Chapter two

The historical sensibility

Whereas the French Revolution had sought to remove God from history, the American Revolution had ‘generated a different moral strategy’. The providence that had enlightened Puritan New England would be seen in the nineteenth century as continuing to manifest in history to guide the development of the young Protestant republic and this was certainly the view of George Bancroft (1800–1891). Although trained principally as a Greek scholar, Bancroft earned his reputation as the ‘father of American History’ through his monumental, ten-volume *History of the United States* (1834–73), a paean to American liberty that by virtue of its more than twenty editions became *the* nineteenth-century standard work. Here, ‘Providence was present in every chapter’ and although Bancroft recognised human agency in history, such agency was for him ‘woven into a fabric of providential design’.¹

Contemporaneous with Bancroft were three men who broadened the national historiography to encompass the American continent and beyond: William Hinkling Prescott (1796–1859), John Lothrop Motley (1814–1877) and Francis Parkman (1823–1893). From his regnal histories of Ferdinand and Isabella and of Phillip the Second, through to his accounts of the conquests of Mexico and Peru, Prescott traced the history of Spain across the Americas. Motley traced the roots of the Protestant United States to the Protestant United Netherlands, whereas Parkman focussed on the histories of French and English involvement in North America, particularly where their interests clashed on the Canadian border. These were the American patrician historians who established the dominant nineteenth-century genre of romantic, patriotic and heroic history written in a literary style that echoed that of their English counterparts. Bancroft read Gibbon daily, Motley was ‘indoctrinated with Carlyle’s version of great men in history’ and both Prescott and Parkman were avid readers of Sir Walter Scott.²
Integral to their romantic view of America was an ambivalent attitude towards Indians. As Enlightenment men, they could pay homage to the idea of the ‘noble savage’ but actual Indians were for them less than human: an element of the howling wilderness, ‘wild as the savage scene … often [the] merciless butchers of defenceless mothers, maidens, and babes’. An exception to this view was taken by the eccentric Richard Hildreth (1807–1865), an early scientific historian who sought to present ‘plain facts in plain English; with no interest but justice, and no aim but truth’. Hildreth’s English was perhaps too plain for him ever to be a popular historian but his History of America (1849–52) did become a college text book and although he felt Indians to be less civilised than Anglo-Americans, they were nonetheless full human beings and therefore human justice was their due. That Indians had in fact suffered great injustice at the hands of the whites was, according to Hildreth, because of the ‘religious and racial assumptions of Anglo-Americans [and] aggressive, land-hungry attitude of the frontiersmen’. A view that, fifty years later, would find resonance in Abel’s work.

The honour of being the first academic historian of the United States arguably belongs to Jared Sparks (1789–1866) who was renowned for his assiduous research into the American Revolution and works of historical biography on quintessential Americans such as George Washington and Benjamin Franklin. In recognition of his efforts, which included the twelve-volume Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution (1829–30), Sparks was appointed as Maclean Professor of History at Harvard in 1832, ‘the first chair distinctly devoted to that subject in the United States’. Yet these erudite gentlemen, including Sparks, were all amateurs, not in the unremunerative or disparaging meaning of the word but in the sense that none had received formal, academic training as historians.

Scion of one of the nation’s pre-eminent families, Henry Adams (1838–1918) was likewise a patrician historian but he was also among the first of a generation of scientifically trained professors of the discipline. Like many of his contemporaries he had studied in Germany and in 1870 was appointed as a professor of medieval history at Harvard where he employed the rigorous German seminar method; introduced into America the previous year by Charles Kendall Adams (1835–1902), this would become a central practice of scholastic history. Henry Adams left Harvard in 1877 to pursue other interests, but he continued to write and publish historical
works and Abel came to consider his nine-volume History of the United States of America, 1801–1817 (1889–91) to be ‘the best general history for the period covered’.

Even in the midst of the Civil War it had been recognised that the conflict would ‘for the next century be a matter of historical research’ and it was the reorganisation of higher learning after the Civil War, which began to transform a collection of pedagogical colleges into a research based, national university system that would see the discipline of history established firmly in the curriculum. It was at Johns Hopkins, established in 1876 as the first research university in America, where ‘the professional historian materialised in the guise of a teacher-specialist’. Across a post-bellum America that now had more time for the mind, some two hundred learned and professional societies had come into existence. As the discipline of history became more collegial it, too, sought professional status with prominent academic historians among those calling for the establishment of a professional body in the early 1880s. A preliminary meeting of the American Historical Association (AHA) was held in Saratoga, New York, on 9 September 1884 and the following day some forty academics, generals, divines and politicians (including the former president, Rutherford Hayes) enrolled to become its founding members. Although the discipline of history had retained a New England middle-class focus, by the early twentieth century it had thus undergone a broad, three-phase development: ‘Puritan, Patrician and Professional’.

Yet it was the need, widely felt across the profession, for the discipline of history to have a scientific basis that would have more profound effects on its development. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, as new technologies such as the railway and the telegraph wrought rapid continental expansion, science became a dominant force in shaping American life. At the same time, emergent theories of evolution began to challenge the providential assumptions upon which the religious beliefs and historical perceptions of most Americans were founded. Indeed, with this combination of technological progress in the world and scientific understanding of the world, science now appeared to hold, potentially, all the answers to the world’s ills; and although Americans generally retained a strong religiosity, the imminence of providence began to give way to the teleology of progress.
At the heart of the scientific project lay an empirical search for truth—or at least for ‘the facts’—and to establish their discipline on such an empirical basis, professional historians now sought to move away from the heroic, almost fictive history of the patrician romantics. After all, evolutionary science described what was essentially an historical process and therefore human history could now be considered scientifically as a ‘part of a comprehensible cosmogony’. ¹¹ Yet to be able to make scientific claims, history as a discipline first had to adopt scientific practices, and foremost among these was the seminar. ¹² Instead of pedagogical, rote learning from standard texts, seminar students would now prepare a discussion of historical questions based on set readings, thus transforming the classroom into a scientific, historical laboratory. Thousands of nineteenth-century American academics, including many historians, had been trained in Germany and from that country America adopted both the seminar method and the teachings of arguably the greatest German historical seminarian, Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), ‘whose name was constantly invoked as an inspirational model by turn-of-the-century American historians’. ¹³ Ranke placed great emphasis on the evidence to be found in primary documents, believing it to provide the essential data of empirical inquiry. While studying at Frankfurt in the 1820s, he had read Sir Walter Scott’s historical novel Quentin Durward (1823) and found himself ‘offended by Scott’s romantic liberties with the facts … and resolved in his [own] works to avoid all imaginary and fictitious elements’. ¹⁴ In the preface to his first book Ranke wrote:

To history has been attributed the function to judge the past, to instruct ourselves for the advantage of the future. Such a lofty function the present work does not attempt. It aims merely to show how it actually took place. ¹⁵

As Peter Novick has argued, it was this last sentence (‘Er will blos zeigen wie es eigentlich gewesen’ in the original) that American scientific historians came to take at face value, transvaluing a mere programmatic statement into a Rankean imperative and giving American scientific historians a scholarly imprimatur for their obsession with the facts. ¹⁶ Ranke actually believed the world to be divinely ordered and although he was convinced that (among other things) historical research required the extraction of the pure facts, he was also convinced that such facts had a spiritual content. It was not only with the revelation of the objective facts that Ranke was concerned, but that such a revelation would open the researcher to a subjective ‘flow of intuitive perception’ about such facts. ¹⁷
As Novick also suggested, it is now difficult to understand the force of Ranke’s impact because he had retired before any American scholars had sustained, first-hand contact with him and by 1895 most English translations of his works had long been out of print. Earlier historians had been as assiduous in documentary research as Ranke; but whereas they had applied their research as a means to serve epic or political ends, the scientific historians sought to apply the Rankean imperative and transform research into a quest for an objective history, scientifically arrived at and untainted by subjective concerns: literally ‘to show how it actually took place’. Such empiricism, however, privileged the documentary evidence that came overwhelmingly from official sources rather than more spurious, subaltern ones:

as official sources delimited the research methodologies of professional historians, these men in turn fetishized the written document and the apparatus associated with its production.

The discursive seminar certainly encouraged collegial collaboration, and multi-volume historical compendia, which continued to be popular in America, were now the products of collaborative effort rather than that of solitary scholars working in splendid isolation. In contrast, the seminar method also gave historians the opportunity to explore a single topic scientifically through monographs, which came:

in a rising tide, which steadily mounted to a flood. The ambitious Ph.D.’s attacked every problem that could be handled within moderate space, endeavouring to exhaust the sources bearing thereon and to frame a narrative or exposition that should be rigidly accurate, impeccably documented, and absolutely without prejudice.

Like their patrician forebears, the new profession of historians was drawn largely from upper and middle-class Anglo-Saxon Protestants who, from their vantage point in the eastern states, continued to look over the collective Atlantic shoulder for historical roots and meanings. Alarmed at the influx of immigrants from Catholic Ireland, Southern Italy, and the Slavonic parts of Europe their fears found a scientific imprimatur in the doctrine of social Darwinism, an elaboration of evolutionary theory that conflated the survival struggle of species with that of race and culture. Promulgated in America—most notably by Herbert Spencer (1820–1903)—social Darwinism proposed that the level of industrial civilisation, cultural sophistication and worldwide political dominance which the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant ‘race’ had achieved was indicative of its evolutionary success as expressed in the historical
struggle between nations. Spencer’s genius, if it may be called that, was the promulgation of what, in the nineteenth century, amounted to a ‘theory of everything’. From the elementary physical principles of force and energy, Spencer constructed a libertarian Weltanschauung, which, by moving from homogeneity to heterogeneity via biological evolution, arrived at the ‘organism’ of modern society. This theory was enormously influential in America because it coincided precisely with the capitalist, laissez-faire sensibilities of the time and it was Spencer who coined the infamous phrase that became both a slogan of, and a scientific rationale for, the Gilded Age—‘the survival of the fittest’.  

As early as 1858, the topic of American history had become infected with Teutonic germs. With ethnic–national identities reinforced with racial histories, the Patrician historians had earlier seen ‘odds in the blood’ and tracing the origins of their own apparent racial success led later professionals ‘to interpret the facts in accordance with the theory that American institutions were Teutonic in origin’. This idea was derived largely from the work of the English historian Edward Augustus Freeman (1823–1892) who postulated an Aryan origin for the peoples of Europe. According to Freeman, these Aryans had given rise to not only the earlier civilisations of Greece and Rome but also that of the Teutons, the ‘recipients of the finest fruits of the racial heritage’. This heritage—the finest fruit of which was the nation state—had become corrupted in Europe by Romance influence; but in England—in spite of the Roman and Norman invasions—it had remained intact to become manifest in that country’s political institutions. Thus Freeman came to regard the English sociopolitical ideal of individual freedoms guarded by a parliamentary system as a direct descendant of the putative democracy of the German tun, the primordial village of the ancient Teutonic forests. This ideal had crossed the Atlantic where it evolved into the New England town meeting from which emerged the greatest flowering of the Teutonic libertarian impulse, the United States Constitution, the nation’s founding document.  

