2002, pp. 137-138.}

Some have even suggested that the RPF’s intervention in the Congo was part of a move to create a massive Tutsi Kingdom in the Great Lakes Region, beginning with Uganda, then spreading to Rwanda, Burundi, and lastly into the Congo. Longman suggests that this theory does not hold much currency given the lack of consistency in the RPF’s policies towards the Congo. Rather than being a well-planned conspiracy to take over the region, he suggests it is more based on the above-mentioned feelings of entitlement and repatriation from the 1994 genocide.\footnote{Longman, T. 2002, pg. 139.}
Overall, it can be seen that a combination of political reasons contributed to Rwanda’s continued intervention in the Congo, with the most influential being the Tutsi government’s need to protect both its regime’s control over Rwanda and its people, even those residing in the Congo. Nonetheless, many have cited economic motives as influential, and even primary, reasons for Rwanda’s intervention in the Congo. The next section will examine the economic motives involved in Rwanda’s participation in the Congo war.

**ECONOMIC MOTIVES**

Evidence indicating that Rwanda profited from the war in the Congo is vast and comprehensive which leads one to suggest that economic gain was likely a strong motive for Rwanda’s intervention in the Congo. If nothing else, the economic gains reaped by Rwanda for their effort in the war served to keep the war engines turning over. Beneficiaries of the war-plunder from the Congo include both the government itself and particular individuals within it. The following section will examine the evidence suggesting that Rwanda gained economic rewards when participating in the Congo’s war.

To begin with, illegal mining from the Congo during the war proved to be a huge windfall for Rwanda. It has very few mineral reserves of its own and when Rwanda began extracting the DRC's resources its mineral exports increased dramatically. For example, Rwanda's diamond exports which amount to 166 carats in 1998, increased massively to 30,500 in 2000.\(^{434}\)

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\(^{434}\) Montague, D. and Berrigan, F. July 2001, pg. 15.
Figure 3.4 – Rwanda: Rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997-October 2000


According to a UN report in April 2001, the invading Rwandan Patriotic Army systematically looted the Congo's existing stores of coltan, with the Rwandan army reported to have taken over the mines itself, using child labor and prisoners under heavy guard to dig. The report estimated the, “RPA must have made at least $250 million over a period of 18 months,”\(^\text{435}\) by selling coltan from the illegal mines through companies such as Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals. Given that the extraction was illegal this also means that the real figures could have been much higher. “Between late 1999 and late 2000, a period during which the world supply was decreasing while the demand was increasing, a (kilogram) of coltan of average grade was estimated at $200”\(^\text{436}\), the United Nation’s expert panel reported.

According to the estimates of professionals, the Rwandan army, through Rwanda Metals, was exporting at least 100 tons per month. The Panel estimated that the Rwandan army could have made $20 million per month simply by selling the coltan


that, on average, intermediaries buy from the small dealers at about $10 per (kilogram). 437

Initially, the Rwandan-backed RCD held power in the Great Kivu areas, which border Uganda and Rwanda. However, this region only produced scarce amounts of precious minerals. Without these lucrative mineral reserves to provide them with funds, the Rwandan-backed RCD turned to extracting various types of fees from local producers and Lebanese intermediaries. As Mwanasali noted,

In Bukavu, an entrepreneur wanting to operate as a ‘commissionnaire’ or intermediary between local (peasant or artisan) producers and the market was required to pay the RCD a US $1,300 fee to be issued with a licence, as well as paying US$3 000 as a ‘deposit’. Rwanda and its RCD partners were also involved in the palm oil business, the only commodity produced in Kisangani, which is regularly exported to Kigali on military planes. According to one author’s informants in Kisangani, palm oil producers are paid normally, but at a very low price. 438

After pressure from its allies, in October 2002 it was reported by the UN Expert Panel on Congo that, like the UPDF, Rwandan troops had started withdrawing. However, instead of simply removing its troops from the Congo, it made sure it could continue to reap economic gains from the areas the RPA had controlled. The Rwandan Government substituted Congolese directors of parastatals with businessmen from Kigali to ensure the flow of revenue from water, power and transportation facilities. Rwandan currency became the currency of operation instead of the local currency. Mining activities continued under the control of RPA battalions; however they ceased

438 Mwanasali, M. 2002, pp.140-144.
wearing RPA uniforms and carried out the activities under a commercial guise.\textsuperscript{439} As outlined in the UN Panel of Experts Report in October 2002,

The Panel’s sources have reported that RPA recently undertook an operation to obtain a large number of Congolese passports so as to give an appropriate identity to RPA officers who continue to be stationed at strategically important sites in the Democratic Republic of the Congo… Instead of departing for Rwanda, large numbers of Rwandan Hutus serving in RPA have been provided with new uniforms and assigned to ANC brigades as Congolese Hutu. Rwanda has diverted attention from those soldiers staying in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by drawing particular attention to those who depart. Ceremonies have been held at points of re-entry. In fact, the number of soldiers who have left the Democratic Republic of the Congo is so far only a portion of the total number of RPA troops in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which various sources estimate at between 35,000 and 50,000.\textsuperscript{440}

Longman also claims that strong evidence exists suggesting that Rwanda has profited substantially from its participation in the war in the Congo. As he notes, Rwanda and Uganda became transit points for diamonds and other minerals extracted from the Congo and generally smuggled out of the country illegally.\textsuperscript{441} Rwanda’s former pawn in the Congo, rebel Wamba dia Wamba, who later became the head of the RCD-Bunia branch supported by Uganda, accused both Rwanda and Uganda of looting the Congo’s minerals. According to Wamba, “[i]n the case of Rwanda, it is a state policy”.\textsuperscript{442} Longman confirms this by pointing out that such a perspective was supported by many other witnesses with whom he spoke. He reported that witnesses from Walikale, a region where Mai-Mai militia were active, told that some

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communities had been driven into regroupment camps where they were required to mine coltan. Longman also suggested after interviewing local populations in North and South Kivu, that the extraction of mineral wealth was not the only way in which Rwanda exploited the Congo. Locals also reported that when RPA troops attacked a village they suspected of harbouring Hutu militia groups, they regularly ransacked the town taking whatever valuable items they could transport. Furthermore, Longman reported that the level of economic benefits taken from the Congo could clearly be seen in the increase in prosperity in Kigali at the time of the war. The number of commercial flights between Kigali and the Congo increased substantially, suggesting exceptional economic activity as a result of the war and Rwanda’s role in it.

Further to this, it was reported by New Internationalist in May 2004 that:

In December 2003 it emerged that the UN Panel on the plunder of Congo’s resources had cut out of its report a chapter that detailed the involvement of Uganda and Rwanda in looting Congo’s resources and arming its militia groups. The reason given was that publishing the chapter could have harmed the fragile peace process in the Congo. The report says Rwanda is still arming the RCD-Goma and Union for Congolese Patriots (UPC) and that its military and security agents still play ‘an important but highly discreet role’ in looting the Congo. It claimed RCD-Goma runs the Congo Holding Development Company (CHDC), which has bases in eastern Congo and Kigali, and that it serves as the primary vehicle for illegally shipping out minerals. Kampala was also accused of ‘a shift to a more centralized, state-sponsored policy’ of militia funding and mineral exploitation.

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443 Longman notes that these interviews were carried out in Goma March 6, 2000, and Mbarara Uganda March 3, 2000.
Rwanda and many individuals from within the Government and Military ranks, as well as the business arena, clearly benefited economically from their role in the Congo’s war. While it is difficult to extract the Rwandan actors involved in the illegal exploitation of the Congo’s resources from the structures they serve, Ali Hussain and Aziza Kulsum Gulamali were highlighted by the UN Panel of Experts in their April 2001 report as playing major roles in the business sides of diamond, gold coltan and cassiterite deals from Congolese territories controlled by Rwanda. The report also named Colonel James Kabarebe and Tibere Rujigiro as military accomplices in the looting of the Congo. And, of course, President Paul Kagame was reported to have been pivotal in the exploitation of the Congo’s resources and the subsequent continuation of war there.

While much of this exploitation may only have been enough to cover the costs of actually participating in the conflict, it is still an important factor as it allowed for the continuation of fighting and subsequently heightening the suffering that the Congolese people had to endure as the multi-state war tore apart their country and crippled their economy. Uganda, like Rwanda, was a major player in the war and was driven by similar political and economic motives. The next section will examine Uganda’s role in the war and the main driving factors behind its participation in the Congo conflict.


UGANDA’S MOTIVES

INTRODUCTION

The precursor to the second part of the Congo war was Laurent Kabila’s decision on 14 July 1998 to replace his Rwandan chief of staff, James Kabarebe, with a native Congolese officer. A few weeks later Kabila declared that all Rwandan soldiers would have to return home. Shortly after, on the 2 August 1998, the rebel movement, the RCD, took up arms, a move which was claimed by Kabila to be the work of Rwanda and Uganda. In the first instance Uganda (as did Rwanda) denied its involvement, however a month later it admitted the presence of its troops in the DRC.

The Rwandan movement which Uganda supported was pushed back largely due to the efforts of Kabila’s allies, Zimbabwe and Angola. After this a high profile disagreement between Rwanda and Uganda erupted over the means and method of displacing Kabila. Both Museveni and Kagame sought to remove Kabila in a way which replicated their own coming to power: Kagame wanted to send a professional foreign-based army (with little popular support) to seize the capital; and Museveni wanted to assist discontented sections of the Congolese population to build a rebellion against their leader. It is this, some have argued, that led to the clash in Kisangani in August 1999 as discussed above.

Museveni’s strategy throughout Uganda’s involvement in the war has predominantly been to train and build up local forces. While allied with Rwanda, Uganda supported

the RCD under Wamba, and after the split their support fell behind the RCD-Bunia, still headed by Wamba, and the later the MCL lead by Bemba. While the bulk of Uganda’s support was initially behind Wamba and the RCD-Bunia, it was a consistent lack of results compelled them to transfer their support behind Bemba and the MLC.\textsuperscript{453} Bemba made use of the RCD's lack of charisma and inability to win popular support, and after a series of victories in the far north he gained the support of the Ugandan military.\textsuperscript{454}

Subsequently, Uganda made Bemba the head of an umbrella organisation that encompassed both the MLC and the RCD-Bunia under the title of the Front de Libération du Congo (FLC). Due to the strategy they undertook, Uganda deployed comparatively less of their own troops (10,000), when compared to the number deployed by Rwanda (25,000).\textsuperscript{455}

In July 1999, the Lusaka accord was signed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and three rebel movements. It included provisions for the normalisation of the situation along the DRC's border, the control of illicit trafficking of arms and the infiltration of armed groups; the holding of a national dialogue; the need to address security concerns; and the establishment of a system for disarming militias and armed groups.\textsuperscript{456}

\textsuperscript{453} Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War’, 2002, pg. 156.
\textsuperscript{455} Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War’, 2002, pg. 156.
However, by November 1999 war was reported to have resumed bringing a near collapse of the peace accord. Hundreds of Ugandan and Congolese rebel troops were said to have rushed to frontline positions in northern DRC after the Kinshasa regime sent troops to attack their positions at Dongo and Makanza. Ugandan military sources said the Government stood by the Lusaka accord, but could not stand by when attacked. Bemba asserted that he regarded the Lusaka ceasefire to be null and void. He said his movement therefore had the right to press on for the total liberation of the country.\(^{457}\) He reported to the Ugandan newspaper, The *New Vision*, that this was the second attack in a week on Dongo. Bemba also reported that since he signed the Lusaka ceasefire on August 1, his troops had been attacked in Gbadolite, Makanza and Libanda, which Kabila troops seized on October 15. “Kabila signed the ceasefire to get a breathing gap to re-organise and rearm his troops. He [Kabila] recently received arms and equipment from China which have enabled him to go on the offensive,\(^{458}\) Bemba said. Furthermore, he claimed that the Joint Military Commission (JMC), a body to monitor the ceasefire, had not responded to his complaints of the multiple violations by Kabila.\(^{459}\)

In March 2000, however, Museveni said Uganda was committed to the Lusaka Peace Agreement and had not started any fighting since the accord was signed last July. “If others have started (war), that will be handled by the Joint Military Commission and the Political Committee,”\(^{460}\) he said. The two bodies are to oversee the implementation of the agreement. Museveni said Uganda had adhered to the spirit of

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\(^{459}\) *New Vision (Kampala)*, ‘Congo war resumes’, 8 November 1999.

\(^{460}\) Museveni quoted in *New Vision (Kampala)*, ‘No winner in Congo war, says Museveni’, 27 March 2000.
the agreement. Yet, in February 2000 the government in Kinshasa had accused the Ugandan army of fueling conflict in the Ituru region between the Hema and Lendu in order to validate Uganda’s ongoing involvement in the Congo’s eastern regions. Local people told stories of rival Ugandan officers training both sides and some Lendu say that Ugandans fought alongside Hema last year. The Ugandan army denied the charges, but admitted they could see how it could be perceived as having taken sides because it often protected the Hema, who were militarily weak, from better-armed Lendu. Nonetheless, according to Blukwa, Jacques Depelchin, Head of Administration for RCD-ML, confirmed that Hema were receiving military help until late 1999 from a rogue senior Ugandan officer who was later arrested and sent home. Depelchin also claimed that troops loyal to that officer, Captain Kyakabale, fought against forces belonging to another Ugandan officer, Colonel Peter Kerim, who reportedly trained and armed 1,000 Lendu tribesmen.