Teutonic Germ Theory flourished at the very moment that Spencer was at his most influential: if history could now be seen as a racial, evolutionary process, then the search for origins became imperative. The champion of such ideas was Herbert Baxter Adams (1850–1901), the history seminarian at Johns Hopkins who discovered in the ancient Teutonic forests the ‘germs of our state and national life’. Such
notions also found favour among such luminaries of the profession as Albert
Bushnell Hart (1854–1953) at Harvard, John Burgess (1844–1931) at Columbia, and
Abel’s instructor at Cornell Moses Coit Tyler (1835–1900) who ‘was so
impressed … with the international implications of the Teutonic hypothesis’ that he
came to view the American Revolutionary War as a ‘needless race feud’.

In spite of all these new theories and methods, the providential view of history
had not been abandoned. In 1845, the journalist John O’Sullivan had declared—as a
justification for the annexation of Texas—that it was America’s ‘manifest destiny to
overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our
multiplying millions’. For John Fiske (1842–1901)—historian, polymath and
fervent disciple of Spencer—it was indeed the destiny of the Anglo-Teutonic race to
civilise and sublimate the world, a destiny that in America had already become
manifest. Having settled the continent, the only question left for civilised people to
decide was, according to Fiske:

by what process of modification the barbarous races are to maintain their foothold
upon the earth at all. While once such people threatened the very continuance of
civilization, they now exist only on sufferance.

Fiske popularised his ideas in a lecture entitled, appropriately enough, ‘Manifest
Destiny’—first given at Boston in the centennial year of 1879 and published six
years later by which time it had been delivered some fifty times across America,
one to President Hayes and members of his cabinet.

Yet by the time Abel went to Yale in 1902, the discipline of history had begun to
move on. Harvard’s Edward Channing (1856–1931) had challenged the Teutonic
Germ Theory and argued it could be equally demonstrated that the origins of New
England towns lay in the ‘Masai enclosure of Central Africa’. In 1898, Frederick
Jackson Turner had expounded his frontier thesis that gave rise to American
exceptionalism: the meanings of America could be found in America without the
need for European origins. With the frontier now closed, America society began to
examine itself more closely and eventually found formulation in James Harvey
Robinson’s New History, published in 1912, which challenged the patrician
predilection for the ‘great men’ of history. In the same year, Charles Beard’s An
Economic Interpretation of the American Constitution sought to demonstrate that the
republic’s revered foundation document was born not from the lofty ideals of
democracy and justice, but from a pragmatism that sought to protect the property rights of the wealthy.

As well-established professionals, Abel’s academic mentors were not overly influenced by these new trends and clung to race theories and Rankean methodologies. Originally trained for the Episcopalian priesthood, Moses Coit Tyler had been professor of English language and literature at the University of Michigan from 1867 until 1881 before moving to Cornell to occupy the chair of American history. He was a member of the original committee of five that had called for the formation of the AHA and a few months later became one of its founding members. Tyler was identified with the Imperial school of history: that current of revisionist thought emerging from the prevailing doctrine of Anglo-Saxonism, which privileged the ‘unique virtues and mission of that “race”’. Although Abel certainly maintained this racialist tradition, Tyler’s influence on her, perhaps should not be over-emphasised: she was one of his last students at Cornell and then only for three months since he died on almost the last day of the old century, 28 December 1900.

When she moved to Yale, Abel came under the tutelage of two important scholars of the period, Edward Gaylord Bourne (1860–1908) and George Burton Adams (1851–1925), both followers of Ranke. Bourne was the son of a New England village minister; from early childhood he suffered from lameness, a handicap that eventually resulted in his death at the age of only forty-eight. His Essays in Historical Criticism (1901) included a tribute to Ranke that was originally delivered as an address to the AHA in Washington on 21 December 1895, the centenary of the great man’s birth. Here Bourne contended that in the development of ‘the historical way of looking at things’, the nineteenth century had been the most conspicuous hundred years since the Renaissance and that no-one had contributed to that development more than Ranke. Most particularly, Bourne stressed the importance that Ranke gave to the critical reading of primary sources and concluded that in this regard his work was epoch-making. The Spanish–American war had engendered a certain amount of interest in Latin American history among early-twentieth-century American historians, and Bourne’s Spain in America, 1450–1580 (1905) was the first important work to inform this interest. Described as one of the best of the twenty-seven collaborative volumes of the ‘American Nation’
series (1904–08), it ‘reflected the … interest in the transmission and modification of European institutions’.32

Like many historians of the period, George Burton Adams (1851–1925) came from an ecclesiastical background; he earned his Bachelor of Divinity at Yale in 1877 and it was there that he spent most of his career teaching history while building the history department practically from scratch.33 He published works on English medieval history but was more renowned as an outstanding historian of the English constitution and, like his colleague Bourne, he was a declared follower of Ranke. Adams was also a leading light in the AHA and at its 1904 meeting ‘proposed that the doctoral dissertation be abandoned’ but, fortunately for Abel, his was a minority opinion.34 For its first decade, under the presidency of the unrelated Herbert B Adams, the AHA had met annually in Washington but in 1895 George Adams was one of a group of professors who insisted that AHA meetings be rotated each year among the major universities. In the same year, George Adams led a group of scholars to found the American Historical Review (AHR), which was allied to—but remained independent of—the AHA for twenty years until that body took over formal ownership of the journal in 1915. In 1909 George Adams became president of the AHA and in his presidential address he railed against the ideas of the ‘new history’ and reconfirmed the historians’ commitment to the Rankean project simply to relate things as they had happened.35 These were the men who, along with Hodder, shaped Abel’s historical thinking and whose influence is apparent in her Yale notebooks.

Only three of Abel’s Yale notebooks appear to have survived and not only is this set incomplete, the volumes themselves are patchy; nor it is always possible to determine with any accuracy which of these notes represented the thoughts of the student or which were simply a record of a professor’s words.36 Nevertheless, they are revealing and commenced in October 1902, recording one of Abel’s first courses at Yale, ‘Historical method and criticism’ taught by Bourne. In a reflection of his own writing on Ranke, Abel wrote: ‘Ambassadors reports = undesigned history, [they] have immediate practical purpose, a future historical value’. She noted that it was necessary to sift sources because, for instance, ‘the forty-one letters of Marie Antoinette were all forged’. Abel also noted the importance of constructing a
bibliography which ought to include ‘books of reference, memoirs etc.—primary, secondary and worthless material’, to which she added the cautionary and somewhat whimsical proviso that ‘A golden mist covers autobiography’. She then drew the distinction between a ‘contemporary account and an account by a contemporary, 1st must be in same time. 2nd may be … written from memory’.

George Burton Adams’ course ‘English constitutional history to 1485’ began in September 1903 and traced English history from the departure of the Romans. Despite Adams’ own reservations about the theory, elements of Teutonic germs infect Abel’s notes: ‘The institutions and laws of England show that they are pure Teutonic—not modified by Celtic or Roman’, she wrote. With the curious claim that ‘less than ten Celtic words’ survive, she further noted that ‘of all law codes published by the Teutons, the Anglo-Saxon are the purest’.” Presumably these conclusions were drawn from Tacitus’ *Germania* which she described glowingly as ‘a most remarkable book. Doubt if another book in the world could compare’. In these notes the privileging of an Anglo-Saxon institutional lineage is also apparent:

Constitutional governments are derived from England wherever they are found. English institutions have made a conquest of the whole world … The New England Town meeting is a lineal descendant [of the Anglo-Saxon town meeting] and is the most unchanged institution in the world.

The coronation charter of Henry I [in 1100] is very important to see how Anglo-Saxons worked out a constitutional government for the world. Read it for yourself. Don’t take any man’s comment. The Declaration of Independence is a clear-cut, business-like document after its preliminary theoretical chaff has been passed. Such was the coronation charter of Henry I … The differentiation of power in the Curia Regis is the basis of the separation of powers in the American constitution.

Although Abel wrote that it was ‘not usually a good idea to teach history by biography’, most of her notes for this course were nothing but royal biographies, with an emphasis throughout on race and bloodlines. Of William the Conqueror she commented that: ‘He was half-peasant which was an advantage in getting a drop of good blood into noble veins’.

Adams’ exploration of English constitutional history was followed in early 1904 by a course on ‘Magna Carta and English History to the Tudors’. Abel’s notes commenced with the claim that: ‘Down to the end of the Tudor period is the formative period of English History. All changes since are matters of detail’. After outlining Scandinavian colonisation projects in England down to Edward the Confessor, she wrote: ‘This is an outline of what we most need in History. It
introduces the elements of our own race and institutions’. She added that the ‘Magna Carta is the most important document ever issued in the world’ and that its Clause 12—no taxation without representation—‘is still considered the cornerstone of Anglo-Saxon liberty’. ‘Our Declaration of Independence is the latest issue of the Magna Carta type of document’ she added, meaning that the underlying principle of both is that the king or president is bound to obey the law.

In the first term of 1903 Abel studied the constitutions of various South American republics with Bourne but her list of secondary sources are the only extant notes from this time. The following summer while she was undertaking research in Washington, DC, Bourne had asked her to look out for some books on the early constitutions of South America. From there Abel wrote that she was not able to find much despite having ‘hunted for material in the Bureau of American Republics, in the State Department and in the Library of Congress’.38 She added that although the United States ambassador to Ecuador had sent her a copy of that country’s 1830 constitution, she was awaiting the return of South American ministers to Washington in order to obtain ‘the earliest constitutions of the other countries’.39 One of the required readings for Bourne’s 1903 ‘American colonial history’ course was Select Charters & other Documents Illustrative of American History 1606–1775 and on the inside cover of her own copy Abel frivolously inscribed, in reference to the famous medieval lovers, ‘Anna Heloise Abelard, Yale University Graduate School, Professor E. G. Bourne’.40

Abel also studied Bourne’s ‘American history from Madison to Lincoln’ and her course notes reflect the development of various constitutional and political issues, in particular the importance of the Louisiana Purchase to American expansion. Bourne’s class also discussed current articles in the AHR such as Max Farrand’s ‘Compromises of the Constitution’, which considered the issues of slavery, the make-up of Congress and the election of the executive branch.41 Her second term notes (January–May 1904) began with the reflection that:

English slowness in getting started [in North America] is a significant fact in history especially when we remember that some claim for the Anglo-Saxon race a natural fitness for colonising.