In March 2001 it was reported that Rwanda and Uganda began withdrawing some of their troops from the Congo, with Uganda withdrawing 1,500. The pullbacks were noted as being the most significant step toward peace since war broke out in the former Zaire in 1998. In 2002 Rwanda was also reported to have withdrawn all its troops. However, in 2002 it was stated that,

The Uganda People’s Defence Forces continue to provoke ethnic conflict, as in the past, clearly cognizant that the unrest in Ituri will require the continuing presence of a minimum of UPDF personnel. The Panel has evidence that high-ranking UPDF officers have taken steps to train local militia to serve as a

paramilitary force, directly and discreetly under UPDF command, which will be capable of performing the same functions as UPDF. There will be little change in the control that Ugandans now exercise over trade flows and economic resources. As UPDF continue to arm local groups, only less conspicuously than before, the departure of Ugandan armed forces is unlikely to alter economic activities by those powerful individuals in the northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.\textsuperscript{465}

It has been suggested by Clark that Uganda entered into the second part of the Congo war without due consideration or a sufficient exit strategy.\textsuperscript{466} As a result of this, as time at war passed for the UPDF and the stakes of war increased, Uganda looked increasingly unwilling to continue their involvement in the war. As one reporter suggested, “[t]he Ugandan government would probably like at least partly to disengage from the DRC, but now finds itself too deeply involved to get out easily.”\textsuperscript{467}

In its report, \textit{Ituri: Covered in blood} published in July 2003, Human Rights Watch approximated that between July 2002 and March 2003 at least 5,000 civilians were casualties of the war in Ituri. The report also claimed that,

\begin{quote}
Uganda, the occupying power in Ituri from 1998 to 2003, failed in its obligation under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian population. The Ugandan authorities played a direct role in political and administrative changes in Ituri, stimulating new political parties and militia groups to form. As this conflict expanded to encompass more people and wider areas, Uganda used it as a pretext to remain in the resource-rich area, exploiting its minerals and commerce.\textsuperscript{468}
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\item Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s adventure in the Congo War’, 2002, pg. 156.
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However, on 9 May 2003, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni agreed during a summit in London to investigate and settle all unresolved complaints against each other. They also pledged to resolve all outstanding issues as to allow their countries to retain their former situation of cooperation. On 19 May 2003, Ugandan troops completed their withdrawal from the DRC. In early June, Congolese refugees were still crossing into Uganda, alongside the last departing battalion of the Ugandan army. Since these developments the situation has simmered down substantially, with only a few minor disruptions of the peace.

Nonetheless, the war that lasted almost eight years has had devastating effects on the Congolese population, and the continued involvement of surrounding states certainly prevented the war coming to a conclusive end sooner. The next section will look at the motivations of Uganda, and will suggest that various reasons, both political and economic in nature, drove the initial and continued participation of the UDPF in the DRC war.

**POLITICAL MOTIVES**

The decision to participate in the war was made by President Museveni himself, after consultation with only a few close military advisors. Many political motivations

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470 For example in July 2004 Uganda called for the disarmament of tribal militias who had resumed fighting in the DR Congo and said the army would defend its territory if the war spills over. Ugandan dissidents based in the DRC troubled region of Ituri looked likely to take advantage of the fighting in the region to regroup and attack the country. See: Africa News Service, ‘Disarm militia – Uganda’, 12 July 2004, pg. NA.

have been suggested as catalysts for the decision to involve, and keep, the UDPF in the Congo war. This section will take a look at these motives, and will argue that it was the security predicament that Uganda found itself in which had the greatest impact on Museveni’s decision to participate in the war. More specifically, the threat of Ugandan dissident groups using the DRC for a base to stage attacks on the Ugandan state was of high concern to Museveni, and therefore likely had a substantial impact on his decision to involve Uganda in the DRC conflict. There are also a number of other political reasons that may have influenced the decision by Uganda to participate in the war in the Congo, which will be discussed below.

One theory that has been suggested, but with little currency to back it up, is that Museveni was seeking to create a Tutsi-Hima empire in the Great Lakes region. This theory is unjustified particularly given Museveni’s policies in Uganda have consistently been aimed towards ridding ethnic politicisation. An attempt to build such an empire would damage attempts to do this and would also put into jeopardy the broad-based support Museveni boasts in Uganda.472

A second unsubstantiated theory is that Museveni was acting under the guidance of Anglo-American interests in the Great Lakes region, to help realise a grand plan of anglicising the entire region and remove French as the lingua franca of the area.473 This is unlikely to be true as the United States showed great displeasure with

Uganda’s role in the war and worried about its implications for the Ugandan economy.\(^{474}\)

A third theory that has been suggested to explain Museveni’s intervention that is plagued with inconsistencies is that it was ideological. The argument follows the line that many Ugandans of all classes perceived President Museveni as a ‘saviour’ of the country.\(^{475}\) Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power after a long guerrilla struggle between 1981 and 1986. In Uganda the NRM was, and still is, synonymous with values such as sacrifice, determination and courage. On coming to power Museveni promoted ideals such as national unity and local autonomy and despite some improprieties in the electoral process in his time in power, it is widely assumed that if free and fair elections were held the NRM would be victorious.\(^{476}\)

Following from this, it has been suggested that Museveni sought to spread this ideology into other states in the region and that the participation in the Congo was simply a means of doing this.\(^{477}\) One article claimed that although Uganda saw itself as a regional policeman at that time, Museveni had learnt the lesson from the remarkable unpopularity of the Tanzanians just months after helping oust Amin in 1979, and therefore didn't involve its troops in any significant combat against Mobutu. Due to this, Uganda was not taken seriously in the post-Mobutu order in Kinshasa, because it didn't fight and its regional standing was deflated. Uganda subsequently lost out when the spoils were handed out in Kinshasa, and powerful business and

\(^{474}\) Clark, J ‘Museveni’s adventure in the Congo war’, 2002, pg. 147.
\(^{475}\) Clark, J ‘Museveni’s adventure in the Congo war’, 2002, pg. 148.
\(^{476}\) Okurut, M.K ‘Surely Obbo, NRM cannot be that rotten’, The Monitor, Kampala, 8 December 2001.
\(^{477}\) Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s adventure in the Congo war’, 2002, pp. 149-150.
military elements in Kampala resented this, the article claimed. When the ‘second liberation’ began in August 1998, Kampala moved into the Congo in a big way to redeem its regional standing, and to have more influence in a post-Kabila Kinshasa.\footnote{Africa News Service, ‘Uganda-Rwanda war; beyond ego And gold (Part III)’, 17 May 2000, pg.1008138u2663}

This argument is fraught with a number of problems. First, Museveni holds a dubious record in terms of promoting multi-party democracy in his own state, and in fact the longer he rejects democracy in his own state the more analysts have come to see him as a dictator rather than a national revolutionary.\footnote{Human Rights Watch, ‘Uganda: not a level playing field’, online accessed at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uganda/ on 30 July 2004; Africa Confidential, ‘Ungracious winner’, 24:7, 2001.} Others have also pointed out that if Museveni was so concerned about democracy in the Great Lakes region, why did he not attempt to remove the kleptocratic Mobutu earlier. Furthermore, when Mobutu was removed, why didn’t Museveni put someone in power that was competent and likely to promote democracy and national unity in the DRC,\footnote{Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s adventure in the Congo war’, 2002, pg. 150.} instead of an ex-warlord who had previously relied on violence, intimidation and illegal extraction of resources?\footnote{The Economist (US), ‘How new a man is Kabila? (Laurent Kabila, leader of new Democratic Republic of Congo)’, 343:8018, 1997, pp. 44-45.}

Another theory that has more currency is that Museveni may have used the second part of the war against Rwanda as a way of uniting the Ugandan population in support of him. One Rwandan suggested in the early stages of 1999 that:

Museveni knows the anti-Kabila war in Congo is unpopular with Ugandans. But a war against Rwanda would mobilise the Ugandan population behind Museveni, along petty anti-Banyarwanda sentiments. According to Kigali folks, playing an external (Rwanda) threat ploy would bring together an increasingly factionalised Movement
and the UPDF itself. Kigali reasons that because of the Referendum Act fiasco and the growing profile of multipartyists, Museveni needs something like a war against Rwanda to divert attention from pressing domestic problems.\(^{482}\) It is possible that the above reason could have played a role in Museveni’s decision to involve Uganda in the DRC conflict. However, it is security concerns that appear to have played the largest part out of all the abovementioned political considerations.

One security concern that Uganda held, that has been cited as a reason for their intervention, is the position of Rwanda. It has been suggested that Museveni could not afford the fall of the Kagame regime there, and as developments inside Congo looked like they might threaten Kagame’s position (see previous section on Rwanda’s political motives for intervention), Museveni subsequently involved the UPDF in the Congo’s war as an ally of Rwanda. A fall of the Tutsi government in Rwanda would have left Museveni facing yet another influx of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda and a neighbouring leadership which could quite likely have been hostile to the Tutsi leadership in Kampala.\(^{483}\) However, while this may have been a factor in the initial stages, this theory does little to explain Uganda’s continued involvement after its split with the Rwandan government that occurred not long after the two states backed the RCD in its initial push against the Kabila government forces and its allies.\(^{484}\)

In Kampala’s *New Vision* newspaper it was suggested that the first rebellion in 1996 against long-reigning dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, was a perfect opportunity to end the problem of anti-Ugandan rebels using then Zaire as a support base\(^{485}\). When Kabila came to power he was unwilling, or at the least unable, to prevent dissident factions

\(^{482}\) *Africa News Service*, ‘Uganda, Rwanda war in Congo was avoidable’, 18 August 1999, pg. 1008229u7696.

\(^{483}\) Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War’, 2002, pp. 151-152.

\(^{484}\) *The Economist (US)*, ‘Old friends, new BB between Uganda and Rwanda are worsening, due in part to the Congolese rebellion’, 352:8133, 21 August 1999, pg. 37.

\(^{485}\) *Africa News Service*, ‘Uganda-Rwanda war; beyond ego and gold (Part III)’, 17 May 2000, pg. 1008138u2663.
from Uganda regrouping in an attempt to stage attacks on Ugandan territory. It is for this reason many have argued, particularly within Uganda, that the UDPF became involved in the second part of the war.  

For a number of years, the Kampala government had been faced with rebel armed groups attempting to destabilise Uganda from bases in neighboring countries. There are three groups in particular that have sought to destabilise Uganda and the Museveni Government from across neighbouring borders: the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) led by Idi Amin's son, Taban which is based in Sudan; the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) led by Jamil Makulu, a Muslim cleric who persistently operates from the eastern Zaire region; and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony which is also based in Sudan. The ADF is made up of former soldiers of Idi Amin, Ugandan army deserters, and leftovers from the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda. The LRA was formed in 1986 in opposition to the government of President Yoweri Museveni in Kampala. The LRA initiates regular violent insurrections from across the border from Sudan into Ugandan territory. The Museveni government has been continually unable to expel or cease the violent actions of the LRA, particularly as it receives support from the government of Sudan. From the evidence on hand at the time, the Sudanese government appeared committed to removing the Museveni regime from power. The Sudanese government has accused Museveni's regime of funding, as well as providing military and logistical support to the southern-based Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA).  

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The SPLA has been fighting against the central government in Sudan since 1983 when they were angered by the then President’s refusal to comply with the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement. This included the government’s decision to embark upon a number of oil and water projects with little Southern Sudanese input and which would provide barely any gains to the Southerners. As Orogun pointed out:

> The intricacies of Sudanese and Ugandan backing of counterinsurgencies in their respective countries is directly pertinent to the DRC civil war because of the regional permutations and the on-the-ground correlation of belligerent forces. Because they are backed by the government of Sudan, the ADF, WBNF, and LRA (Ugandan rebel groups) operate in the Congo without hindrance from President Kabila’s government.

The ADF, in particular, threatened stability in the Ugandan districts of Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kasese, Bushenyi, Rukungiri and Kisoro, as they had been conducting raids into the above territories since 1996. As with the Hutu militia residing in the Congo, it is unclear whether Kabila supported the ADF and other groups that threatened the security of Uganda, or whether he was simply unable to prevent their operation in the DRC’s territory. Once the UPDF had penetrated substantial portions of Congolese territory it claimed it found evidence of Kabila’s support for the ADF and its activities along the border. In particular, Ugandan military forces reported in the local press, evidence of a large-scale Sudanese presence in eastern Congo in support of the ADF, a claim that was backed up by experts in the area. When asked what Kabila’s motive was for allowing parts of the DRC territory to be controlled by foreign groups,

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Ugandan officials suggested that Kabila was desperate for allies who would help boost his disordered army.\footnote{491}

There is no doubt that Museveni was genuinely concerned about infiltrations along the border regions, and that he was also reacting to public discontent in Uganda from those who lived in fear of such infiltrations. However, as Clarke has suggested, the nature of Uganda’s participation suggests that other goals also drove Museveni’s decision to intervene.\footnote{492} As pointed out by Prunier, the fact that the UPDF was deployed more than 1000 kilometers from (the Congo-Uganda) frontier provides strong evidence that Museveni’s regime did have other goals.\footnote{493}

In its support of Bemba’s MLC the UPDF was deployed far to the west of Kisangani in the Equateur region. This meant that the ADF was actually able to continue their attacks on the border region, even though that is what Kampala asserts they were trying to prevent. Another problem with the security reason for intervention is that the UPDF was already allowed in DRC territory under the terms of DRC-Uganda security agreements. Signed shortly after Kabila came to power, a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ provided Uganda the room to cross the border in pursuit of the rebels without engaging in full-scale warfare against Kabila’s regime. The Ugandans reply to such assertions was that the root of the problem needed to be removed for their security to be assured. However, as Clarke points out, even if they were able oust

Kabila’s regime there would be no certainty that the new ruler would guarantee Uganda’s security, or even have the capacity to.\textsuperscript{494}

This leads us to the next section: Uganda’s economic motives for involvement in the Congo war. As stated above, security concerns appeared to play a role in the decision to enter and re-enter into the Congo war. However, there appears to have been other goals for the involvement also in the form of economic gain. At the very least, economic activities played a role in sustaining the war effort, without which the conflict would have likely come to an end sooner. The following section will examine Uganda’s economic motives for participation in the Congo war.

\section*{ECONOMIC MOTIVES}

Evidence of Uganda’s economic activities in the Congo is widespread and comprehensive, encompassing everything from looting to the development of businesses created to exploit the Congo’s vast resources. In 1998 the UN developed a Panel of Experts to investigate the plundering of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In April 2001 the Panel produced a report that thoroughly outlined the investigations they had been carrying out and identified the vast amount of profiteering that was being undertaken by the external powers involved in the war. The report showed that it was not only large scale looting of more accessible goods and resources that was occurring, but also systematic and systemic exploitation of resources was widespread. The looting included coffee, machinery from factories, theft from the financial sector and other organisations. The looting was sometimes random and unorganised carried out by soldiers, whilst on other occasions it was

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{494} Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War’, 2002, pg. 148.}

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masterminded and condoned by Rwandan and Ugandan military officers. The systematic exploitation of natural resources such as Timber and in the mining sector was a more organised effort, however also ranged from military officers setting up their own commercial interests to operations that were said to be run by the UPDF. Many of the commercial enterprises set up by Ugandan personnel and the UPDF were made possible by connections and deals that were made between the late Laurent Kabila and Ugandan and Rwandan officers and leaders whilst they were in partnership to remove Mobutu in 1996.  

In the period between 1998 and 2001, it is estimated that the rate of deforestation increased at an alarming rate in Kivu and Oriental provinces. The Panel of Experts reported that Ugandan and Rwandan-based companies were exploiting timber with total disregard for any basic standards surrounding sustainable timber harvesting. The report accused DARA- Forest, which was a holding of DARA Great Lakes Industries and a partner of Nyota Wood Industries located in Uganda, of clearing forests to export approximately 48 000 meter cubes of rare timber per annum. According to the same report, many private companies such as Trinity and Victoria Group were set up by people close to Museveni to exploit DRC's diamonds, gold, coffee, and timber. For example, Museveni's son (Muhozi Kainerugabe) and brother (Khaled

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Akandwahabo alias Salim Saleh) were co-owners of Trinity. Museveni's brother also owned Victoria Group.497

The second UN report reiterated that exploitation of DRC’s natural resources by the parties to the conflict continued unabated. Although the second report stated that Museveni’s brother terminated his gold business in 1999, he remained a partner in Air Alexander, which before the assassination of Laurent Kabila in early 2002 was flying passengers as well as gold and diamond cargo to Kampala. Other Ugandan senior officers were reported to have benefited from the anti-Kabila war. Brigadier Kazini was accused of distributing diamond and cobalt concessions while he was the commander of UPDF operations in the DRC.498

Official figures by the Bank of Uganda indicated that Uganda's gold exports increased from US$12.4 million in 1994-95, to US$110 million in 1996.499 The availability of gold helped the Ugandan balance of trade improve by almost US$600 million in 1999, although gold represented only 0.2 per cent of exports in the 1996-1997 periods. Furthermore, Rwanda and Uganda had no history of diamond production. However, from 1997 to 2001, Uganda's exports of diamonds earned its treasury some US$4.75 million or the equivalent of 33,227 exported carats (see figure 3.5 and 3.6 below).500

Figure 3.5 - Uganda: Gold production and exports, 1997-2001


Figure 3.6 - Uganda: Rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997 – October 2000

As the report pointed out:

The illegal exploitation of natural resources is facilitated by the administrative structures of Uganda and Rwanda. Those countries’ leaders directly and indirectly appointed regional governors or local authorities, or more commonly appointed or confirmed Congolese in these positions. Typical examples are, on the Ugandan side, the appointments of Ituri Province. On 18 June 1999, Ugandan General Kazini appointed as Governor of this Province Adele Lotsove, a Congolese who had already been employed by Mobutu and Kabila administrations. Information gathered clearly indicates that she was instrumental in the collection and transfer of funds from her assigned administrative region to the Ugandan authorities in 1999.501

In December 2002 Uganda was reportedly developing a paramilitary force in readiness of the UPDF’s withdrawal. As stated by the Panel of Experts:

According to the Panel's sources, is expected to continue to facilitate the commercial activities of UPDF officers after the troops have departed. Members of the Ugandan network are typically tax exempt. The Panel is in possession of documents showing that the network uses its control over the RCD-K/ML rebel administration to request tax exonerations for imports of high-value commodities… Economically speaking, this region has become a captive region, where the types of commercial ventures are manipulated and the viability of local businesses is controlled. Furthermore, the flow of money is regulated by the network through currency trading and the widespread introduction of counterfeit Congolese francs… Coltan has been exploited extensively in Orientale Province by various armed groups under the protection of the UPDF. Armed groups frequently identified with militias under the command of UPDF officers manage sites in remote locations where diggers pay a daily fee to exploit an area.502

In its last report made public to the Security Council in late October 2003, the UN Panel of Experts re-emphasised the illegal exploitation of the DRC's wealth.

Nonetheless, one section had to be deleted because the UN Security Council feared


that it could derail the peace process.\textsuperscript{503} The section includes details on how dubious networks of business and military figures tied to the governments of Rwanda and Uganda continued to illegally export gold, diamonds and other minerals from eastern DRC.\textsuperscript{504}

In 1999 \textit{The Monitor} reported on the Belgian publication,

\ldots La Libre Belgique says that Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD-Kisangani) leader Prof. Wamba dia Wamba was linked to a massive international investment fraud and money laundering scheme. The Belgian newspaper, in a report filed by Marie-France Cros, claims Wamba formed a business alliance with an American named Van A. Brink to create a commercial entity known as the African Reserve Bank (ARB). The document setting up the arrangement, according to the paper, was apparently signed on June 15, 1999 and reportedly was between the “Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo”; and the “African Union Reserve System”, a trust which had to be established in Congo, most probably once Wamba took power… The paper alleges that some prominent Ugandan officials were linked to Wamba's business, citing President Yoweri Museveni's brother Major General Salim Saleh as one of them… Information is now flowing to indicate that Kampala was in the thick of the Wamba exercise, with involvement by Major General Salim Saleh, a relative of Uganda's President Museveni, the paper alleges… The Belgian paper also cites “weapons-for minerals swaps, massive scams in the Congo, and heavy involvement by Ugandan government and banking officials, and perhaps even Russian mafia-style money-laundering operations.”\textsuperscript{505}

During the war period Uganda also controlled many of the economic networks in the areas in which their forces were deployed. For example, in the Equator Province, coffee producers were made to sell their coffee beans to the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC) leadership and specific Ugandan buyers, usually at very depressed


\textsuperscript{505} \textit{Africa News Service}, ‘Gen. Saleh, Dia Wamba Linked To Congo Fraud’, 9 September 1999, pg. 1008251u5577.
Owing to the low prices of oil in Kisangani, producers were pushed to sell their produce to Rwandan intermediaries below the market price.\textsuperscript{506}

One main argument, when it comes to Uganda’s economic activities, is that the Ugandan government purposively planned and carried out Uganda’s invasion of the Congo in order to enrich their own state.\textsuperscript{507} This argument falls down however since it appears Uganda’s economic situation did not increase from the time the war began.\textsuperscript{508} However, off-budget funding for Uganda’s continuing occupation of the Congo was very important given World Bank guidelines specify that Uganda should spend no more than 2 per cent of GDP on its military and security efforts. According to many sources, including the UN Security Council report, Uganda was only able to meet this goal by using off-budget funds to pay for military services in Congo.\textsuperscript{509} Therefore, as opposed to enriching the Ugandan state, it is likely the spoils of the Congo war served more as a vehicle for sustaining the war effort.

An argument has also been made suggesting that Museveni’s desire to integrate Uganda economically with the other states of central and east Africa drove his economic participation in the Congo during wartime. However, this argument lacks currency as the war never really seemed to boost Uganda’s economic situation, particularly given the costs involved in participating in the war itself. Furthermore, much of the revenue did not make it back to the Ugandan state, with personal members of the UPDF taking the lion’s share of much of the profits. Some have also

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{506} Mwanasali, M. 2000, pp.140-147.  \\
\textsuperscript{507} Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s adventure in the Congo war’, 2002, pg. 152.  \\
\end{flushleft}
suggested that Museveni used the Congo war and its resources to reward important and powerful members of the military and Ugandan society for their support of his regime.\textsuperscript{510} This argument also has problems, as many of the UDPF troops were not keen about participating in the war as they felt the Rwandans had started it and should therefore finish it too. This suggests that plunder and resource extraction were not of high priority to them at the time.\textsuperscript{511}

Another argument that exists suggests that UDPF officers only became interested in the economic potential of occupying the Congo when they re-entered the Congo state in late 1998. This argument acknowledges that the UDPF took part in plunder as well as legitimate business in the Congo, yet saw the army to be acting only under loose control of its commanders. In other words Museveni and other high-ranked officers may not have been condoning and pushing their troops to undertake this economic activity, however they were not strongly condemning it either.\textsuperscript{512}

The collection of taxes and customs duties was also an area of contention between the three rebel factions and their respective backers. The Ugandan forces and their RCD allies controlled the customs post of Kasindi in North Kivu, which brought in monthly revenue in excess of US$20 00. They also held power in a province called Kibali-Inuri in the Oriental Province. The Kibali-Inuri area is highly productive and is home to Bunia and Watsa (where the Kilo-Moto gold mines are located).\textsuperscript{513} It has been claimed that a number of conflicts in 1999 between the armies of Uganda and the joint

\textsuperscript{510} Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s adventure in the Congo war’, 2002, pg. 153.
\textsuperscript{512} Clark, J. ‘Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War’, 2002, pg. 154.
\textsuperscript{513} Mwanasali, M. 2000 pp. 140-147.
rebel-Rwandan troops in Kisangani were results of disputes over the control of economic resources by Ugandan and Rwandan commanders.\textsuperscript{514} The fact that Rwanda and Uganda’s seemingly strong relationship was able to crumble under the pressure of resource bickering, one would assume that the economic spoils of the war were extremely important to the two states.

However, despite the evidence suggesting that Uganda and the Ugandan government was heavily involved in economic activities in the Congo, there are also credible accounts, including from the Uganda-based RCD leaders, that UDPF high ranking officers and Ugandan government officials have condemned the looting, exports of precious minerals, and destruction of property by the rebel forces and their backers in the Kivu and Oriental Provinces. The Ugandan government even suspended the licence of a Ugandan private airline whose major business consisted of chartering looted products from the Congolese northeastern region to Ugandan and other external markets.\textsuperscript{515}

Furthermore, according to the MLC's secretary of finance, Francois Muamba, the rebels simply wanted to facilitate the private sector and collect a 10% export tax. Revenues from diamond sales could generate upwards of $1.2m. Francois Muamba published an annual budget released in September 2000, which envisaged salaries being paid to civil servants who, at that time, only received 'compensations'. The MLC wanted to be seen as serious managers to attract inward investors. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the movement's leader, once owned a cellular phone company and small airline in Kinshasa, but closed his commercial operations in the Congo to avoid

\textsuperscript{514} Mwanasali, M. 2000, pp. 140-141.
\textsuperscript{515} Mwanasali, M. 2000, pp. 140-141.
conflicts of interest. Meanwhile, the French Geolink satellite Phone Company assisted the MLC with overseas communications.  

It was widely believed to be safer in the MLC-controlled territories than either DRC government-held zones. As opposed to the government held areas, businesses were allowed to make transactions in hard currencies. However this also meant that taxes derived from sales in the MLC-controlled areas also had to be paid in hard currencies. Overall though, in terms of producing a stable economic environment for people to operate in, the rebel movement was performing much better than the central government.