This course covered the development of the original thirteen colonies, including the Salem witch trials and Parkman’s Montcalm and Wolf, although apparently not his Conspiracy of Pontiac. Her notes here displayed a great amount of detailed judicial,
religious and commercial history, but there were, surprisingly, only one or two passing references to Indians including a solitary mention of King Philip’s War (1675–76). She did, however, make note of a History Club meeting on 6 May 1904 where Bourne read his paper ‘Amerigo Vespucci and the naming of America’ which appeared in the AHR the following October.

Abel’s 1905 notes on Bourne’s historiography course began with the founding of Göttingen University, an institution ‘which emphasised historical studies and was the first university to be frequented by American historians such as Bancroft, Everett and Motley’. Abel also wrote that there were ‘two lines of study in historiography: widening of the content and horizon of history [and] the development of historical criticism’. In reference to her professor’s article in the AHR, Abel wrote that ‘the best introduction to Ranke’s criticism is Prof. Bourne’s essay’, before listing points from a series of historiographical reports of such historians as Bancroft, Henry Adams, Prescott, Fiske and Francis Parkman. In reflection on Ranke’s ‘flow of intuition’ she added:

The peculiarity of criticism of the last hundred years = realization of the necessity to be able to trace a line of conveyance of fact to a primary source. Its derivation from a primary source whose value is not the fact itself but the record of impression on the human mind.

Student notebooks are but markers on the intellectual journey and not definitively reliable. Thus one can only legitimately derive a hint of Abel’s post-graduate thinking from such a fraction of lecture notes, but they do add weight to the proposition that Abel’s texts reflect that narrow time frame when in the discipline of history, Ranke was king, Teutonic germs infected almost everyone and social Darwinism was the dominant world view. Throughout these notes, Abel’s copious use of bibliographies and references was demonstrated, the beginning of a lifelong practice. Curiously, considering that her dissertation topic was to be Indian removal policy and that she had begun her research, nowhere in these notes did she mention Indians; yet whatever the incomplete lecture jottings of a postgraduate may or may not reveal about the historical sensibility of the time, Abel’s dissertation was to be a resounding success and secured her a place in the academic profession.

In the summer of 1904 Abel wrote to Bourne from Washington, DC, to inform him that she had been very fortunate in obtaining material on Indian colonisation:
There is enough in the records of the Indian office to keep me busy for a year. The records from 1800 to 1824 are very meagre and have been subjected to great neglect. Many of the papers are in the basement in a sort of chaotic condition. Thus far I have examined only two years of the Jackson Papers—1815 & 1816. I suppose I shall have to look over the van Buren Papers also; although Mr Bassett tells me that they do not contain anything of much importance on the Indians.

She then sought Bourne’s help in gaining access to other Government files:

Before I take up the subject of the 2nd Seminole War, it will be necessary to get a letter from some senator. The Papers are in the War Department and General Ainsworth … will not grant me access without a recommendation. I wonder if you could get me a letter from Senator Proctor of Vermont or from H. C. Lodge. Both have great influence with General Ainsworth. I am afraid my own application would be insufficient.

In September, Abel once again wrote to Bourne begging his pardon for:

troubling you again; but I have heard nothing from Senator Lodge and it will soon be time for me to ask for admittance to the records of the War Department. Of course, I am not sure that I shall find anything there of immediate use to me; but I may, and I would not like to leave Washington without having looked.

She went on to ask if she might also delay her return to Yale by a couple of weeks because she still had much more work to do. ‘In fact, I could stay a year or two without feeling sure that I had exhausted the material’, she wrote. ‘Nevertheless, I must admit that I am not making any great discoveries’.

This correspondence revealed the difficulties under which historical researchers had to work before the establishment of the national archives, yet Abel did manage to make sufficient discoveries to expand on the theme she had tentatively considered in her first publication, that of United States Indian policy. Working back, as it were, from the narrow canvas of the Kansas reservations, Abel now sought to investigate the origin and development of the policy of which those reservations were but one result. That investigation resulted in her doctoral dissertation, The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi, which broadly speaking covered the first forty years of the nineteenth century.

‘Thoroughly revised, rearranged and enlarged’ Abel’s thesis was first published as a chapter in the AHA Annual Report for 1906 and her preface began:

The germ of this thesis was a task, apparently an insignificant one, assigned to me in the college classroom, several years ago, by Prof. Frank Heywood Hodder—a task that eventually developed, under influences, the most favorable, into an earnest and prolonged study of Indian political relations with the United States.
She then outlined those library collections that she had consulted in the course of her research—notably those of Columbia, Cornell, Yale and the Library of Congress—and, for primary sources, highlighted her preference for the Indian Office Records as ‘the court of last resort’ over all other collections, despite the fact that ‘none too much care’ had been taken to preserve them. She further noted that:

Indian removals were to so great an extent brought about by pressure for western settlement that even the faintest of lights thrown upon the conditions of that settlement may be, in reality, a guiding star to further research. Hopes are entertained that at no distant day I may be able to continue the present work along the line of the effect of the actual removals and then an opportunity will be given for a more extensive inclusion of descriptive material.

In her opening remarks to the first chapter, Abel supposed that Indians had played ‘but a sorry part in national affairs’, and found it remarkable that no-one had yet determined how the Louisiana Purchase had contributed to Indian policy. Thus she repeated her opening contention of both Kansas reservation works by locating the origin of the idea of Indian removal in Jefferson’s proposed constitutional amendment of July 1803. She quoted this amendment in full because it not only encompassed the ideas of right of occupancy and self-government for the tribes within the Louisiana Purchase area but, more importantly, the ‘authority to exchange … lands possessed by the Indians within the U.S. on the east side of the Mississippi’. Although the proposal was constitutionally questionable and never adopted, Abel felt that it nonetheless marked ‘an epoch in Indian history’.

For her, the idea of Indian removal was ‘absolutely original with Jefferson’ because it was he who first contemplated ‘an Indian Territory, perhaps an Indian State, to which all the tribes might be removed’. Yet Abel here displayed a common misconception about Indians when she held that such schemes:

may have had their rise in the familiar nomadic tendencies of the aborigines. The Indian ... could be easily uprooted and transplanted; for was he not a wanderer by nature, a voluntary exile?

Abel also demonstrated that the proposed amendment marked a change in Jefferson’s own professed attitude to Indian sovereignty for, having once argued that the federal government had ‘no more right to grant land to the Indians than to cede it to a European power’, by July 1803 he was, in theory at least, prepared to do just that. Although the Louisiana Territorial Act of 1804 did contain a clause which ‘empowered the President to effect Indian emigration’, resistance from white settlers
in the new territory meant that ‘Jefferson’s scheme had practically to be abandoned for more than twenty years’. In 1804 a Chickasaw delegation from Mississippi Territory went to Washington and was invited by Jefferson to exchange their lands and move to the Louisiana Purchase area but, Abel noted, there remained ‘no record of what impression this invitation to emigrate made’. Three years later, the Choctaws likewise ‘evinced a disposition to withdraw themselves from the encircling white settlements’ and the government prevailed upon them to emigrate beyond the Mississippi. Nevertheless, despite their habit of regularly crossing over into the Arkansas valley to hunt, they refused.

Abel then explained how the Cherokees, who ‘constituted the most numerous, the most powerful, and the most highly civilised of the southern tribes’, were divided into the ‘Lower’ who lived in Georgia and the ‘Upper’ who lived in Tennessee. The Lower Cherokees, who lived by their traditional hunting and fishing, ‘strenuously resisted’ white settlement on their land and ‘quarrelled incessantly with the ... upper towns’. Under instruction from Secretary of War Henry Dearborn [1801–09], the Cherokee agent sought to further the idea of removal among his charges and was able to convince ‘the more nomadic that their only hope of earthly salvation lay in emigration’. This would, however, be dependant upon an individual acre-for-acre land exchange but, since Indians traditionally held land collectively, there was no way of making such a determination without a population census and a survey of tribal lands, a complex and presumably costly process that was not undertaken. Such attendant difficulties—aside from any Indian resistance—would continue to plague removal policy over the coming years.

In conclusion, Abel suggested that Jefferson’s original plan—by embracing the twin ideas of removal and colonisation—envisioned the removal of the entire North American Indian population to beyond the Mississippi. For her it was these ideas that came to distinguish ‘the real philanthropists [that is, the colonialists] ... from the self-seeking and aggressive politicians [that is, the removalists] who cared not what became of the aborigines so long as their presence was not allowed to obstruct the onward path of the white men’.

Abel went on to consider in great detail the various moves by both the British and Americans in seeking Indian allies during the War of 1812. Though each side held talks and offered gifts, only
the deluded Indians in the days of their first innocence ... ever affected to believe that what [the talks] contained was true. Their object was to make a favorable impression for the time being upon the poetical sensibilities of the hearer—hence the rhetorical flourishes and the high-sounding, meaningless phrases about the ‘Great Father’ and his ‘tender care for his beloved red children’, which were their most marked characteristics.

Abel argued that the principal interest of the British and Canadians was the fur trade, whereas for the Americans it was ‘settlement, permanent occupation, and the dispossession of the natives’. As an example of American avarice, she pointed to the 1787 congressional grant of a vast tract of land north of the Ohio River to the Scioto Land Company, a grant that had taken no account of the resident Indians.

Indeed, as white settlement advanced, it was the Indians who were accused of attacking frontier settlements, upon which Abel remarked:

> Alas for the inconsistency of human nature! When white men fight for home and country they are lauded as the noblest of patriots. Indians, doing the same thing, are stigmatized as savages. What a fortunate and convenient excuse the doctrine of manifest destiny has proved!

Abel here made reference to the 1795 Treaty of Greenville which not only established a dividing line between white and Indian territories but also ‘provided for a number of reservations to which the native occupancy title was declared extinguished and to which citizens of the United States were to have an unobstructed right of way’. In other words, the first reservations in the United States were conceived not for Indians to live on but rather for white men to have safe passage through, an irony upon which Abel failed to comment. Such an arrangement naturally increased white incursion into Indian lands, and by 1800 led to the organisation of the Indiana Territory, whose aggressively expansionist governor, Henry Harrison, sought to negotiate further land cessions. He did so, as Abel noted, ‘with factions, with isolated bands ... quite in defiance of Indian usage, which required the consent of a general council’.