However, one particular article in Kampala’s *The Monitor* blatantly expressed the opinion of many in Uganda regarding the logic of the war and plunder in the Congo. After receiving credible information regarding the ‘booty’ being obtained by the Zimbabwean forces for their war effort, in this case 15 000 tonnes of copper concentrate, the author asked where Uganda’s goodies were. The author suggested that while individuals, such as army generals, were profiting from the war in the Congo, the Ugandan people were in fact losing out from the war as it was their taxes that were paying for the UPDF to continue its operations there. As the author points out,

> While death is inevitable in war, it is common logic that countries often commit their troops to secure economic interests. Even the security interests Uganda talked of at the start of the war can only be

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516 Misser, F. ‘While Kabila flounders, rebels thrive (civil war in the Congo)’, *African Business*, Oct 2000, pg. 34.
517 Misser, F. Oct 2000, pg. 34.
518 Note: It was also the case in Zimbabwe that members and associates of Mugabe’s government and the army were benefiting economically from their role in the Congo, while average Zimbabwean people were suffering from the costs of the army being there. See: Braeckman, C. ‘Congo: a war without victors’, *Le Monde diplomatique*, April 2001 online accessed at http://mondediplom.com/2001/04/07/congo on 01 June 2007.
justified by economic interests. In case President Yoweri Museveni hasn't woken up to the reality in DRC, he had better now than never. The war in Congo is not merely a shooting one at that. Neither is it a stage to prove who is a better fighter. It can only be a war for Congo's resources, like it or not. Actually it might be necessary that we even set up a special office to co-ordinate and track economic benefits from the war in Congo. Ugandans work a lot to provide for the UPDF in DRC. They are also taking much pain to bury sons who die there. So if we can't get goodies out of there, it is high time we quit.\textsuperscript{519}

Overall, there is clear evidence that economic activities in the Congo were being carried out by some UPDF officers and Ugandan government officials, in particular the exploitation of the Congo’s natural resources. It is unclear as to whether Museveni was authorising the activities or simply turned a blind eye to them. Either way it is unfeasible that he had no knowledge of them whatsoever. If he was authorising, or allowing such actions it was to fund the continued war effort. Therefore, while political motives did play some role in Uganda’s decision to intervene initially, economic motives certainly contributed to the perpetuation and prolonging of the conflict.

\textbf{ANGOLA’S MOTIVES}

\textbf{INTRODUCTION}

Angola’s MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) government backed Kabila relatively consistently from its initial support that brought Kabila to power with the ousting of Mobutu in 1997, and throughout the second part of the war that began in August 1998. Angola’s support of Kabila was largely because the MPLA government in power preferred a political leadership in Kinshasa that would promote peace and security in Angola, by alienating the National Union for the Total

\textsuperscript{519} \textit{Africa News Service}, ‘Hello Mr. President where is Congo war booty?’, 4 October 1999, pg. 1008276u4235.
Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebel movement, which had been waging a civil war there almost since its independence in 1975.\textsuperscript{520} Kabila's retaining of power and therefore ongoing support to the MPLA was seen as essential for peace and security in Angola.\textsuperscript{521}

Angola was willing to help remove Mobutu in support of Kabila as Mobutu had allowed UNITA forces to regroup on his territory for decades.\textsuperscript{522} Under Mobutu’s leadership UNITA’s war efforts in Angola were funded largely through the diamond trade, with the precious stones being smuggled out through Zaire with arms returning via the same path. With the fall of Mobutu, UNITA’s trade route was disrupted placing them at a severe disadvantage. However, in 1998 when the Congolese rebels attempted to oust Kabila, UNITA leader, Savimbi, was offered an opportunity to reestablish his supply lines. One of the key insurgent groups in Congo was largely composed of former Mobutu loyalists with deep ties to the UNITA leadership. Angola also had reason to support Kabila as his opposition, Rwanda and Uganda, also reportedly fought alongside UNITA in late 1998 and early 1999.\textsuperscript{523} As a consequence, Angola's support for Kabila was unrelenting; Angolan troops played a major role in repelling the initial march on Kinshasa in August 1998.\textsuperscript{524}

Not only did Angola support Kabila in both 1996/97 and in the war that began in 1998, Angola’s backing was the strongest, most influential actor on Kabila’s side. As Gordon pointed out in 1998:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{520} Mwanasali, M, 2002, pg. 147.
  \item \textsuperscript{521} Orogun, P. 2002, pg. 25-41.
  \item \textsuperscript{522} Wrong, M. 2001, pg. 263.
  \item \textsuperscript{523} Turner, T. 2002, pg. 86.
  \item \textsuperscript{524} Weinstein.,J.M. 2000, pg. 11.
\end{itemize}
…the deployment of Angolan troops to the west of Kinshasa two weeks ago was the key factor in preventing the rebels from reaching the capital and ousting Kabila. Angolan air power is also the essential ingredient if Kabila is to mount a successful counter attack against the rebels who control up to a third of the vast country, including Congo's third largest city, Kisangani.525

Along with Angola’s political reasons for intervention in the DRC conflict, economic interests have also contributed to their sustained participation. In the southwest, Angola's diamond stocks were absorbing Katanga’s production in repayment for military services rendered, while other resources from the DRC such as petroleum were also said to be affording Angola’s aid to the Kabila government.526 The following section will examine both Angola’s political and economic motives for participation in the Congo’s civil war.

**POLITICAL MOTIVES**

Angola’s political reasons for intervening in the Congolese war have their origins as far back as the 1960s. In 1961 a rebellion started in the Bakongo-populated far northwest of Angola. This was organised by the *Uniao das Populacoes de Angola* (UPA - Union of Peoples of Angola), which the direct descendant of an explicitly northern movement was named the *Uniao das Populacoes do Norte de Angola* (UPNA – Union of Peoples of Northern Angola), created by Bakongo émigrés in Kinshasha. The Bakongo are Angola’s third largest ethnic group and also make up a large part of the populations of Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC. Based in Kinshasa, the UPA set up a nationalist ‘front’ known as the *Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola* (FNLA – National Liberation Front of Angola), and a ‘revolutionary government in

exile’ in 1962. The FNLA continued to engage in small-scale guerrilla war in northwestern Angola, supported by bases in Zaire, where it enjoyed the support of Mobutu.\textsuperscript{527}

In the 1970s, Angola was prepared to expel the Zairian secessionist forces from its territory in return for a similar measure from Mobutu regarding the FLNA. The Zairian president kept his side of the deal; however Angola was unable to deliver. Instead, some of the more radical members within the MPLA at the time foiled the attempts to expel Zairian rebels based in Angola, and in fact aided them in carrying out incursions into Zaire from Angola on two occasions in 1977 and 1978. This subsequently depleted Mobutu’s confidence in the Angolan government, however the negative repercussions for Angola were much greater than Zaire’s. Mobutu’s allies at the time, including the United States, France, Belgium and Morocco, rapidly came to his aid and pushed the invading forces back to Angola. Furthermore, the MPLA would suffer the consequences for many years because those invasions provided Mobutu and his Western allies with a convenient excuse for continuing intervention in Angola. In the Cold War context, as Angola received some support from the USSR at the time,\textsuperscript{528} its actions – regardless of Soviet and Cuban consent – were read as being an attempt to expand the USSR’s sphere of influence in Southern and Central Africa. The West therefore stepped up its assistance to the other rebel groups operating in Angola (at the time UNITA), as well as its support for Mobutu. Subsequently the US supported, if not guaranteed, Mobutu’s ties with UNITA.\textsuperscript{529} It produced diplomatic support for loans from multilateral creditors in return for aiding UNITA rebels and


\textsuperscript{528} Turner, T. 2002, pg. 78.

allowing them permission to use a Zairian air base at Kamina to re-supply their forces. 530

Henceforth, throughout Mobutu’s years in power he consistently provided support for UNITA, in particular by offering them a base at which they could regroup before continuing to wage their guerrilla war. Mobutu also allowed UNITA to use the Congo as a ‘safe haven’ for smuggling diamonds, weapons and other goods. 531 While UNITA lost American and South African support with the end of the Cold War, it continued the mutually beneficial relationship that had developed with Mobutu’s Zaire since the late 1970s. Therefore, reports of close relatives and aides of Mobutu smuggling hundreds of tons of weapons to Angola for enormous profits were unsurprising to most observers. 532

The Angolan government therefore saw the removal of Mobutu as essential. As one analyst pointed out:

The only reason they became embroiled in the Congo was for internal reasons. The only reason they went in the first place was because of threats to Soyo, Cabinda, and the prospect of chaos along their northern borders. That is why they went in and that is why they stay there. 533

Furthermore other historical links were involved in Angola’s participation in the DRC. On the eve of Angolan independence in November 1975, the Katangans stood alongside the MPLA troops to bar the route to the South Africans and to Mobutu’s troops, who were assisting the rival movements (the National Front for the Liberation

of Angola (FNLA) and UNITA) with the support of the CIA. The effort of the Katangans apparently enabled The Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement of the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to retain control of Angola until the arrival of the Cubans. And if Angola did not remember this debt, then Victor Mpoyo, state minister under Kabila, a Katangan, reminded them of it.534

Not long after the removal of Mobutu from power, UNITA was accused of finding new friends in the DRC in the form of the Rwandan-backed RCD rebels. While the Congolese rebels have flatly denied such allegations535, reports exist suggesting the RCD rebels in western DRC had enlisted ex-FAZ troops, previously loyal to Mobutu. Angola’s desire to remain out of the conflict was therefore increasingly untenable, especially with UNITA making strategic gains at the same time.536

Angola was hesitant in entering the DRC conflict in 1998, as they risked alienating the Rwandan-backed alliance (the RCD) which they had fought alongside to remove Mobutu. Angolan military officials traveled to Kinshasa and Kigali in hope of settling a deal on the issue. However, no deal was achieved as Rwanda angered Angola when they launched one particular offensive after offering no consultation on the issue.537

However, even when Rwanda and Angola were both fighting on Kabila’s side, Angola hesitated in getting too close to Rwanda, whose methods they found distasteful. Braekman has reported that, specifically, Angola was adverse to the Rwandan armies’ methods of killing UNITA prisoners and Rwandan Hutu, and

536 Shearer, D. 1999, pg. 96.
537 Shearer, D. 1999, pg. 96.
suggests that this helps to explain why, in the second part of the war, Angola would find itself in opposition to Rwanda and Uganda.\textsuperscript{538} Turner, however remains sceptical in regards to the last assertion, arguing that while some Angolans may have been shocked, the Angolan authorities joined the other camp in order to pursue the fight against UNITA.\textsuperscript{539} Angola's official leaders had no desire to see Rwandans and Ugandans on its doorstep; especially given the latter's sponsorship of a rebel group very close to the Angolan ruling party's greatest enemy, Jonas Savimbi and his army.\textsuperscript{540}

As stated in the International Crisis Group’s report in 2000,

> The state of Angola’s relations with Uganda are little better, as evidenced by its views on Bemba. Luanda distrusts Kabila for his erratic behaviour, and penchant for presenting his allies with faits accomplis such as the summer 2000 Equateur offensive. At times therefore, it suits Angola to appear equivocal. Its officials make an effort to tell foreigners that they are fed up with Kabila. The day after the FAA Chief of Staff’s late September meeting with Museveni, Kabila was summoned to Luanda for three hours of discussion with Dos Santos, the subject of which was not disclosed to observers. Luanda however, has no intention of dropping Kabila for Bemba - to whom they refer as the ‘young delinquent.’\textsuperscript{541}

Overall Angola was driven strongly to participate in the Congo war by its security concerns with UNITA, both prior to the war and at the time of the conflict itself. In this sense, the intervention of Angola in the DRC was a success. The year 2000 saw the defeat of UNITA as a conventional military force. This was largely due to the presence of FAA troops in the DRC, which frustrated UNITA efforts to find fuel,

\textsuperscript{539} Turner, T. 2002, pg. 83.
\textsuperscript{540} Moore, D. 2001 pg. 36.
munitions, and spare parts. However economic motives have also been cited as a motivating factor in Angola’s participation in the Congo war. This will be examined in the following section.

**ECONOMIC MOTIVES**

The Angolan commitment in the DRC war, following its initial intervention, was minimal. FAA forces in the country in 2000 were said to number only 2,500. Angola’s troops limited themselves to protecting only important strategic points such as the port of Matadi, the Kamina airbase, and the Inga hydro-electricity dam that feeds the Angolan grid. 542 Also important was the FAA’s fleet of MiG and Sukhui jet planes and helicopter gunships that remained ready to intervene in the DRC. The economic spoils of the DRC war were distributed by Dos Santos himself and helped to retain his overall hold on power. The Presidency controlled Sonangol (National Angolan Fuel Company), which, in return for the FAA’s assistance, gained control of the DRC’s petroleum distribution and production networks via Cohydro firm. Reports in 1999 suggested that Kabila handed over his government’s share of the offshore Coco crude production, estimated at 15 000 a barrels day. 543 Angola also placed itself in a position to control deals covering future exploration in Kinshasa's offshore territorial Congo Basin. These agreements were in part, negotiated by Mpoyo, who had ethnic links to Angola. Strategically then, Angola had gained control of a 1 000 km stretch of Atlantic seaboard, including DRC, Congo-Brazzaville and its own

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Cabinda enclave – which also promised further gains in the oil industry. Overall, Angola’s participation in the DRC shaped new interests and new enemies. Financial interests in the Congo, as well as the alleged interests of its generals in the country’s diamond business, made it complicated for Luanda to relinquish its influence in the DRC.

However, economically Angola experienced a negative fall-out from their intervention in the Congo. As Vesley has suggested,

Sucked in to the conflict to prevent the Congo being used as a UNITA rearguard base, Angolan troops are mired down in an enlarged area that only serves to weaken their offensive capability. With the next 15 years of oil revenues already spent to maintain the status quo in the guerrilla war against Savimbi’s UNITA, the dos Santos government in Luanda is bankrupt. Controlling the Inga Dam electricity supplies and Matadi port through which imports and exports are routed has brought some relief but as the war drags on President Kabila is finding it increasingly difficult to pay the Luanda regime for its military support.