By 1811, the Shawnee chief Tecumseh (1768–1813) had been able to create an alliance among eastern Indians to resist this American expansionism. In November, while he was in the south on a largely unsuccessful mission to enlist Creek support, Harrison attacked the Indians at their village of Tippecanoe. This attack provoked an Indian uprising and pushed Tecumseh to align with the British in the war, which began in June of the following year. Of the uprising itself—which came to an end with the death of Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames (5 October 1813)—Abel had
little to say; however, in an extraordinarily revealing passage, she not only compared it with earlier Indian resistance movements but highlighted the central cultural difference in regard to land tenure:

The Indian uprising of 1811–12 [sic] possessed one feature that was almost, if not quite, unique in Indian history. Pontiac and Thayendanega had each in his turn dreamed of a concerted action among the tribes that would result in the expulsion of the whites and the reestablishment of native power; but it was left for Tecumseh to advance the theory that no individual tribe possessed the power of alienation. He argued that originally the continent belonged to the red race as a whole and that therefore no part of it could be sold without the consent of all. The doctrine was radical but by no means inconsistent with the fact that, until the advent of the white man, the Indian had had no conception of an individual personal interest in realty. Each tribe, it is true, had had its own indefinitely defined hunting grounds; but a map outlining them ‘that would be correct for a given date would probably be sadly misleading in the study of events that took place a few years earlier or later’. With specific reference to recent occurrences, Tecumseh held that all the treaties made subsequent to 1795 that involved the transfer of land northwest of the Ohio were absolutely invalid unless it could be shown that each and every tribe interested in the treaty of Greenville had subscribed to them. This proves conclusively where the real grievance of the Indians lay. There was no occasion for the British to excite them to war. They were already excited and had only to await their opportunity.66

Following the war, one British proposal discussed at the peace negotiations was the idea of an Indian state that would act as a buffer between the United States and Canada. Had such a proposal been accepted, Abel suggested, ‘the removal of the northwest tribes would never had been necessary’.67 But what she regarded as more significant about these discussions was that:

Americans placed themselves on record as resorting to Indian treaty making as an a temporary expedient only [and] admitted they had no intention of regarding such compacts as binding, even though they were made by duly accredited commissioners and solemnly ratified by the Senate’.68

Indeed, such was to be the pattern of United States Indian policy for the remainder of the century.

Whether, as the Americans alleged, the British had incited them, Indian involvement in the War of 1812 and the failure of Tecumseh’s resistance movement certainly marked a watershed in the efforts towards removal. In a confusing and somewhat peripatetic chapter, Abel considered the progress of the removal project in the immediate postwar period, noting that President James Monroe [1817–25], Secretary of War John C Calhoun, and the hero of the recent conflict, General Andrew Jackson, now ‘stood at the head of a coterie of men favoring vigorous
measures’ for removal—a movement of which Jackson was the leading spirit. The huge influx of European immigrants attracted by a postwar boom, effected a westward population expansion beyond the Alleghenies into the Mississippi Valley and gave further strength to the removal ideas, particularly in the North-west. In the South, following their defeat at the battle of Horseshoe Bend in 1814, Jackson had secured land cessions from Tecumseh’s Creek allies, cessions that Abel considered to be the first step in the direction of systematic removal. In March 1816, the War Department entered into a convention of limits with the Cherokees and sought to negotiate similar conventions with the Chickasaws and the Choctaws. Yet, as Abel noted:

the methods pursued were anything but honorable. Intimidation and bribery have no legitimate place in civil or diplomatic contracts. Such practices were, however, so much part of negotiations with the Indians that we can safely take them henceforth for granted.

When the State of Tennessee sought to extinguish Cherokee land titles, Jackson met with tribal chiefs in August 1816 at Turkey Town where the question of a land exchange was discussed. The tribe was, however, divided. Some Cherokees had earlier moved westward voluntarily, but were now being harassed by the local Osage and Quapaw tribes and sought the protection of the United States. Although they had been encouraged to move, these so-called Western Cherokees had never been legally granted land in the West and the government now sought to treat with them in terms of an exchange for their lands in the east, an arrangement to which the Western Cherokees were favourably inclined. However, since the Cherokee National Council had not been party to these earlier removals, the chiefs felt that the tribe as a whole ‘was under no obligation to surrender land proportionate to the number of emigrants’. A treaty that did benefit Western Cherokees was negotiated in July 1817, but before it could be ratified it became apparent that ‘force and fraud had been instrumental in securing signatures’. Finally, in 1819, another treaty was negotiated by which the tribe ceded a portion of their land, which temporarily put an end to talk of further removals. Between 1817 and 1820, Jackson led further commissions to treat with the Chickasaws and Choctaws for a land exchange and ultimate removal. Although he met with little success, Jackson made very good use of the money appropriated to secure such treaties in order to obtain land deals for his friends. Nevertheless, Abel excused him because:
he was the easy dupe of designing men, and was the devoted friend of land
speculators. Upon his several Indian missions, he was invariably surrounded by a
group of these, selfish and unscrupulous, who never lost a single opportunity to
gain their own ends.76

Since some of tribes of the old North-west traditionally crossed the Mississippi
to hunt or to engage in warfare with more western tribes, their removal was
considered an easier option than that of the southern tribes. In 1816, in exchange for
a land cession, the Indians of Ohio were therefore offered individual allotments
either within the cession or on land beyond the Mississippi. The Senate refused to
allow ‘so radical a change in the red man’s tenure’ and no arrangements were made
for their removal.77 Instead, wrote Abel, these tribes (that is, Delaware, Seneca,
Shawnee, Ottawa and Wyandot) were allotted reservations, ‘some so comparatively
small that community life was imperiled’.78 In 1819, a similar treaty was signed with
the Kickapoos of Illinois but again, as in the case of the Ohio tribes, the Senate
refused to ratify it. Abel noted that although the removal project was thus delayed, it
was ‘carried forward both by national and local endeavor’ so that by 1820 the North-
west states ‘could almost foretell the time when they would be altogether cleared of
the native incumbrance’.79 Quite apart from the official efforts at removal, many
bands had, under pressure from rapid white expansion, simply wandered westward of
their own accord and had settled in Missouri Territory; but with the prospect of
statehood there were already:

faint glimmerings of trouble over Indian possessions [and] it would be but a few
years before the Federal Government … would have all its work to do over again.80

During Monroe’s presidency ‘the country was full of enthusiasm concerning its
future’ and this included missionary projects for the civilising of Indians.81 Abel
noted that in 1818 Congress had appropriated $10,000 for the purpose of creating an
Indian civilisation fund, and that in 1820 the Reverend Doctor Jedidiah Morse
(1761–1826) had put forward proposals for Indian advancement through the
establishment of small communities, or ‘Education Families’, which would, ‘by
evolving an ideal out of a primitive communism, prepare [Indians] for
individualism’.82 Although his proposal did not envisage wholesale removal, Morse
thought that such groups could be brought together in various favourable locations
and thereby be ‘excluded from too free an intercourse with the questionable
characters that are always to be found on the outskirts of civilization’. In order to
prepare the Indians for the nineteenth-century world, he proposed that each community would have its own church and school, and even envisaged ‘a great central college for all’.\(^\text{83}\) Morse also thought that eventually such communities could be combined into an Indian state—an idea that, as Abel noted, had been suggested as far back as the 1778 Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delawares.\(^\text{84}\)

To test the feasibility of his scheme, in the summer of 1820 Morse set out with a government commission to tour the North-west. His brief was to determine precisely how many tribes there were, ‘their present condition in point of civilization’ and, perhaps most importantly for the government, the quality and extent of their lands. At all events, the information he gathered seemed to be unpropitious for his grand scheme for, although he gained encouragement from some quarters, his suggestions were ‘rejected with scorn’ in others. He got the impression, however, that ‘the country to the immediate westward of Michigan was just the locality for his Indian settlement’.\(^\text{85}\)

In her consideration of the Morse report, Abel recorded that he had heard of scattered bands of Indians in Florida who might come together in one community ‘ready for the immediate establishment of an Education Family’, but nothing came of it.\(^\text{86}\) From New England, Morse had received various letters in regards to his plan, but he considered the few Indians still in Connecticut ‘too degenerate and decreasing to deserve notice’. The Indians of Rhode Island, who were well established in their fishing communities, would not entertain any thought of being ‘removed into a wild country’, and the same could be said of the Indians of Maine and Massachusetts who were likewise ‘tenacious of their lands’ and therefore also unlikely to want to move.\(^\text{87}\)

Finally, Morse came to consider that the New England Indians ‘were not fit subjects for colonization’ but, should the government provide them with ‘an Asylum’, he thought that the ‘remnants of these depressed and wretched people ... might be persuaded to take shelter’. But for all his benign intentions, Morse revealed an underlying racist sentiment when he noted that:

\[\text{The body of them, however, would doubtless prefer to remain where they are, for this prominent reason ... that very few of them are of unmixed blood ... having intermarried with the lowest classes of white people and negroes, and feeling no sympathy with Indians of pure blood, would not be comfortable, or happy, or of wholesome influence, if removed and planted among them.}\(^\text{88}\)\]
Morse also recommended to the government the formation of a welfare society for all Indian tribes in the United States, a survey of all Indian land and a permanent allotment of between 160 and 640 acres, ‘secured to him and his family forever’, to any Indian who ‘evinced a serious disposition to settle himself permanently, and to pursue civilized habits’. He also suggested various sites for the establishment of his ‘education families’, in particular a reservation area near Saginaw in Michigan Territory that could hold all the Indians from the North-west and New England ‘who might be inclined to move, a body of from twenty-five to thirty thousand’.

Since Morse’s plan entailed the removal of the New York Indians, Abel here digressed into a long and somewhat tortuous history of the ‘notorious’ Ogden Land Company. Originally, the State of Massachusetts had a pre-emptive right to purchase land from any Indians who wished to sell, but by 1821 this right had passed to the entrepreneur Thomas Ogden and his associates. Meanwhile, in 1816 ‘the sachems of the Six Nations’ (that is, leaders of the Iroquois Confederacy) had sought to sell their land and move to Ohio. At this time, however, the federal government was apprehensive about further Indian emigration to Ohio in case of another war with Great Britain and so, barred from their preferred site, ‘the Indians lost all desire to emigrate’. There then arrived on the scene an Episcopalian missionary, Eleazar Williams:

the same who figured later on in fact and fiction as a pretender to the French throne, was himself of Indian extraction, [and] also a lineal descendant of the survivor of the Deerfield massacre.