Overall, political factors appear to have been the driving force in Angola’s involvement in the Congo’s conflict, both in the first and second part of the war. The MPLA’s need to prevent UNITA’s arms supply through the sale of resources that had been smuggled out through states such as Zaire/DRC meant that the Angolan government saw no other option than to intervene. However, the economic gains reaped through the participation, via the sale of natural resources, ensured their continued involvement, without which, they would have struggled to maintain their participation.

ZIMBABWE’S MOTIVES

INTRODUCTION

Mugabe began supporting Kabila in 1996 when he advanced him over US$5 million to begin his ‘liberation’ campaign.\textsuperscript{547} After assisting Kabila’s rise to power alongside Rwanda, Uganda and Angola in 1997; Zimbabwe continued their backing of Kabila and his ADFL against the Ugandan and Rwandan-backed rebels when relations between those two states and Kabila soured. The critical decision by Zimbabwe to deploy 600 troops under Operation Restore Sovereignty was made at the very last minute at the second stage of the Congolese war in August 1998.\textsuperscript{548} The quick pace of events at that time did not allow for prior public debate in Zimbabwe regarding this decision. Initially, the insurgency by the Congolese rebels opposing Kabila’s leadership was considered incoherent and unorganised, leading Zimbabwe to assume that the rebels would be rapidly defeated without many complications. However, as the assessments of the situation in Kinshasa were inaccurate, more than thirty months later the Zimbabwean forces in the Congo had expanded to 16 000, with Mugabe clearly lacking a viable exit strategy.\textsuperscript{549} By the end of August 2000, Zimbabwe had spent US$200 million on the Congo war effort, according to Simba Makoni, Zimbabwe’s finance minister.\textsuperscript{550}

Zimbabwe deployed more troops to the southern front of the Democratic Republic of Congo to strengthen the allied forces' uneasy defence lines and control rebel advances as renewed fighting in the war intensified. In January 2001 it was reported that,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{547} Moore, D. April 2001, pg. 36.
\textsuperscript{549} Rupiya, M. 2002, pg. 94.
\textsuperscript{550} International Press Service, 31 August 2000.
\end{flushleft}
Information at hand shows that government of Zimbabwe dispatched 1.1 Infantry Battalion (each battalion has 1 000 soldiers) based at Induna Barracks in Bulawayo to the Congo war front. This follows the fall of Pweto and Pepa last month. It is understood that the government has also deployed specialised paratroopers from the Parachute Group based at Inkomo Barracks, about 40km outside Harare, to reinforce the allied ranks. “About 130 members belonging to Company B from Inkomo Barracks went to the DRC in early December following the defeat and crossing into Zambia of Zimbabwean and Congolese government forces”, a military source told the Zimbabwe Independent. “Companies A and C will follow anytime now as reinforcements. They are currently on stand-by”, the source said.  

By 2002 Zimbabwe had already deployed approximately 8 000 - 11 000 soldiers of its 31 000 strong army into the Congo. Hawk jets, tanks, and armoured personnel carriers supported the troops fighting in the jungles and savannas of DRC.

After pursuing a largely military-based approach towards the Congo for approximately a year, with the signing of the Lusaka Peace Settlement in July 1999, Zimbabwe began to look for diplomatic solutions to ending the war in the Congo. A positive note was struck on 3 September 2001 when Zimbabwe announced that it was removing its troops from the DRC and Namibia declared that it would do the same. This declaration followed the withdrawal of some 10 000 Ugandan soldiers and the announcement by Rwanda that they ‘expected to withdraw over 15 000’. The Departure of Rwandan and Ugandan forces, as well as the United Nations mission MONUC had always been publicly asserted as a precondition for the exit of Zimbabwe’s military forces.

554 Edgerton, R. 2002, pg. 239.  
555 Rupiya, M. 2002, pg. 94.
There are multiple factors, both political and economical in nature, which impacted on Zimbabwe’s decision to intervene in both the first and second parts of the Congo’s war. To begin with, Kabila appealed to Zimbabwe after their initial assistance in bringing him to power to help him against the Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels. One of the reasons Zimbabwe responded to Kabila’s call for assistance was that the Southern African states were concerned about the repercussions that might be felt from the unstable situation in the Congo. Zimbabwe also felt threatened by the increasingly imperialist behaviour of Rwanda and Uganda as they attempted to create spheres of influence within the Congo to protect their own security interests.

It has been suggested that President Mugabe’s August 1998 decision to participate had more to do with his own ambitions to assert his leadership as an African statesman than with the interests of his country.

It has also been widely suggested that the economic interests of the ruling elite which kept Mugabe in power, and Mugabe himself, were a strong determinant in Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war. As was suggested in one article, the intervention by Zimbabwe strongly manifested empirical overtones of business interests.

Zimbabwe’s assistance to Kabila was reportedly provided in exchange for diamond mines and other property and commodities, including a majority share in Gecamines.

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557 Rupiya, 2002, pp. 94-95.
Part way through, however, Mugabe came under political pressure at home and found himself stuck in the Congo. There existed a large degree of discontent amongst the Zimbabwean population and Zimbabwean troops towards the intervention. Many felt that valuable resources were being wasted on a war that did not need to concern Zimbabwe, not to mention the loss of troop lives in the battle. Mugabe, however, could not pull out without achieving a return on what he had already foolishly invested in the war. This had the potential to damage the interests of powerful domestic political forces upon whose support his position depended, and still depends upon. Similarly, he could not afford to fight because of the economic crisis that afflicted, and continues to afflict, his country. This situation highlights both the political and economic motives for intervention and also how they can often be strongly interconnected. The following section will examine Zimbabwe’s political and economic motives for intervention in the Congolese war and how these affected Zimbabwe’s involvement in the war and the overall passage of the war itself.

POLITICAL MOTIVES

One of the primary political reasons that have been suggested for Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Congo’s war is the growing strength and influence of Rwanda and Uganda in the region. Zimbabwean officials knew the desires of Rwanda and Uganda to establish territories of security influence in the regions of the Congo that shared

adjoining borders with those states. Such imperialistic behaviour by Uganda and Rwanda, it has been argued, was understandably of concern to Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{565}

Another reason for Zimbabwe’s entry into the Congolese war was, at least in part, occasioned by the Southern African states’ (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) concern for the resultant instability in the Congo and the affect this would have on their states. Also, the South African response was, to some extent, manipulated by Zimbabwe, through its leadership of the regional organ for politics, security and defence. However, South Africa, which was known to view involvement in the Congo with substantial scepticism, was notably absent from the summit in 1998 that decided upon the intervention.\textsuperscript{566}

Both Mandela and Mbeki wanted to deal with the problem of the Congo with diplomacy, as opposed to military intervention. When the initial uprising of Kabila against Mobutu occurred in 1996, Mandela attempted what he called ‘Ocean Democracy’ to facilitate a negotiated peace in the country with the Congolese people, however Kabila was not even interested in coming to the table. Since Mbeki has been in power he has sought to spread the idea of an ‘African Renaissance’ in the region of economic and policial cooperation of African states across the continent, with a neo-liberal underpinning. This drive comes, as international powers are increasingly unwilling to enter into violent situations in Africa, therefore calling for solutions to come from within Africa. There are problems with the use of such policy when trying to solve conflicts such as that in the Congo. The same neo-liberal philosophy that is

\textsuperscript{565} Rupiya, M. 2002, pg. 94.
used to promote the African Renaissance in Africa can be used in a place like the Congo to allow exploitation of resources, a breakdown of previous patrimonial based politics and resulting in warlords controlling resource rich areas for profit. Such warlords are not normal politicians that Mbeki’s government can work with towards the African Renaissance. And in the same people supporting them in their own state – South African businessmen with funds to invest – have done so in some of the companies known to be plundering the resources in the Congo.  

South Africa was also viewed sceptically in regards to the Congo war as they previously provided arms to Rwanda and Uganda and were also slow to condemn their initial intervention in the conflict. However, they later tried to broker an agreement with the assistance of Libya, Tanzania and Zambia and looked to implement a ‘neutral’ police force as was developed by Libya, yet finding actors who are neutral and will stay that way in such a conflict is certainly a difficult task.  

In 2003 however, South Africa sent 1400 troops to join the UN peacekeepers in the Congo, whilst continuing to follow a line of non-militarisation with military spending dropping to only 1.6% of GDP in 2004.

Mugabe strongly maintained that Zimbabwe’s intervention in the Congo was based strictly on the political imperative to defend a sovereign African government against the de facto foreign invasion and military aggression initiated by Rwanda and Uganda.  

Speaking at an Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution lecture in

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569 *The Economist*, ‘Trying on blue berets; South Africa tries peacekeeping’, v. 368, i. 8341, 13 Sep 2003, pg. 63.
Abuja, Nigeria, in 2000, Mugabe said Zimbabwe's commitment of an estimated 12,000 combat troops to the DRC civil war was designed to uphold United Nations resolutions and various African conventions in a mission to uphold international justice. Mugabe also stated that his decision to back Kabila with troops and war equipment could be likened to Nigeria's regional peacekeeping missions on behalf of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU).\(^{571}\) This also points to the idea that Mugabe saw himself as a regional hegemon, or at least would have liked to, verifying suggestions that his decision to involve himself in the Congo war could be partly attributed to his determination to increase Zimbabwe’s sphere of influence.\(^{572}\)

Furthermore, it has been suggested that Zimbabwe’s intervention can also be attributed to a ‘permissive condition’ as opposed to the other reasons which were ‘active causes’. The permissive condition referred to, is the situation Zimbabwe found itself in around that time in regards to its military capacity, in particular its military force capacity. It is indeed an important factor that the ZDF had at its disposal a brigade-size combat unit, involving air power tanks and special infantry forces.\(^{573}\)

While some have argued that economic interests did not contribute to the initial calculus of Zimbabwe’s intervention in the Congo,\(^{574}\) there is much evidence to suggest that economic concerns, which were in fact linked to domestic political concerns in Zimbabwe, played a large part in Zimbabwe’s decision to intervene.

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\(^{573}\) *Rupiya*, M. 2002, pg. 96.
\(^{574}\) *Rupiya*, M. 2002, pg. 97.
ECONOMIC MOTIVES
Throughout its intervention in the Congo, the Zimbabwean government was clear about what it felt it was owed for services rendered in the conflict. In 2003 the Harare based weekly, the Financial Gazette, claimed that the DRC owed Zimbabwe US$1.8bn for the support President Robert Mugabe’s regime gave it in the four-year civil war that began in 1998.575

Political pressure at home with an ever-worsening economy causing widespread social unrest, placed Mugabe in a situation where compensation for the war effort in the DRC was of extreme importance, which perhaps explains Zimbabwe’s continued involvement. This is particularly so as Zimbabwe was unlikely to have been reimbursed for their efforts in supporting Kabila in coming to power if a group other than Kabila’s ADFL attained control of the Congo. Mugabe also needed to keep his domestic friends in high places happy to ensure their support of his leadership. As many of the economic ventures in the DRC were run by such characters, particularly many of the army generals from the ZDF, Zimbabwe’s participation in the war also served Mugabe’s interests in that respect.576 The ZDF is also crucial to Mugabe’s power base. With his less than liberal rule of Zimbabwe, particularly in the last five years, the economic exploits in the Congo served to pay the forces substantial amounts, subsequently keeping them happy and ensuring their support for Mobutu.577

As Chan points out regarding the intertwined political and economic reasons for Zimbabwe’s participation:

…attention has turned to Congo’s wealth, not as an addition to the economic resource base of an expanded region, but as something to be appropriated – no longer by Mugabe, and not by the Zimbabwean state but by Zimbabwean military leaders, their political friends, and their expanded range of business colleagues...In August 1999, a peace accord was signed among the Congolese factions. There is some reason to believe that, had it held, it would have been sufficiently face-saving for Mugabe to begin withdrawing his troops. Indeed, he probably at that point wanted to withdraw them. However, the accord did not hold, and the generals of the Zimbabwean army, for financial and military reasons, did not want to withdraw; as domestic opposition grew, Mugabe needed the support of the army, so it stayed in Congo.\(^{578}\)

However, there have also been claims that a substantial per cent of the riches gained from the war in the Congo went straight to the pocket of Robert Mugabe himself.\(^{579}\) Mugabe has been referred to as ‘King Robert’ by opponents who suggested there was a similarity between him and the Belgian King Leopold, who made the Congo his personal fiefdom at the beginning of the century. Another important point is that Zimbabwe, more than 1 000 miles away from the Congo, has no common borders or real political interest in the DRC state. Critics suggest that Mugabe offered Zimbabwe’s assistance to Kabila primarily in exchange for a vast array of business and mining deals for the president and his cronies.\(^{580}\)

Such a suggestion is justified given Zimbabwean businessmen connected to Mugabe have been awarded an array of contracts in the Congo, including rights to one of the country’s most profitable cobalt mines.\(^{581}\) In October 2000, the Congo’s Societe Nationale d'Electricite (SNEL) offered to supply an additional 100 megawatts to the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) pending the completion of the

\(^{578}\) Chan, S. 2003, pg. 137.
\(^{580}\) Lamb, C. 1999, pp. 32-33.
\(^{581}\) Lamb, C. 1999, pp. 32-33.
Congo's main power station and the high-voltage line to southern Africa. This proposed electricity supply was arranged as partial payment for Zimbabwe’s part in the Congo war.\textsuperscript{582} Furthermore, the state-owned company ZDI (Zimbabwe Defence Industry) had contracts for most supplies to the Congolese government, and the transport company used for trucking these goods was owned by Lieutenant Zvi, Zimbabwe’s army chief.\textsuperscript{583}

The Zimbabwean government also took advantage of its position in the Congo war to increase trade with the DRC. Zimbabwe made no attempt to hide its economic interests in participating in the Congolese war. It publicly encouraged Zimbabwean business to make the most of the intervention in order to displace South African competition.\textsuperscript{584} The Zimbabwean company, Ridgeport, signed copper and cobalt concessions with the DRC’s state-owned Gecamines.\textsuperscript{585} Zimtrade, the semi-governmental trade promotion agency, organised a series of workshops on ‘Doing Business in the DRC’ that were developed to assist small businesses export their products to Congo.\textsuperscript{586} Kinshasa admitted meeting some of Zimbabwe’s military costs. The war, it has been reported, proved a windfall for some Zimbabwean officials and ministers who seized economic opportunities from their positions of power.\textsuperscript{587}

Another report by the \textit{New African} also pointed out that Zimbabwe’s senior officers have enriched themselves from the DRC’s mineral assets, under the pretext of arrangements set up to repay Zimbabwe for military services during the DRC war. In

\begin{footnotesize}  
\textsuperscript{583} Lamb, C.1999, pp. 32-33.  
\textsuperscript{584} \textit{Africa Confidential}, ‘Zimbabwe’, 39:19, 1998.  
\textsuperscript{585} Shearer, D. 1999, pg.98.  
\textsuperscript{586} Weinstein, M. 2000, pg. 11.  
\textsuperscript{587} Shearer, D. 1999, pg. 98.  
\end{footnotesize}
late 2002, the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) began establishing new companies and contractual arrangements to defend its economic interests in the longer term, should there be a complete withdrawal of ZDF troops. New trade and service agreements were signed also between Congo and Zimbabwe, just prior to the announced withdrawal of ZDF troops from the diamond centre of Mbuji Mayi late in August 2002.  