By Indian request this character had been licensed as a catechist and although initially he opposed removal, he seems to have come under the influence of Ogden who stood to make huge profits should the land be vacated of Indians. Williams attained some success with those Oneidas who, under his own proselytising, had become Anglican, and he allured them ‘by a most Utopian dream of an Indian Empire’ which, as Abel suggested, was ‘an exaggeration of Morse’s Indian State’. In the end, such pressure proved counterproductive for, despite the company’s implications that the Indians would be forced to move, the government would not countenance removal except on a voluntary basis. The Senecas remained particularly recalcitrant and although some bands from other tribes did emigrate westward, Morse’s ‘grand scheme for the establishment of an Indian State’ came to nothing.
Returning to another issue she had discussed in her Kansas Reservations paper, Abel noted that the ‘constitutional significance of Indian removal’ lay in the select committee report, tabled in January 1822, which held that the federal government had failed to implement its side of the 1802 Georgia Compact. The committee argued that in the matter of cessions, the preference shown to other states was against the spirit of the compact, and the ‘guaranties of integrity’ shown towards Indian land claims were against its letter. Congress therefore appropriated monies toward extinguishing Indian title within Georgia and authorised the purchase of Indian land. Although the Creeks were reported to be favourable, the Cherokees decided in National Council ‘to hold fast to the remainder of their tribal land’.

Nevertheless, the government entered into negotiations that Abel characterised as ‘an illustration of the inconsistency to which white men were so often reduced in their dealings with natives’.

This ‘talk’ paid a high compliment to Cherokee civilization, and then proceeded to define the Indian political status as excluding interference by the State. Finally, it urged removal on the plea that the white people were so crowded ‘that they were driven from friends and connections to foreign lands’. The Great Father of the Universe had intended the earth ‘equally to be the inheritance of his white and red children’; but in Georgia the latter had a much larger share than the former. The Cherokees replied that they did not know as to the intention of the Supreme Father, but it was quite evident that neither individuals nor nations had ever respected the principle; and, as experience had taught them that a small cession would never satisfy the white men, they were determined to make none at all. Love of country impelled them to stay where they were, where their ancestors had lived and died. Those who had gone west had suffered great hardships, and their numbers had been much lessened by sickness, war and other fatalities.

Meanwhile, George McIntosh Troup had become governor of Georgia. Described by Abel as ‘impatient of restraint [and] possessed of an ungovernable temper’, Troup held that the Cherokees were merely tenants. In support of their governor, Georgia congressmen railed against the federal government, declaring that if the Indians would not vacate their lands peacefully, then it was the duty of the United States to so order them. Monroe’s reply in Congress emphasised the ‘peaceably and on reasonable terms’ aspect of the compact and this provoked further protest from Troup. Later that year, a federal House Committee resolved that necessary measures be taken to remove the Cherokees beyond the limits of Georgia and also made an
appropriation towards extinguishment of Creek and Cherokee titles in that state, which ‘put a temporary quietus upon the whole affair’.

At this point Abel turned to consider the fate of the Seminoles in Florida. When Jackson was made governor of Florida Territory in 1819, he ordered the Seminoles to join up with the main body of Creeks in Georgia; but when they refused, reservation became the next policy option. Various sites were considered until ‘some one proposed the neighbourhood of the Everglades’. In September 1823, this led to the Treaty of Camp Moultrie, which was, according to Abel:

without question, one of the worst in all history. It is not so characterized because of any bribery used to effect it, though that was not absent, but for the misery that it caused, dare we say intentionally?, to over four thousand hapless human beings.

These Indians had professed a willingness to settle and adopt agriculture, yet the government deliberately placed them in the Everglades ‘where subsistence by that means was absolutely impossible’.

Abel then considered the case of the Creeks. She described their fifty-six towns as being divided:

not politically, but geographically into the Upper of Georgia and the Lower of Alabama. As near as can be made out, Little Prince was their great chief, the king, so to speak, of the Creek Nation, with Big Warrior as a close second. William McIntosh ... was not a head chief, but a chief fifth in rank, yet he seems to have been the recognized leader of the lower towns. He was a half-breed of Scotch extraction, a cousin of Governor [George McIntosh] Troup, and a clever, capable man, shrewd and unscrupulous.

In anticipation of forthcoming talks with federal commissioners, some Creek chiefs met at Tuckaubatchee, Georgia, in May 1824 and resolved that no more of their land would be sold or exchanged. Although William McIntosh did not sign this resolution, it was reinforced at a further meeting of chiefs in October, at Pole Cat Spring, during which they also ‘revoked any authority heretofore given to any individual to dispose of Creek land’. Moreover, it was decided to publish the Tuckaubatchee resolution ‘so that it may be known to the world that the Creek people are not disposed to sell one foot more of their lands’.

When the bilateral talks were held at Broken Arrow (the Creek National Council Square in Alabama) in December 1824, the treaty commissioners proposed a land exchange and removal to beyond the Mississippi. The reply to this proposal, signed
by four chiefs, including Little Prince and McIntosh, was quoted by Abel in full and included the following passage:

> The agreement between our Father, the President of the United States, and our Brothers of Georgia we have never before this time been acquainted with; nor are we now convinced that any agreement between the United States and the state of Georgia will have the effect of alienating the affections of a just Parent from a part of his children, or aggrandizing the one by the downfall and ruin of the other. That ruin is the almost inevitable consequence of a removal beyond the Mississippi, we are convinced. It is true, very true, that 'we are surrounded by white people,' that there are encroachments made—what assurances have we that similar ones will not be made on us, should we deem it proper to accept your offer, and remove beyond the Mississippi; and how do we know that we would not be encroaching on the people of other nations?¹⁰⁶

The commissioners replied with a threat: ‘one of two things must be done, you must come under the laws of the whites or you must remove’.¹⁰⁷

Frustrated at not making any headway in council, the commissioners then sought to deal with chiefs individually, which was against Indian custom as Abel had previously remarked. Most chiefs were appalled at this suggestion, though McIntosh appeared amenable to the commissioners’ blandishments and on suspicion of such was deprived of his office as a speaker of the Creek Nation. When the commissioners sought permission from the War Department to deal with individual chiefs, they were informed that the president could not authorise any treaty unless it was made with the tribe in council. The commission did, however, change the location of the treaty ground to Indian Springs, Georgia.¹⁰⁸

The talks recommenced in February 1825 at the new location, where Chief Poethleyoholo declared the meeting unlawful and invited the commissioners ‘to return three months hence to the National Council Square at Broken Arrow’.¹⁰⁹ In their determination to conclude a treaty, however, the commissioners warned Poethleyoholo that if he left the treaty ground, they would complete the negotiations with any who remained. The chief did leave and it was the McIntosh party that signed the Treaty of Indian Springs which included a ‘surreptitious’ article providing for the disbursement of $200,000 of the purchase money to McIntosh himself, which Abel described as ‘probably the price of his treachery’.¹¹⁰ As he departed, Poethleyoholo is reported to have said to McIntosh, ‘My Friend, you are now about to sell your country; I now warn you of the danger’—though, uncharacteristically, Abel gave no source for this remark.¹¹¹ The commission was able to report that a
treaty had been concluded with the ‘Creek Nation Indians’, which was technically correct but, as Abel pointed out:

very few of the men present were chiefs, none of them were chiefs of first rank while [Poethleyoholo] the representative of Little Prince and Big Warrior was a dissenter. Of the signers, McIntosh and possibly two others were the only chiefs in good standing, the rest were ‘underling chiefs, broken chiefs, and boys’.

Nevertheless, Abel claimed, the idea of ‘general colonization west of the Mississippi’ was now firmly back on the political agenda.\textsuperscript{112}

In spite of the fact that investigations were underway into the fraudulent process by which it was achieved, the Treaty of Indian Springs was proclaimed on 7 March 1825 as one of the first acts of President John Quincy Adams [1825–29]. Abel thus considered his election to have been ‘inauspicious’ for Indian removal.\textsuperscript{113} The Upper Creeks simply refused to accept the treaty and ‘prepared to execute a law of their nation, prescribing capital punishment for anyone who should propose a cession in defiance of the national will’.\textsuperscript{114} Citing \textit{Niles’ Register}, Abel noted that this law had been passed at the Creek National Council in July 1824 and, more significantly in the light of subsequent events, McIntosh himself had proclaimed it ‘at ball play in August ... before the assemblage’.\textsuperscript{115}

Coincidentally, the Georgia State elections were due and Governor Troup sought to gain settler support by ‘bringing the Creek ceded lands into the market’.\textsuperscript{116} The Treaty of Indian Springs specifically debarred white settlement on ceded lands until September 1826 and such settlement was, in any case, contingent on the running of state boundary lines, an exercise that a state governor was not legally permitted to undertake without federal approval. Troup, however, thought that Indian consent would override any such prohibition and therefore sought such consent from his cousin McIntosh and that was given on 25 April 1825. Five days later, ‘enraged warriors of the opposing party surrounded his [McIntosh’s] house at break of day and … shot him down in cold blood’.\textsuperscript{117} In Abel’s eyes the killing was ‘really the enforcement of an article of Creek internal police’, but Troup regarded it as an act of hostility against the United States, called out the state militia and exclaimed:

I sincerely trust, if these infuriated monsters shall have the temerity to set foot within our settled limits, you may have the opportunity to bayonet them freely, the instrument which they most dread and which is most appropriate for the occasion.\textsuperscript{118}
The War Department ordered that the $200,000 previously offered to the McIntosh party was now to be ‘doled out, irrespective of faction, whenever a chief should manifest his willingness to emigrate’. When General Edmund Gaines—sent by Washington to guard the Georgia frontier and investigate the causes of the disturbance—applied for the money, he found it had been invested in cotton and slaves.

When Gaines reported that ‘forty-nine fiftieths of the Creek Nation were opposed to the treaty of Indian Springs’, Adams forbade Troup’s survey. In October, Troup was re-elected governor and armed himself against any possible presidential impeachment of the Treaty of Indian Springs by receiving from the Georgia legislature ‘a confession of faith in its validity’. The following month, a Creek delegation led by Poethleyoholo went to Washington ‘to utter our grievances to our Great Father, to show that the treaty was made by fraud, by thieves, by walkers in the night’. Eventually, the Treaty of Washington was negotiated with two parties of Creeks, one led by Poethleyoholo and the other representing the McIntosh party; the whole legislative process hinged on the question of money.

On the one hand, Abel wrote, ‘Poethleyoholo’s delegation and their Cherokee secretaries were planning ... to keep back for their own use a large part of the purchase money’; on the other, the ‘McIntosh party had persuaded [Senator Berrien of Georgia] that “if sufficient inducements” were offered, they would get most of their tribe to emigrate’. None of this financial wrangling was evident in the final wording of the treaty, which was enacted 20 May 1826. It specified $60,000 to be ‘appropriated to aid the emigrating Creeks’ and they were still left with nearly 200 thousand acres within western Georgia.