When the Panel of Experts compiled their first report on the Congo on 12 April 2001 they argued that Zimbabwe’s participation in the war was legitimised as they were simply “defending the sovereignty of Congo then at stake, and to support a legitimate and internationally recognised government of President Laurent Kabila completely”. However Britain and the US, amongst others were not happy with this assessment calling for further investigation, which came in the form of the Kassem Panel. The Kassem Panel produced a report that added allegations against the Government of Congo (GOC) and Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, in particular charging that the GOC and Zimbabwe were wrong to cut economic deals among sovereign states.

Towards the end of its second mandate, the Kassem Panel received a copy of a memorandum dated August 2002 from the (Zimbabwian) defence minister to President Robert Mugabe, recommending that a joint Zimbabwe-Congo Company be set up in Mauritius to disguise the continuing economic interests of the ZDF in

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Congo.\(^{591}\) It also made reference to plans to create a private Zimbabwean military company to guard Zimbabwe's economic investments in Congo after the planned withdrawal of ZDF troops. It stated that this company was developed to operate alongside a new military company owned by Congo. Reliable sources told the Panel about plans to set up new holding companies to disguise the continuing ZDF commercial operations in Congo, and a ZDF-controlled private military company to be deployed in the country to guard those assets.\(^{592}\) In the addendum to the April report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo put forward in late 2001, Zimbabwe was reported to be “the most active” of all the states allied to the Kinshasa government in regards to the exploitation of natural resources.\(^{593}\)

However, despite the exploitation that had been occurring, in December 2000 it was reported by the International Crisis Group that, at that stage, the benefits to Zimbabwe had been elusive. When the Lukasa agreement was signed, the DRC government already owed the Government of Zimbabwe US$2.6 million for arms payments. At the time of the report the DRC government had discontinued paying the monthly installments it owed Zimbabwe.\(^{594}\) Other forms of compensation proved equally fruitless at the time – many of the ventures they entered into, such as that of

\(^{593}\) *Africa News Service*, ‘UN confirms continued exploitation of DRC’s resources’, 20 November 2001, pg. 1008324u0333.
\(^{594}\) Mutsakani, A., ‘Arms firm in desperate bid to get Kabila to pay-up’, *Financial Gazette*, Harare
Gecamines, were nowhere near as productive as they expected, especially without the large investments needed to make them profitable.\textsuperscript{595}

Furthermore, despite the fact that President Laurent Kabila mortgaged what little was left of the copper and diamond industry to Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s states’ economy was struggling to say the least. As Vesley noted,

\begin{quote}
The Zimbabwe dollar lost 60\% of its value in 12 months, tobacco exports are down 37\%, commercial lending rates rose above 40\% and a budget deficit of Z\$3bn is exacerbated by President Mugabe’s $2m dollar a day Congo adventure. November riots in Harare and Bulawayo due to a 67\% price hike on fuel is just the tip of the iceberg, knowledgeable observers believe.\textsuperscript{596}
\end{quote}

Most notably, it has been documented that Kabila has given one Zimbabwean company, with Board members from the Zanu-DF, the world’s largest logging concession. This concession allows the Zimbabwean company to log 33 million hectares of DRC forest, which is equal to one third of the total Congolese state. Logging had already commenced in the Katanga Province when Global Witness released their report in 2002. The logging was being carried out by a group named SAB Congo, whose sales arm went under the name of African Hardwood Marketing Ltd.\textsuperscript{597}

As the report by Global Witness stated:

\begin{quote}
The vehicle for this ‘resource colonialism’ is SOCEBO (Société congolaise d’exploitation du bois), a joint venture between Zimbabwean military controlled OSLEG (the ironically named Operation Sovereign Legitimacy) and Kinshasa based company Comiex. It appears that DRC has placed most, if not all of its
\end{quote}

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\end{footnotes}
timber concessions under the SOCEBO umbrella. It is unlikely that SOCEBO can achieve its over-ambitious production and profit targets, but such a deal would almost certainly see severe social and economic impacts on local populations, who virtually always suffer at the hands of industrial forest concessions, massive revenue loss in DRC and massive destruction of the country’s forest resources.\(^{598}\)

According to the Addendum to the Report of the UN Panel of Experts investigating natural resource exploitation in the DRC (released in late 2001) a stated goal of SOCEBO was to “contribute to the war effort in the framework of South-South cooperation”.\(^{599}\) As Global Witness suggested, even in a continent ravaged by resource-based conflicts, this blatant claim was a surprisingly cynical example of perpetuating conflict using funds derived from natural resource exploitation. They also went on to propose that such actions could more accurately be regarded as South-South colonialism.\(^{600}\)

Even after the Lusaka peace process and the proposed withdrawal of troops from DRC by foreign governments, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces still planned to exploit DRC’s forests. Fake troop withdrawals were made by Zimbabwe whereby troops were being flown into DRC, and then directly back again, creating the illusion that they were returning soldiers.

In short, to obtain personal wealth and to shore up Zanu-PF’s political machine, Zimbabwe’s elite are pursuing the development of a business empire at the expense of a country (DRC) which has seen the deaths of 3.3 million people and where 75% of children born during the war have or will die before their 2nd birthday.\(^{601}\) In this, the Zimbabwean government is complicit in prolonging one of the world’s bloodiest conflicts. The growing oppression, intimidation and violence against

the lawful political opposition, white farm owners, black farm workers, all to perpetuate the rule of one man, requires extensive funding. This funding is being sought from even weaker countries – a new colonialism. 602

The actions of Zimbabwe in the DRC war have been judged differently by various analysts and commentators. While the intervention by Rwanda and Uganda is largely regarded as a breach of sovereignty, many feel that Zimbabwe’s assistance of Kabila was acceptable, or even justified, as Zimbabwe was attempting to protect the government in power. However, many have also argued that since Kabila’s government was not democratically elected, support for him is no more acceptable than that of the rebels. 603 Furthermore, that line has also been questioned by many given the blatant resource exploitation in the Congo by Zimbabwe, which has led such analysts to question Mugabe’s motives. Evidence given in this chapter suggests that the latter assessment is correct and that involvement under such pretenses is not acceptable or justified. It is likely that the participation by Zimbabwe made them complicit in prolonging one of the world’s bloodiest conflicts.

OTHER STATES’ MOTIVES: BURUNDI AND NAMIBIA

BURUNDI

The security predicament in Burundi is similar to that of Uganda and Rwanda, giving it too a reason for interest in the Congo war. Burundi’s role in the DRC conflict remains a subject of speculation and controversy. The Kabila government has repeatedly accused and publicly denounced Burundi for violation of Congolese

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territorial borders. Burundi officials strongly deny any involvement or military support for the RCD rebels.\textsuperscript{604}

In Burundi a Tutsi and military government seized power in a coup in July \textsuperscript{605}1996, after Burundi suffered from a similar, but to a lesser extent, Hutu-Tutsi conflict as Rwanda. Furthermore, as in Rwanda, the outbreak of ethnic violence was sparked by the shooting down of the then Rwandan President’s plane in 1994, which was also carrying the Burundian President at the time, Cyprien Ntaryamira.\textsuperscript{606}

The coming to power of a Tutsi government in Burundi resulted in large refugee flows of Hutu militia and citizens to the DRC. Hutu rebel groups continued to cause the Tutsi government in Burundi grief from their bases they created in the DRC. By 2001 a UN-sponsored peace process had failed to bring together the Tutsi-led military government and the militant Hutu groups in refugee camps in the DRC.\textsuperscript{607} As Orogun has suggested,

Burundi soldiers have repeatedly crossed into Congolese territory to engage in military reprisals against the Hutu rebel guerrillas known as the Forces for the Defense of Democracy, or Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (FDD). Another rebel group, known as the National Liberation Front (FNL) continued to engage in cross-border raids against the Tutsi-minority military regime in Burundi.\textsuperscript{608}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{604} Orogun, P 2002, pg. 34.
\item \textsuperscript{607} The Economist (US), ‘Peace here means war elsewhere; Congo and its neighbours; Congo’s war shifts to its neighbours’, 23 June 2001, pg. 5.
\item \textsuperscript{608} Orogun, P. 2002, pp. 34.
\end{itemize}
As mentioned above, the Burundian government vehemently denied supporting the RCD; however Kinshasa has accused Burundi of secretly providing assistance to the RDC rebels, including helicopter assaults on the Congo. As Orogun notes, “Other regional sources noted in 1999 that some 2 000 Burundian troops were fighting in the east of the DRC against Burundian Hutu guerrillas”.  

As the IGC reported,

Burundian rebels, especially the FDD were rearmed to fight with the Kabila coalition. In order to counteract the FDD, the Burundi military government has deployed forces in the southeast of Congo. Apart from fighting the rebels, Bujumbura is also protecting its vital economic route across Lake Tanganyika, which is used to bring in strategic goods. This was a major trade route during the embargo between 31 July 1996 and 23 January 1999. Indeed, the DRC generally acted as an important commercial channel for Burundian imports during this period.  

Given the above evidence it is clear that Burundi’s involvement is yet another contributing factor to the prolonging of the war in the Congo, however, as opposed to the involvement of Rwanda and Uganda, it appears as if Burundi’s alleged participation was predominantly politically driven.

NAMIBIA

Namibia supported Kabila from the beginning of the initial insurgency against Mobutu, and again in the second part of the conflict against the various DRC rebel groups and their regional backers. Namibian President Sam Nujoma stated unequivocally that his government's intervention in the DRC was strictly designed to

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609 Orogun, P, 2002, pp. 34.
defend the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kabila's regime in Kinshasa. \textsuperscript{612} Such a move, he suggested was important for the security of the Namibian state and the region as a whole. \textsuperscript{613} Nonetheless, the deployment of Namibian troops to protect Kabila's government provoked controversy among the SADC member-states. Regional analysts emphasised that Namibia’s intervention seemed to be based on political and core economic expediency rather than just the protection of sovereignty. \textsuperscript{614}

The Namibian government had plans to divert water from the river Congo across Angola to northern Namibia. Thus, by intervening on Kabila’s behalf in the Congo crisis, President Sam Nujoma, like President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, hoped to secure economic and vital resource benefits while advocating the political rhetoric of standing up to South Africa. Namibia was reported in mid-August 1998 to have provided approximately twenty tons of military weapons and other supplies to the DRC government. In late August of the same year, the Namibian government admitted to supplying arms and other equipment to the DRC but continued to refute reports that it had also sent troops there. Many of the small arms in the DRC originated in Eastern Europe, or from recycled stocks in central and southern Africa. \textsuperscript{615}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{612} Orogun, P. 2002, pp. 25-41.
\end{thebibliography}
Namibian officials publicly committed to keeping their troops inside Congolese territory for the duration of the war, to reap the dividends of their support for the Kabila government. They have steadfastly maintained that only when the United Nations peacekeeping forces are on the ground (inside the DRC territory), they will seriously contemplate the possibility of troop withdrawal.  

On 9 June 2001, *The Namibian* reported that the Namibian government had begun the withdrawal of its troops with 600 soldiers returning home from the DRC conflict. The UN-supervised withdrawal started from 12 May when small detachments of soldiers were put on Namibian Defence Force (NDF) cargo planes that were flying back to Namibia on re-supply missions.

Once again the involvement of this regional actor served not to bring the conflict to a conclusion, but to prolong and intensify it, particularly through the influx of arms. Namibia also looks to have been both politically and economically motivated, by both concerns for its borders, and in an attempt gain the Congo’s resources, namely water.