This land was guaranteed them until 1 January 1827, but Troup sought to occupy the Creek lands in September 1826 because the Georgia legislature had resolved that ‘in so far as the treaty of Washington had divested Georgia of any rights acquired in 1825, it was illegal and unconstitutional’. Unsure of his ground, Adams referred the matter to Congress, which advised the purchase of the remaining Indian land in Georgia; and so, after further negotiations, by early 1828 the entire Creek lands in Georgia were, in Abel’s word, ‘surrendered’. Alabama sought to embark on the same legislative path as Georgia to rid itself of Indians, but in this case ‘controversy was averted by the respect shown for a decision in the United States district court for Alabama that such legislation was unconstitutional’. Abel could now locate the whole question of Indian removal within a national political context:
Those in the North, who before had been disposed to advocate [Indian removal] out of an honest regard for the general welfare of both races were now opposed, the more so because, as time went on, it became evident that Georgia was determined not to give the policy a general application until her own territory had been disencumbered; that is to say, she persistently sacrificed the great and benevolent plan of colonizing all the Indians to the inordinately selfish desire of immediate personal relief. She diverted every suggestion for general removal into the narrow channel of Creeks and Cherokees...

From one viewpoint, however, she really advanced the cause of removal … inasmuch as she so continually agitated the question that the nation could not forget it, and sister States, not to be behindhand where benefits were to be secured, united their complaints with hers, thus making it appear to be a more or less universal demand.  

At this point in her narrative, Abel returned to her consideration of the Seminoles, who had been concentrated in the ‘desolate country … north of Charlotte Harbor’ where, unable to return to their own lands:

many of them skulked around the settlements, stealing when they could and, when provoked, murdering; yet as a body they were not hostile. Such depredations as were committed were the acts not of tribes, but of individuals reduced to dire straits, vagabonds by necessity.

The land allotted them was so poor that it was feared that these Indians might become permanent recipients of government welfare. Governors Troup of Georgia and Duval of Florida also believed the Seminoles to be harbouring fugitive slaves and were ready to bring out their state militias against them. Thus removal was seen as the only remedy. Until this could be accomplished, Adams offered the Indians a loan of an alternative site, but this proved to be equally unproductive and Indian depredations continued. At this point, albeit by way of a footnote citing *Niles’ Register*, Abel introduced what was for her a rare glimpse into Indian cultural attitudes. A Seminole delegation had visited Washington in 1826 seeking a permanent settlement:

They wanted a piece of land from which they would never have to move again. They were told that that could only be west of the Mississippi. They did not want to go there it was a strange place. They denied hiding runaway slaves, and instead accused the white people of stealing theirs. They did not care to compete in the matter of education, for they were too far behind the Europeans to begin with. All they asked was to be left alone. They gave a very ancient origin to the white man’s duplicity, and, at the same time explained the source of his superior knowledge. Long ago an old blind man promised a book to the representative of the race that should first kill a deer. The white man killed a sheep, and the blind man, not detecting the difference, gave him the book and taught him to read. Later on the red man came in with a deer, but he was too late.
Despite further attempts at persuasion, the Indians refused to remove west of the Mississippi and the government would not appropriate further monies for their relief. As Abel rather ominously noted, now ‘Congress was waiting for Andrew Jackson’.\footnote{130}

She then returned to the question of Georgia to consider how that state had dealt with the Cherokees. Of all Indian peoples, Cherokees had perhaps best acculturated to the white man’s ways. As Abel put it:

Wise in their day and generation, they saw that the strongest argument for removal was their own adherence to primitive customs, which made it appear that they were unprogressive, or, if you will, uncivilized, and they resolved to disabuse the world of that idea. It was not enough to have their own alphabet, their own printing press, their own churches and schools, their own laws, regulating public and private relations, they must have a republican form of government.\footnote{131}

That opportunity came with the passing of the traditionalist principal chief, Path Killer, upon whose death tribal leaders called a constitutional convention. Accordingly, on 4 July 1827, delegates from all parts of the Cherokee country met in constituent assembly at their capital of New Echota, Georgia, to draft a constitution that was closely modelled on that of the United States. It was ratified by the end of the month when the new principal chief, John Ross (1790–1866), also became president of the Cherokee Republic. The creation of such a politically independent entity within the United States was, according to Abel, ‘by a very free construction of the constitution of 1787 … an open violation of its fourth article’.\footnote{132} The previous February, when intimations of Cherokee intentions reached Washington, it was reported to Secretary of War James Barbour [1825–28] that it was:

much to be regretted that the idea of Sovereignty should have taken such a deep hold of these people. It is now possible for them to erect themselves into a state of such independence and a separate and distinct Government, and the sooner they are enlightened on the subject the better. The most they can ever hope for if they retain their possessions within the States, is to hold them under the laws of the States as Citizens.\footnote{133}

In retaliation to the Cherokee declaration of independence, the State of Georgia declared that ‘on and after 1 June 1830, the Cherokee country was in all respects to be subject to [the state’s] exclusive jurisdiction’.\footnote{134}

Meanwhile, by 1824 some eight thousand Indian emigrants from the northern states had been resettled in south-western Missouri, but now that state also wished to be free of Indians. In order to execute the removal policy, cessions had to be wrung
from those western tribes that Abel here described as ‘the indolent Kaws and the
fierce Osages’. For her the significance of these cessions lay in their elimination of
what she considered to be the ‘crowning obstacle’ to colonising the Indians in the
West.

Unsure whether removal or assimilation would be the best policy, Barbour had
commisioned a report on the consequences of each and, since he had not realised the
extent of antipathy towards the Indians, came down on the side of assimilation.
When a Bill for ‘the preseravation and civilization of the Indians’ again came before
the House of Representatives in 1825, Barbour demonstrated, as Abel rightly
declared:

how far above the majority of his contemporaries he was in his conception of
justice. He read the times aright, did not mince matters or cater to local prejudices,
but frankly criticized the Government for its existing policy toward the Indians.

He first noted that missions had been established for the moral improvement of
Indians and that they had been persuaded to abandon hunting and take up settled
agriculture. He continued: ‘then you send your Agent to tell them they must
surrender their country to the white man, and re-commit themselves to some new
desert’ and claimed that Indians ‘see that our professions are insincere—that our
promises have been broken; that the happiness of the Indian is a cheap sacrifice to
the acquisition of new lands’. Barbour then proposed his own plan (which Abel
cited in full) that would: set aside all the country west of the Mississippi and the land
between Lakes Huron and Michigan exclusively for the Indians; remove them
westward individually rather than tribally; impose a territorial government
maintained by the United States; and—in anticipation of the Dawes Act some sixty
years later—move toward ‘the extinguishment of tribes ... and a distribution of
property among the individuals’. Congress thought this plan, like that of Morse’s,
unfeasible.

According to Abel, the last annual war department report of Adams’ presidency
bridged ‘the voluntary removals of Monroe ... and the coercive of Jackson’. The
Georgia legislature had sought to discourage the civilising of Indians because that
would tend to impede removal, and so Barbour’s replacement, Peter Porter,
suggested diverting missionary efforts to the West. Abel believed that Porter’s plan
anticipated the later reservation system, ‘viz., a tract in common, and tracts in
severalty with restricted alienation’, but once again the plan was ‘ineffective as far as Congress was concerned’.

After this long and complex political narrative in which the Jeffersonian idea of Indian colonisation in the West still had not been accomplished, Abel finally arrived at the 1830 Removal Bill—introduced under the presidency of Andrew Jackson [1829–37]:

There was much of the bully in Andrew Jackson’s make-up and his dealings with the Indians had always been coercive. Consequently, the South and West had every reason to expect a change of tactics as soon as he came to power. Strange, however, to relate, the Indians likewise looked for something from him; for was not justice his cardinal doctrine?

Within two weeks of his inauguration, Jackson—whose reputation for dealing with Indians was based solely on his military capabilities against them—addressed the Creeks and the Cherokees. The tribes were given to understand that the United States could not and would not interfere with the legitimate authority of a state within its own limits and that if the Indians wanted a home they could call their own then they must go to the West, for only there could the president guarantee that the soil should be theirs ‘as long as the trees grow and the waters run’. The Indians were ‘incredulous’ that such sentiments could proceed from their ‘Great Father’ and so Jackson sent agents ‘to secure individual acquiescence’ for removal.

Similar proposals were communicated to the Choctaws of Mississippi. Thus far, throughout Abel’s account Indian voices had been largely silent, but she now cited the eloquent rebuttal given by Mingo (Choctaw regional leader) Colonel Folsom:

The red people are of the opinion that, in a few years the Americans will also wish to possess the land west of the Mississippi. Should we remove, we should again soon be removed by white men. We have no wish to sell our country and remove to one that is not fertile and good, wherever it is situated ...

... here is our home, our dwelling places, our fields and our schools, and all our friends; and under us are the dust and the bones of our forefathers. This land is dearer to us than any other. Why talk to us about removing?

... here it is, in this very land that we wish to reside and make greater improvement till we become a happy people. Our hearts cleave to our own country. We have no wish to sell.

Abel also cited Jackson’s reply, which makes a wonderful contrast and is a perfect example the of high-sounding and meaningless phrases of which she was scornful:
Say to them as friends & brothers to listen to the voice of their father, and their friend. Where they now are they and my white children are too near to each other to live in harmony and peace. Their game is destroyed & many of their people will not work, & till the earth. Beyond the Great river Mississippi ... their father has provided a country, large enough for them all, and he advises them to remove to it. There their white brethren will not trouble them, they will have no claim to the land, and they can live upon it, as long as grass grows or water runs, in peace and plenty. It will be theirs forever ...

Say to my red Choctaw children, and my Chickasaw children to listen—my white children of Mississippi have extended their laws over their country If they remain where they are they will be subject to those laws. If they remove across the Mississippi river they will be free from the laws of the state, and only subject to their own laws, and be under the care of their father the President of the United States ... Say to the chiefs and warriors that I am their friend ... beyond the limits of any State, in possession of land of their own, which they shall possess as long as Grass grows or water runs, I can and will protect them and be their friend & father ...

Tell them it is from my own mouth you have rec’d [this talk] and that I never speak with a forked tongue ... the plan proposed is the only one, by which they can be perpetuated as nations & where can be extended to them, the right of living under their own laws ...

As with other Indian tribes, the Choctaws were divided on the question of removal. At a meeting of their national council, held in March 1830, two mingo resigned, ‘frightened, it was conjectured, by a law of Mississippi imposing a fine of a thousand dollars and imprisonment for one year upon any Choctaw who should exercise the authority of a chief’. A third mingo, Colonel Leflore, was made tribal chief and he put it to the Choctaws that they had three options: to fight the United States, submit to Mississippi State law or to remove. They chose removal.

As Abel reminded us, the United States had not yet begun to negotiate with the Choctaws, yet it was at this point in the council meeting that Leflore produced ‘a document of cession fully drafted’. This was an offer to buy their land for a million dollars, and provide 640 western acres for each man plus compensation for animals, cost of removal and provisions for one year. Finally, the new land in the West would be ‘guaranteed to them as a State with the promise of ultimate admittance to the Union on equal terms with other States’. The traditionalists among the Choctaws railed against the illegality of this proposal and there was great consternation, which ‘in some cases ... gave a loose rein to vice and intemperance’. Even the rejection of this proposal by the Senate did little to quieten things because, according to Abel, ‘everyone knew that negotiations would be resumed as soon as possible and an attempt be made to secure the land on terms more favorable to the oppressor’.
Among the Creeks and Cherokees, Jackson’s agents had persuaded some sixteen hundred Indians to remove westward, although ‘not fast enough to suit the white people’. In 1829, when gold was discovered on Cherokee land, white miners flocked there and settled in defiance of federal intercourse laws, and the consequent lawlessness added further impetus to the removal plans. Yet Jackson’s ultimate willingness to use force to remove the Indians divided the nation and, as Abel noted, the issue not only became a question of party politics, it also divided the various missionary bodies. While northern Baptists supported removal and hoped for the establishment of an Indian state, the Episcopalians and Presbyterians tended not involve themselves; and while the Methodists remained divided, the Society of Friends and the Congregationalists ‘stood forth bravely as champions of Indian rights’. In 1829, New York Episcopalian and Dutch Reformed Church officials organised an Indian Board for the Emigration, Preservation, and Improvement of the Aborigines of America to support removal.

In his first annual message, delivered on 8 December 1829, Jackson had advised removal but had also declared his intention not to use force, although, as Abel pointed out, ‘the whole country knew that every measure yet taken gave it the lie’. In February 1830, two Bills, one from the Senate and one from the House, were presented to Congress and, Abel noted, the report which accompanied both was editorialised in *Niles’ Register* as ‘an argument that “seems to begin and end with POWER—originally to claim, and now to possess the right of the soil”’. The original House Bill was dropped, but in May the House began to debate the Senate Bill which had been ‘carried by an inconsiderable majority’ on 26 April. Abel made particular note of three speeches that for her typified the many presented throughout the course of the debate. In an echo of Barbour’s sentiments, Storrs of New York:

> exposed the fallacy of pretending to remove Indians for their own good from a community where they had pleasant homes, churches, and schools, to a wilderness where roamed hostile tribes scarcely emerged from savagery.

In rebuttal, Lumpkin of Georgia ‘appealed to sectional prejudices ... and made a most absurd profession of regard for the red race’; and whereas Ellsworth of Connecticut did not object to removal as such, he claimed that the South was ‘actuated by mercenary motives’. The Removal Bill was only just passed—in the House by a majority of five; in the Senate only by the speaker’s casting vote—and enacted 28 May 1830. It authorised the president to offer a land exchange to any of the tribes
now residing within the limits of the states or territories’, but without ‘the slightest hint of compulsory removal’. 157

Whereas the Cherokees took their case against Georgia to the Supreme Court, by the end of August the Chickasaws of Mississippi agreed on a provisional treaty of removal. Some three weeks later, by the terms of the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, the Choctaws ceded all their eastern lands ‘except such small reservations as might be selected by individuals who preferred citizenship to emigration’. 158 Removal was based on the promise that no state or territory should ever circumscribe them again but, as Abel quite rightly stated, it was a promise that ‘experience ought to have warned them ... was worthless’. 159 In the North, another of Jackson’s special agents, Colonel James B Gardiner, negotiated five removal treaties with the tribes then residing in Ohio. The treaties were proclaimed in April 1832 and Jackson appointed Gardiner to be the superintendent of the removals. 160

In the Supreme Court, the petition of the Cherokees was dismissed on the grounds that an Indian nation was not a foreign state within the meaning of the Constitution. 161 Many Creeks were by this time starving because their agent was withholding annuities in order to pay for law-suits brought against them by white citizens of Alabama and, when they sought to plead their case in Washington, were informed that their only recourse was removal. Hence a treaty of cession was negotiated by which the Creeks exchanged their eastern lands for a ‘pecuniary consideration’, again with a promise of territorial independence similar to—and equally worthless as—that made to the Choctaws. 162

The reader will begin to think that the execution of the removal Act was proving to be a very easy matter—not so. In Illinois all was confusion.

Thus Abel introduced that episode of Indian resistance that became known as the 1832 Black Hawk War. In 1804 the confederated tribe of Sacs and Foxes had negotiated a treaty of limits that had been reconfirmed several times but, as Abel pointed out, those agreements came to be interpreted by the whites to mean a relinquishment of all territorial claims east of the Mississippi. 163 In the spring of 1829, these Indians returned from their winter hunt to find ‘a whole village ... seized, the cornfields enclosed, and the lodges torn down’. 164 Although they did not at this point resort to violence, they declared that other tribes of the North-west were
prepared to join with them in resisting further American intrusion onto their land. But as with almost all other Indian nations, the Sacs and Foxes were factionalised over the issue. One faction sought peace and was prepared to remove westward; the other, led by Black Hawk, was prepared to resist.

At the prospect of peace, at least with one faction, the War Department called for leniency on the part of the Illinois governor for one more year; but this was ‘a case of holding out the olive branch with one hand and stabbing with the other’ because at the same time the department sought to sound out the Sacs and Foxes on a possible cession of their mineral lands west of the Mississippi.¹⁶⁵ A year later, when Black Hawk’s Indians again returned from the winter hunt only to discover that their land had been surveyed and sold, they ‘threatened to form a coalition against the United States and destroy all the settlements from Detroit to the Sabine’. The state militia was called out and, with the aid of federal regulars, quelled the disturbance; but this was not without the further provocation of ‘desecrating the Indian burial ground’.¹⁶⁶ On 30 June 1831 the Indians capitulated to superior force, withdrew to the western bank of the Mississippi and promised not to return.

Over on the West, the Sacs and Foxes were subject to attack by Sioux and Menominees, and when Black Hawk was falsely appraised of a British and Indian plot to attack the Americans he decided to leave the peaceful members of his tribe and recrossed to his old camping ground. This was, as Abel noted, the signal for renewal of hostilities that might have been avoided once Black Hawk became aware of the falsity of the report about British intentions. However, ‘a troop of rangers ... violated an Indian flag of truce [and] the maddened Indians routed the half-intoxicated and cowardly aggressors’. Despite the efforts of Generals Atkinson and Scott, the war dragged on until the Indians were defeated at the battle of Bad Axe, 2 August 1832. In the subsequent peace treaties, Abel claimed that entire tribes were made to suffer for the disaffection of a few; but having excoriated the whites for their depredations she then described the Winnebago Indians as ‘vacillating and treacherous’ for having aided Black Hawk. They were forced to cede all their lands east of the Mississippi and moved to land in Iowa and Minnesota, whereas the Sacs and Foxes, who Abel now described as ‘the greater sinners’, were concentrated on a small reserve of four hundred square miles in Iowa. Perhaps by this time Abel was
beginning to tire of this sad tale, or perhaps she was being uncharacteristically ironic when she added: ‘With two more tribes disposed of, let us return to Florida’. 

Jackson’s agent James Gadsden had told the Seminoles that they must unite with the Creeks and in May 1832 negotiated the Treaty of Payne’s Landing that was to be binding upon the Seminoles, but only when their reconnoitring party returned from the West with favourable reports. Yet there was trouble in the new Indian colonies:

The Quapaws, disappointed in their union with the Caddoes had returned to Arkansas; the Chickasaws had not yet found a country to suit them and the Creek and Cherokee boundaries conflicted, as did the Delaware and the Pawnee.

To overcome these difficulties, Jackson established another commission—led by the Reverend JF Schermerhorn—that successfully negotiated some accommodation with the Cherokees and Creeks, the latter agreeing that the Seminoles could ‘locate as a body upon their reserve’. A third treaty, made only with the Seminole reconnoitring party but absolutely unauthorised by the tribe as a whole, became ‘the direct cause of the second Seminole war’. Schermerhorn, who Abel considered a disgrace to his cloth, left the reconnoitring party and forced the refugee Quapaws into the north-eastern corner of the Indian Territory. Meanwhile, another of Jackson’s commissions negotiated with the tribes resident in Missouri and—by the four treaties of Castor Hill, October 1832—that state was disencumbered of its remnant Kickapoos, Delawares, Shawnees, Weas, Peorias, Kaskaskias and Piankeshaws. Initial negotiations with the Pottawatomies were less successful until, in September 1833, yet another commission successfully negotiated the Treaty of Chicago with the ‘United Nations of Chippewa, Ottawa, and Pottawatomies’.

Abel turned her narrative gaze once more to the Cherokees and a consideration of the infamous legal case of *Worcester v. Georgia*. By late 1830, intrusions into the gold-rich Cherokee country had become so great that Georgia was forced to pass an act that forbade white men to live among the Indians, but such a law could not apply to federal government agents. At the end of December, missionaries to the Cherokees held a meeting at New Echota at which they:

- declared their conviction that the Cherokees as a people were averse to emigration and that the extension of Georgian jurisdiction would [according to the *Missionary Herald*] work ‘an immense and irreparable injury’.

When called upon to ‘retract or remove’, the missionaries refused and three of their number, including Reverend SA Worcester, were arrested but, because they were
nominally agents of the United States, were released by a superior county court judge. The missionaries were in fact employees of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and so the federal government was not obliged to recognise them as its agents, except for Worcester who also happened to be the postmaster at New Echota. In order that he might face Georgian justice, he was therefore ‘deprived of his secular office’ and—with ten other missionaries—was rearrested, convicted and sentenced to four years hard labour at the state penitentiary. Worcester appealed to the Supreme Court, which overturned the Georgian assumption of jurisdiction over the Cherokee country, a ruling that was ignored both by Jackson and the Georgia Governor. This case notwithstanding, steps were undertaken as early as 1831 for the enforced removal of the Cherokees with the establishment of enrolling agencies. This was a story, Abel wrote, that was ‘too long and too disgraceful’ for her adequately to treat.

The full extent of Cherokee factionalism crossed family boundaries. This was shown in the support given to the pro-removalists (headed by Major Ridge) by Andrew Ross—brother of the principal chief and leader of the anti-removal faction, John Ross. With Andrew Ross’s cooperation, John H Eaton, who had been Jackson’s secretary of war [1829–31], negotiated a treaty of cession and removal in June 1834, but ‘to the disgust of the President’ its ratification was defeated in the Senate. With Schermerhorn’s connivance, the Ridge faction drew up another treaty early the following year without John Ross being consulted but, as Abel remarked rather hopefully, ‘as this treaty was to not take effect until agreed to in national council, there was yet time to strike one more blow for justice’. The Ridge treaty came before the Cherokee National Council in October but it was rejected and John Ross prepared to travel to Washington for further talks. The Georgia guard then arrested him on the grounds that he was ‘a white man residing ... within the Indian country’ and while Ross ‘certainly did have a large proportion of Scotch blood in his veins’, the charge ‘was so absurd ... that he was soon released’.