**CONCLUSION**

One of the main determinants of the present conflict and instability in the Great Lakes region is the decay of the state and its instruments of rule in the Congo. For it is this decay that made it possible for states the size of Congo’s smallest province, such as Uganda and Rwanda, to take it upon themselves to impose rulers in Kinshasa and to invade, occupy and loot the territory of their bountiful neighbour. This situation would have been unthinkable if the Congolese state institutions were functioning as

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agencies of governance and national security, rather than as Mafia-like organisations serving the self-centred interests of Mobutu and his associates, especially his generals. The Congo under a capable and responsible government could have stopped the spread of the 1994 conflict in Rwanda into the Congolese state, or at least prevented the genocidal forces from using Congolese territory to dispatch raids into Rwanda. The deterioration of the Mobutu regime and the state decay associated with it made both possibilities feasible, while Kabila’s sponsorship by Rwanda and Uganda made it possible for these countries to feel entitled to determine the Congo’s future. The power vacuum created by state decay made the Congo even more attractive as a territory to exploit and extract resources from.618

Based on the quantitative and qualitative evidence presented in the above section, we have concluded that the war against Mobutu was motivated primarily by political motives or grievance, interpreted as institutional differences between the ruling group and the people, even if greed likely played a role. The majority of the surrounding state actors in the war against the Kabila regime in 1998, however, were motivated initially by grievance, but as actors saw opportunities for attaining economic gain from the conflict, economic gain became a substantial motivating factor to continue participation in the Congo war. Not only this, but the economic gain reaped allowed the surrounding state actors to continue pursuing their political goals through violent means in the Congo conflict.

CHAPTER SIX: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

GREED, GRIEVANCE AND IR THEORY

The two main schools of thought in contemporary international relations theory, Realism and Liberalism, are both partially useful when attempting to deal with this problem. The radical perspective can also be useful in explaining much of what is occurring, particularly the economic motives for conflict in these areas, however it fails to provide viable responses to the weak state wars that occurring in Africa. ..

The next section will examine these three schools of thought and show their inadequacy in deriving solutions to weak state wars in Africa where surrounding states are involved. The subsequent parts of this chapter will then present policy suggestions for peace based on the findings of this thesis, which follow a Liberal line, but one that takes into account notions from radicalism and cosmopolitanism.

A number of realists have suggested that many civil wars are best understood as the unavoidable stage of ongoing processes of ‘state building’. Mohammed Ayoob has put forward an argument along these lines via a theory he calls ‘subaltern realism’. This theory can be applied to any states of ‘inferior rank’ on the world’s periphery. Using classic realism, Ayoob provides useful insights into both domestic and international politics in the third world. He suggests that contemporary leaders of the third world are imitating the leaders of European states in the early modern period.


Their primary aim, as with their European predecessors, is to build up their states in regards to their economic strength, administrative capacity, and military power. Ayoob argues that in building state strength, war fighting and intervention in neighbouring states is a rational part of the process.621

Clarke suggests that Ayoob, like Machiavelli and Hobbes, the political philosophers of early modern Europe, take for granted that domestic and foreign policies are unavoidably linked, and both of them support the nationalist aim of state building. Among interveners in the Congo, Uganda is the best illustration of this. President Yoweri Museveni appears to have been building up the economy and military strength of the Ugandan state since his arrival to power in 1986. Given the extensive amounts of natural resources and wealth that has been acquired from the Congo by Uganda since 1998, it is possible to perceive the invasion and occupation as part of a rational plan to strengthen the Ugandan economy at the Congo’s expense.622

David has also put forward a similar theory that sees a developing state’s military intervention into a neighbouring state as that of ‘leadership survival in the face of domestic threats’.623 Clarke points out that one may concur with Ayoob that domestic politics are central to the foreign policies of domestic states without agreeing that rulers are actually increasing their states’ capacities. It has been a common theme in Africa for rulers to be concerned almost solely with the business of staying in power, regardless of the impact of their behaviour on the state.624

While this realist approach is useful in many ways, it is also limited for a number of reasons. First, it is not at all clear that the overall trend from these wars is one which the involved states are getting stronger. It has been suggested that Uganda may be a candidate for an increase in state strength, but for Sierra Leone and the Congo, the wars have only served to weaken the state. This may be due to the current global context in which alterations to colonial drawn boundaries are extremely difficult to achieve. Another global context limiting the scope and usefulness of realism in this situation is the international community’s weak stomach for wars, even if the latter do have a potential to strengthen states.

Given the belief of Liberals that liberal democracies are less likely to go to war against each other, the West and the international community have aimed their policies in Africa towards building up liberal democracies in the region. This has included the use of structural adjustment programs, which have involved tight monetary and fiscal policy, less scope for government and reduced governmental intrusion in markets and enterprises. Uganda, with one of the most liberal economies in Africa, has been coined a World Bank Structural Adjustment success

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625 See Clark, J. 2002, pg. 5.
626 Orogun, P. 2003, pg. 311.
story. However, despite the progress towards liberalism that the state has made, it has been one of the most heavily involved in the Congo war.\textsuperscript{631}

Furthermore, although post-cold war optimists following the liberal line of thought have suggested that capitalism, peace and democracy are natural bedfellows, Keen’s research suggests that this view should be cautioned. Free enterprise, as is commonly promoted by international institutions such as the World Bank, has frequently taken violent forms, and increased economic violence has often replaced the vacuum left with the departure of the cold war superpowers from the developing world.\textsuperscript{632} Globalisation has created new opportunities for elites and competing actors within wars to pursue their economic agendas through trade, investment, and migration ties, both legal and illegal, to neighbouring states and to more distant, industrialised economies.\textsuperscript{633} As Radicals correctly point, there is a significant role played by globalisation in the development and continuation of these wars in Africa. Radical theory draws attention to the inequalities existing in the current global system and asks us to question the situation that has some states and actors operating with a disproportionate amount of power and wealth, often referred to as the ‘core’, whilst others operate as the ‘periphery’ with little power and wealth.\textsuperscript{634} Querying the neo-liberal capitalist system where the acquisition of profit is the main driving force can help to provide answers for these wars in Africa. For example, some degree of monitored capitalism which provides a level of governance or rules to operating in the global economy could be useful. That way the resources being sold on international

\textsuperscript{631} Clark, J. 2002, pg. 7.
\textsuperscript{632} Keen, D. 1998, pg. 71.
\textsuperscript{633} Berdal, M. and Malone, D. 2000, pg. 3.
markets from these war zones could be prevented from being sold. Another way in which radical theory could have been used for these cases is because in each case study the state was weak due to warlord actors that operated in each state as they controlled resources. If the people/the State owned the resources in a collective fashion it would not be possible for such actors to weaken state institutions and depriving the people of funds for basic needs that they should enjoy.

**A COMBINATION OF MOTIVES FOR INVOLVEMENT: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC**

As can be seen by the case studies, surrounding state intervention in African civil wars is driven by a multiplicity of forces. In this thesis I have shown that neighbouring states participate in domestic wars in their region for both political and economic reasons. The political motives for involvement often stem from surrounding states’ perceived threats to either the state itself, or the security of a particular regime within that state. Another political motive that emerged from the case studies was the desire for increased power by particular regimes in power in Africa. Amongst these cases, the level of legitimacy of claims of these perceived threats varies. For example, Rwanda and Uganda’s role in the Congo war was possibly more legitimate than Taylor’s role in the Sierra Leone war, and Zimbabwe’s role in the Congo war. For the Liberian state was not threatened by the actions of Sierra Leone, and although Taylor’s regime survival may have been threatened by actions taken by the then Sierra Leone government, Taylor’s regime was hardly a legitimate governing body in itself. Similarly, it is very difficult to argue that the Zimbabwean state was threatened by the war in the Congo. But the security of the Rwandan and Ugandan states, on the other hand, was at least to some extent threatened by the actions of the Congolese
government and the advancements of the security situation there. The case studies also found that political reasons tend to provide the initial driving force behind the involvement by neighbouring states in domestic wars in Africa, and those economic benefits that may be attained through participation in the war serve more as a means to fund and prolong the involvement. This final chapter will use these findings to present policy suggestions for the future.

As just stated, the main political motive for neighbouring state involvement in weak state wars in Africa is the perceived threat to regime or state security by the neighbouring state, stemming from actions of a particular group within the war-torn state. Others have also cited expansionism as a reason for involvement in such wars; however this argument has substantially less evidence to back it up. Given that the main political force driving neighbouring states to intervene is the security threat posed by the weak state, I would argue that the most logical response is for the international community to assist the weak state in securing its own boundaries. If Rwanda and Uganda did not perceive the Hutu that fled to the Congo to be a potential danger to their states, and the regimes in power there, they would have no justifiable reason to remain involved in the Congolese war. If they did continue the involvement, one would have to suggest that economic motives were then predominantly driving their involvement. Economic motives cannot be, and are not, deemed by the international community as an acceptable reason for participating in, and subsequently heightening and prolonging, warfare.
ADDRESSING THE ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR SURROUNDING STATE INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICAN CIVIL WARS

The identification of economic motives and the role of natural resources in perpetuating wars in Africa provides policy makers with a path for developing policies designed to instigate peace in war-torn African states. For example, many of the primary commodity resources, particularly in weak and war-torn states originate in highly informal market channels but make their way onto world markets. Therefore, one way of preventing these resources from being used to fuel warfare may be to prevent illegitimate goods from gaining access to legitimate channels.  

One initiative that has been put in place in an attempt to control and monitor the flow of natural resources that fuel warfare is the Kimberley process. It was designed to shut rebel organisations out of the global market for rough diamonds. This process will have been effective even if rebels are still able to sell the diamonds they extort from local producers, as long as the price the rebels can get on the illicit market is driven to a deep discount. It is too early to judge whether the Kimberley process will be a sustainable success. If it proves ineffective, intergovernmental legislation will have to reinforce the current private, voluntary agreement. If, however, the Kimberley process succeeds, then it could provide a model for the governance of other commodities that inadvertently fund conflict, notably timber and coltan.  

There is also no reason why this method cannot extend to include those in surrounding states seen to be plundering resources in weaker war-torn states and prolonging war there.

Each commodity transaction has a financial counterpart. Just as at some point in the chain of physical transactions a conflict diamond switches from being illicit to licit, so at some point in the chain of financial transactions money is laundered. Monitoring and investigating the financial transactions may often be easier than tracking the physical transactions. Requiring official scrutiny of physical transactions at some points, notably customs, in relation to information about counterpart financial transactions may also be useful. Left to its own devices, the international banking system is unlikely to provide the necessary degree of scrutiny, as the pressures of competition encourage secrecy and complicity rather than active scrutiny.637

The reduction in economic support provided by superpowers at the end of the Cold War has encouraged internal plunder and the use of more violent methods by elites to make money and build political support.638 Aid may reduce the likelihood of those in poverty turning to war in pursuit of sustenance.639 For even aid that is stolen can help lower market prices and prevent people from turning to violence in order to sustain themselves. In Sierra Leone, those fleeing the violence were often faced with the choice of starving to death, or joining an armed band – whether it be the government forces or a rebel group. Those attempting to influence parties at war to end the conflict must take into account what considerations the warring parties are adding up in their decision-making. In this case particularly, reducing the economic benefits of violence is extremely important, as is creating incentives for peace.640

639 Keen, D. 2000, pg. 37.
640 Keen, D. 2000, pg. 37.
However, in addition to the aid, in order to achieve economic prosperity the central government within the particular weak state must adopt policies that are conducive to growth. Markets need to be kept competitive so that one warlord or group cannot monopolise trade and use that to control population in that particular area. Collier has also suggested that policies be directed towards competition in order to decrease profit margins and therefore incentive for conflict.\textsuperscript{641} The international community could also try to diversify the economies of these weak states through development assistance. This could work to reduce risks produced by a high dependency on primary commodity exports for income.\textsuperscript{642}

Warring sides, whether it is the government, rebel groups or neighbouring states acting in and perpetuating weak state wars, are usually heavily dependent on external support and supplies.\textsuperscript{643} Following from this, some have suggested that aid disbursements to surrounding states involved in such wars should in some cases be made conditional on their compliance with the relevant peace agreements and on verifiable measures taken to halt the illegal and illicit exploitation of the resources in the conflict-ridden states.\textsuperscript{644}

However, over the past decade support for comprehensive economic sanctions, such as trade embargoes or the withholding of development assistance, has deteriorated. The weaknesses of such methods have become clear, including their undesirable impact on civilian populations and their non-efficacious nature. As a result of this, policymakers have turned to targeted financial sanctions that attack directly the

\textsuperscript{641} Collier, 2000, pg. 91-110.
\textsuperscript{642} Collier, 2000, pg. 106.
personal financial and commercial interests of the leadership responsible for the unacceptable behaviour.\textsuperscript{645} Thus far, most of the preparatory work in the field has been done at the Expert Seminars on Targeting UN Financial Sanctions in Interlaken in 1998 and 1999. The introductory paper for the Interlaken conference described targeted financial sanctions as ‘measures such as the freeze of foreign assets of specifically designated individuals, companies or governments that particularly contribute to the threat of peace and security.’\textsuperscript{646} To facilitate this process, there also must be systems that require states, and particular groups within states, to divulge what earnings are being made through what sources.\textsuperscript{647} Most financial sanctions refer to the freezing of assets or asset blocking. The terms are interchangeable. If a property, whether it be a vehicle or a bank account, is blocked or frozen, title to this property remains with the designated country, individual or entity. However, exercise of powers and privileges normally associated with ownership is prohibited without authorisation by the appropriate authority. ‘Refusal to deal’ can also be another form of financial sanction and includes the prohibition of any financial or commercial dealings with particular individuals or entities.\textsuperscript{648}

Such sanctions, however, are not easily enforced. The international financial structure of today is intended to operate outside state control. Nonetheless, structures and systems can be implemented to facilitate emplacement and enforcement of financial sanctions and there is certainly a role to be played by financial sanctions in breaking down warfare that is perpetuated by the funds attained through international channels.

\textsuperscript{648} Porteous, S. 2000, pp. 174-75.
As Porteous has also pointed out, financial sanctions are substantially cheaper than military intervention as well.  

It must be asked, however, who should instigate and develop these responses to civil wars where surrounding state actors have become involved and where economic motives can be seen to be prolonging the conflict? Some have suggested that relatively strong African states such as Nigeria and South Africa should play a role in achieving regional peace, and even deploying armed forces in domestic conflicts.

**WHO SHOULD BE RESPONDING?**

Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and potentially one of its strongest in regards to extending its influence on neighbouring African states, and even events outside the continent. Within the West African sub-region, Nigeria boasts the largest economy, military and population, with it subsequently regarding itself to be a sub-regional ‘hegemonic power’.  

During the 1970s, a clear foreign policy focus, backed up with strong economic performance, gave Nigeria an important stake in the African continent, with its ideas and opinions valued and respected. It also made a name for itself within the international community. However, since the early 1980s and increasingly throughout the 1990s, a number of forces brought a disintegration of Nigeria’s influence in the domestic, regional and international arenas.

Nonetheless, Nigeria played a substantial role in preventing the RUF and its AFRC collaborators from taking control of Sierra Leone. During their time in Sierra Leone
some 700 Nigerian troops were killed. Nigerian and Kamajor forces were also influential in reinstalling the democratically elected President Kabbah nine months after he was overthrown in 1997. Furthermore, Nigerian forces led the offensive to drive back the RUF/AFRC forces in the aftermath of the rebel attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999.\textsuperscript{652} However, it has been suggested that Nigeria's primary interest in Sierra Leone was diamonds.\textsuperscript{653} Overall, in regards to Nigeria’s military intervention in West Africa, in particular Sierra Leone and Liberia, it has been suggested that there was more cause for caution than optimism. State sponsorship of insurrection from neighbouring states, it can be argued, is at the root of regional instability and is therefore an inappropriate response to the breakdown of stability in the region.\textsuperscript{654}

Given the distinct lack of interest by great powers such as the US in Africa’s turmoil,\textsuperscript{655} South Africa has been left the prime candidate for playing a leadership role in resolving the continent’s problems.\textsuperscript{656} However, South Africa has also chosen to limit its area of involvement to its immediate region South African Development Community (SADC). It was particularly reluctant to intervene in the Great Lakes Region, yet it was later forced to adopt a leadership role in the peace process there. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF), under the new leadership has engaged in major operations, such as mine clearing in Angola and Mozambique.\textsuperscript{657} Nonetheless it appears unwilling to commit heavily to any military ventures in other

\begin{thebibliography}{999}
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\item Leatherwood, D.G. 2001, pp. 76-81.
\item Retyntjens, F. ‘The first African world war’, \textit{Africa Now}, August/September 2000, pg. 25.
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African states,\textsuperscript{658} and it was even accused of providing arms that have fuelled wars in states such as Angola and Rwanda.\textsuperscript{659}

Overall, I would argue that regional powers acting unilaterally in domestic wars has the potential to add fuel to the fire, as opposed to putting it out. It is unlikely that states will act with no self-interest, simply for the good of the war-torn state. The Congo, for example, is already fraught with intervening actors pursuing their own goals within its borders and does not need another state doing so. States such as South Africa should also cease in providing arms to groups that continue using violent means to achieve their goals. Furthermore, in regards specifically to the responses suggested in this thesis, I would argue that regional powers have neither the economic nor military strength to influence the situation to the extent that is needed, at least not alone.\textsuperscript{660} However, having said this, regional powers could play a positive role in a multilateral context given their military strength and resources at their disposal. The following sections will examine the various possible multilateral actions that could be taken.

African regional bodies have long been cited as the most viable actors to negotiate and maintain peace in the region, especially given the absence of great powers in the region.\textsuperscript{661} Examples of such regional bodies include the African Union (AU), which was officially launched in 2002 to replace the 39-year old Organization of African Unity as a framework for increased cooperation across the continent. Under South


\textsuperscript{660} Africa News Service, ‘Regulating illicit trade in natural resources’, 26 November 2003, pg. NA.

\textsuperscript{661} Wright, S. 1999, pg. 16.
African leadership, the AU embraced the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), designed to increase cooperation among African states, donor countries, and multilateral organisations. Africans welcomed the prospect of new commitments to unity but many are still unwilling to act more decisively as one entity within international affairs or to promote economic and political integration at the expense of national interests.662

One major facet of the AU is that it is looking to develop an African standby force, with the aim for it to be implemented by 2010. In legitimate situations, this force is proposed to undertake peacekeeping operations, as well as military interventions, humanitarian operations and post-conflict reconstruction. One of the main aims is to prevent unconstitutional changes of government in African states. According to the New African: “It will also tackle mercenaries and situations where democratically-elected governments lose legitimacy for various reasons other than through democratic means”.663 Such a force would have been, and still could be extremely useful in the situation in the Congo, as well as Sierra Leone and many other African states such as Sudan where conflicts are ongoing.

The East African Community has also embraced the regionalisation of conflict resolution, promotion of security and good governance, which was recognised in the Draft Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.664 In 1980, the SADC was set up to reduce the region's economic dependency on apartheid South

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Africa. It later embraced majority-ruled South Africa and, in 1995, set about acquiring a new political and security role. Its mandate was then extended past its anticipated direction when it was called to act with the outbreak of war in the Congo in 1997, causing a rift between member states. Overall, however, the record of these organisations to date has in large been poor. These regional bodies, up against the pressures of globalisation and states’ unwillingness to relinquish their sovereignty, have continually had to adapt and regroup in order to assert any influence on the region. Like the regional powers in Africa, African regional bodies do not have the economic pull and military strength to carry out the responses suggested in this thesis, however they could play a valuable role assisting the UN in doing so.

The United Nations is one actor that could play a significant role in these domestic conflicts where neighbouring states become involved. The United Nations sent peacekeeping missions to both Sierra Leone and the Congo with varying success. In January 2002 when the Sierra Leone government announced that the country’s decade-long war was over, a 17,000-strong UN peacekeeping force supervised disarmament and patrolled the countryside. In the Congo, UN peacekeeping forces proved largely ineffectual. In particular, in the Eastern Congo the force had only 4300 troops, who spent much of their time guarding UN compounds, and tended to steer clear of places where fighting had erupted. As a result, tribal militias whose only weapons of mass destruction may be machetes and a few old guns have been able to massacre with impunity. Nonetheless, the United Nations potentially has the

666 Wright, S. 1999, pg. 16.
669 The Economist (US), ‘Turning machetes back into farm tools; Congo's war’, 366:8317, 2003, pg. NA.
capacity to help weak states protect their boundaries, which could help alleviate both the weak states’ concerns of neighbouring states taking advantage of their weakness and plundering their resources; and to dispel the threat to neighbouring states who see the weak states as a potential breeding ground for regional instability. For example, if Rwanda and Uganda could have been assured that the Hutu Interahamwe and other rebel groups could not pose a threat to their own states’ security, they would have had no justifiable reason to be in the Congo. If they were to remain there with no justifiable security concerns, much like Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Congo, the international community could assume that economic plunder was the primary motive for the involvement. This is a situation that should not be deemed acceptable and towards which substantive action should be taken in regards to the main actors.

The international community’s response has thus far consisted of genuine attempts to investigate clandestine linkages and to ‘name and shame’ the countries, political leaders, private businesses, and the individuals that have promoted, colluded or supported the illegal trade of natural resources, particularly diamonds. The long-term goal of the United Nations Security Council is to permanently eradicate the mechanisms and processes that have allowed these resource-based conflicts to thrive and perpetuate regional insecurity and political instability in Africa. Specifically, in order to do this the United Nations has undertaken moves such as economic sanctions such as the development of the Kimberley Process-diamond certification scheme in an attempt to verify the origination of diamonds sold on the international markets.670

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670 Orogun, P. 2003, pg. 293.
Other groups such as the European Union can also use their economic power in attempts to prevent the behaviour of plunder from taking place, and to punish those responsible for it. In 2000, British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook produced a new intelligence report on Liberia that persuaded the European Union to freeze US$47 million in development funds for Taylor's government.\(^\text{671}\)

For the United Nations’ (and European Union for that matter) initiatives to be successful it will generally require support from at least one major power, such as the United States.\(^\text{672}\) It is in the best interest of the United States and states involved in the War on Terror to promote peace and strong states given the current climate of terrorism, as war-torn and failing states have proven to be a breeding ground for terrorism.\(^\text{673}\) The United States was involved in peace processes and negotiations towards peace in Sierra Leone and the Congo wars. And shortly after the United Nations supervised disarmament in 2002, the 'new' British-trained Sierra Leone Army began to deploy near Sierra Leone's borders with Liberia and Guinea, ahead of elections which were scheduled for May.\(^\text{674}\)

The Clinton administration was committed to the 1999 Lusaka Agreement for peace in the Congo including the involvement of UN peacekeeping troops, and establishing a cease-fire in the DRC. The Clinton administration also endorsed a tightening of the ban on illegal diamond trading, in an attempt to restrict the ability of the various Congolese rebel factions, as well as UNITA in Angola to fund and continue at war.\(^\text{675}\)


\(^{675}\) Turner, T. 2000, pg. 3.
However, proposals set out by the United Nations in 2001, including embargoing the import or export of strategic minerals were not accepted well by the US State Department, who has indicated that it is unlikely to recommend sanctions against its African allies as it would block Western corporations' access to strategic minerals. Furthermore, according to East African media reports, Rwanda and Uganda are allies of the US in the Great Lakes region and they subsequently the US does not want to accuse or pressure either Kagme or Museveni. UN sources also reported that James Cunningham, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, merely asked Uganda to address the UN findings in a constructive way. Montague and Berrigan also noted that the IMF and World Bank declared that they would not be changing their policies toward Rwanda and Uganda.

There are also a number of other ways in which these powers could have been more responsive such wars in Africa. The United Nations Expert Panel tried to use the voluntary OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) Guidelines for Multinational Corporations to enforce investigations into the corporate role in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo; but governments of the OECD countries, the world’s most industrialised nations, have thus far taken no action. Furthermore, the United States should stop its flow of weapons and military training to those involved in the Congo conflict.

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679 Turner, T. 2000, pg. 3
During the 1990s alone, the United States gave more than US$200 million worth of equipment and military training to African armies, including six of the seven that have had troops involved in Congo's civil war. At the same time, the United States continued to cut development assistance to Africa and was unable (or unwilling) to promote alternative non-violent forms of engagement. Washington could further help create the conditions needed for peace and stability by unconditionally cancelling the debt accrued by Zaire under Mobutu, pressuring the international financial institutions to do the same, and greatly increasing its level of development assistance to Africa.

The United States and Britain should support the United Nations in securing weak states’ borders, if only for their own benefit in the future. The United States does not need another failed state in which terrorism can thrive and breed. Furthermore, the United States is the leader in imposing financial sanctions against individuals and organisations, with numerous executive orders freezing assets and blocking financial dealings. Much of this has been a part of the American-led ‘War on Terror’ and is aimed at drug traffickers, terrorists and their supporters. However, if this sort of attention can be directed towards such individuals and groups, it would seem appropriate that potentially more destructive and dangerous political leaders acting in African weak state wars are treated similarly.

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680 Hochschild, A. 2003, pg. 5.
682 Turner, T. 2000, pg. 3.
CONCLUSION

Overall this thesis has shown a number of points about the role of neighbouring states in weak state wars in Africa. First, the involvement of these surrounding states tends to prolong and intensify warring by adding arms and resources to the conflict. Second, neighbouring states participate in these wars for a multitude of reasons – both political and economical. While on the political side, state and regime security and stability concerns appear to drive neighbouring states’ involvement in weak state wars in Africa. On the economic side, the plunder of resources from within the weak state appears to serve to fund the continued warfare or may simply be a money-making venture.

To be certain, many lives and much devastation could have been prevented if these wars had not been perpetuated and drawn out by the actions of neighbouring states. Although this thesis was not intended to be prescriptive, I have concluded with a very brief section containing recommendations for the future. I have suggested that weak states need assistance from bodies such as the United Nations in securing their boundaries; and that restrictive measures need to be taken vis-a-vis the role of companies and individuals involved in arms supply and resource plundering. Due to the humanitarian impact of embargoes and moratoriums banning the export of raw materials originating in war-torn states, I have suggested that targeted financial sanctions, as well as a number of other responses including aid and assistance in diversifying the economies of the affected states are the more preferable methods of dealing with this problem. The recent renewal of war in the Sudan shows that such wars in Africa, unfortunately, are still occurring and could develop in the future. Sudan, blessed with substantial oil reserves is a target for neighbouring, and even
international states meddling in its war and therefore prolonging it. Going into the future, however, hopefully decision-makers heed some of the messages in this thesis and act decisively and quickly to prevent the devastation as was seen in Sierra Leone and the Congo.
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