Meanwhile, Schermerhorn (who had presented the Ridge treaty to the Cherokee National Council) lingered in the Indian country and in December, ‘in excess of his instructions’, presented a new treaty to the council, which was ratified by the United States Senate despite protests from John Ross. From then on, as Abel declared, the Cherokees were doomed, and in 1838 many of these ‘victims of tyranny and
injustice, were escorted West ... More than one-fourth are said to have perished on
the way’. In the same year, the Seminole Treaty of Payne’s Landing had expired
but their removal had been postponed for:

a fatal six-months, weighty with all the disasters of a long and bloody war! The
Black Hawk of the Seminoles appeared in the person of Osceola, more commonly
known by his English name of Powell ... War broke out ... and lasted until 1842.
The Indians were gradually subdued ... and most of them forced westward. Some
are still in Florida.

‘Pity it is,’ remarked Abel on the Jackson presidency that came to an end in 1837,
‘that it is not a part of American history upon which one can look with any pride’.
Having accomplished a great deal of Indian consolidation in the West, Jackson
bequeathed the as-yet-unresolved problems of the Cherokees and Seminoles to his
successor, Martin Van Buren [1837–41]. Since Van Buren was a New Yorker, this
gave Abel cause to return to ‘the strenuous and continuous efforts’ of the Ogden
Land Company to remove the New York Indians. The Company had hoped to
convert Wisconsin into an Indian territory but the plan was abandoned by 1837
because of difficulties between the various tribes over land quality, which various
United States’ arbitration schemes had failed to resolve. Although Abel included as a
footnote the full text of the unratified treaty of 1836 drawn up by Schermerhorn
between the Stockbridges, Munsees and Menominees, she found it scarcely
necessary to go into the details of the more important Treaty of Buffalo Creek with
the Seneca in 1838. What Abel found more interesting was its repudiation by the
Society of Friends, at the instigation of Seneca chief Red Jacket ‘on behalf of an
oppressed and outraged people’. Despite the society’s efforts in furnishing proofs
of its fraudulent nature, the Senate ratified the treaty and, although Van Buren
thought it ‘a most iniquitous proceeding’ he confirmed it nonetheless. Although the
treaty provided for the removal of the Seneca to Kansas:

the Indians never went there in appreciable numbers, and their persistent refusal to
do so proved the source of an almost endless litigation in which their rights, as
against those of the Ogden Land Company, were always more or less of a
secondary consideration.

In her final paragraph, Abel asserted that had they been guaranteed some form of
self-government the Indians would have readily emigrated westward, but:

the disencumberment of the Eastern States was the main thing thought of, and all
other interests, even though it involved the fate of a race, were disregarded. The
best criticism that can be passed upon Indian removal is that it was a plan too
hastily and too partially carried into execution for its real and underlying merits ever to be realized. That it had merits none can gainsay. But since it stopped short of self-government, for which some of the tribes were even then well fitted, it was bound to be only a temporary expedient.

The whole, sad story was not yet finished because, as Abel concluded, the land in the West ‘that was to belong to the Indian in perpetuity, was [already] in the white man’s market’.

In spite of the tendency of the patrician historians to treat Indians as largely marginal to their accounts, popular works on Indian history had appeared in the nineteenth century. Samuel Griswold Goodrich (1793–1860)—the very popular historian, geographer and children’s writer who used the pseudonym Peter Parley—wrote a history of the Indians on both halves of the continent. Published soon after the removal policy had come into effect, Goodrich echoed the sentiments of Morse when he remarked that the policy had been adopted because of the ‘evils attending the proximity of the whites to the Indians’. Indeed, drawing solely on Indian commissioner’s reports, Griswold was optimistic of the policy’s success and noted that lands were ‘perpetually guarantied [sic] to the Indians’ and that some tribes had ‘already made important advances towards civilisation’. Yet he also sadly reflected that in ‘the history of the aborigines of America … so many pages … have been written in blood and … such multitudes have perished in the vain attempt to resist outrage and oppression’. A decade later, in a summation of the fate of Indian peoples across the continent, Henry Harvey, Quaker missionary to the Shawnees, wrote of the general population decline and claimed that of some two hundred thousand Indians in 1660, less that a quarter of them had survived. He then posed the question: ‘Is this caused by the bad treatment of the white people? Ah! To this solemn question we are compelled to answer in the affirmative’.

These views were echoed in Helen Hunt Jackson’s famous tract, *A Century of Dishonor* (1881), a powerful contribution to the movement for Indian reform that likewise regaled against Indian policies and the abuses they engendered. Jackson was neither historian nor academic and in a prefatory note, described her own work as ‘only a sketch, and not a history’. As an introduction to her 1898 master’s thesis on the Sioux Indians, Lucy Elizabeth Textor had briefly outlined the development of American Indian policy, but she also took a reformist stance, similar to that of
Jackson. Thus Abel may not have been the first writer to draw attention to the ‘Indian problem’, but her dissertation was undoubtedly the first work by an academic historian to deal exclusively with the topic of Indian removal in its early stages.\(^1\)

Abel’s almost total reliance on documentary evidence provides a good demonstration of the Rankean method that privileged official sources. Her annotated bibliography followed the structure she had noted at Yale and included primary, secondary and worthless sources.\(^2\) Her list of primary sources—of which Ranke himself surely would have been proud—comprised well over three hundred volumes and it is doubtful that she would have read, or even consulted, all of them. They included: thirty-eight volumes of *American State Papers*, forty-two volumes of the *Annals of Congress*, sixteen volumes of the *Abridgement of the Debates of Congress*, twenty-seven volumes of *United States Statutes at Large* and, most importantly, over two hundred and fifty volumes of correspondence files from the Indian Office records. In addition, she listed forty-six volumes of British and Foreign State Papers, papers of various missionaries, soldiers and statesmen including twelve volumes of John Quincy Adams’ *Memoirs* and about ‘7,000 distinct papers … together with thirteen volumes of letter books and military records’ of Andrew Jackson.\(^3\) Abel also found it necessary to consult four different sets of Jefferson’s writings, comprising four, nine, ten and eighteen volumes respectively.

Of her secondary sources, Abel considered Henry Adams’ nine-volume *History of the United States 1801–1817* (1898) to be ‘the best general history for the period covered’.\(^4\) For an even earlier period of American history, she consulted Herbert L Osgood’s three-volume *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (1902–07), which she claimed, ‘treats in a masterly way of Indian relations … and the beginnings of the reservation system’.\(^5\) She also listed Hildreth’s six-volume *History of America* without comment, but considered Lucy Elizabeth Textor’s work on the Sioux, which was prefaced by a full résumé of United States Indian policy, to be ‘masterly’.\(^6\)

Among the ‘worthless’ sources that Abel consulted was Caleb Atwater’s *The Indians of the Northwest* (1850), which she claimed was ‘full of mawkish sentimentality and of pedantry’ and had ‘little historical value’.\(^7\) She found Helen Hunt Jackson’s *A Century of Dishonour* (1881) to be ‘in the main based upon facts’ but also felt that its tone was ‘a trifle sentimental; and considered Thomas
McKenney’s Memoirs to be ‘singularly destitute of anything valuable’, and that his collaborative efforts with James Hall on Indian history contained ‘much that is traditional, sentimental and worthless’. At the beginning of the twentieth century, there were few Indian sources available to history researchers, but Abel did include a biography of Black Hawk, some pamphlets covering the laws of the Cherokee and Choctaw nations, a proposal by Chippewa chief George Copway on the reorganisation of the Indian Territory, and two short pieces by the Delaware historian and advocate Richard C Adams.

Much of Abel’s narrative was simply a prolix litany of failures to implement any removal policy across the first forty years or so of the nineteenth century, so much so that the work might well have been entitled The History of non-Events … Although she demonstrated how Indian removal related to American continental expansion, for Abel, the ‘events’ were not so much about the actuality of removal, but those played out on the political stage, be it on the floor of Congress, out on the various Indian treaty grounds or in official correspondence. To be fair, she had noted the limitations of the study in her preface and expressed the hope to expand on it by considering the effects of the removal policy and its failures. But did she mean the effect on the Indians or the effect on the United States? Her methodology was so archive focussed, it is difficult to imagine anything but the latter.

To an overwhelming extent, the players in this drama were white men; for the most part Indians remained in the background as shadowy and occasionally threatening figures. Abel made scant note of the level of Indian acculturation, particularly among the south-eastern tribes, and even displayed an antiquated naiveté in describing a Creek chief as a ‘king, so to speak’. At the beginning of this work she repeated the erroneous sentiment with which she closed her Kansas reservations piece: the Indians were nomadic and therefore removal appeared to be an easy policy option. To her credit, she did proffer some Indian voices, but those she quoted often suffered from the same flowery language that framed white voices and thus, by her own critique, were suspect. Nonetheless, the Indian declaration for the love of country was heartfelt whereas the white voice was always transparently void and patronising.
To the long and bitter resistance struggle waged by the Indians throughout this period, Abel gave but lip service. Was that her intention? Did she simply assume, on the part of her readers, knowledge of the Indian wars in order that she could concentrate on political developments as she read them in the official archives? Within the framework of such an expectation, she simply dropped the names of resistance leaders such as Pontiac, Thayendanegea, Tecumseh and Osceola; she certainly assumed knowledge of the War of 1812 and the associated Creek uprising, and the Seminole Wars rated only a footnote. The forced march of the Cherokees, the most infamous of the many ‘trails of tears’ that befell so many Indians, was skipped over in a sentence. Only the Black Hawk War (which, compared with the Creek and Seminole resistance, was only a minor episode) did Abel think worthy of extensive comment. Even here, Abel was at best ambivalent. She noted the white atrocities, particularly the desecration of an Indian graveyard; but in the end it was the Indians who were ‘treacherous’, ‘vacillating’ and ‘sinners’.

One of Abel’s central themes was an attempt to draw out a comparison between an apparently genuine, if patronising and misguided, philanthropic impulse to establish Indian colonies beyond the Mississippi and the political imperative to disencumber the states and territories of Indians in order to free up land for their burgeoning populations—the great American land-grab. Hence she iterated much of Morse’ report and noted the involvement of the religious denominations. She exposed the ambivalence of the federal politicians who, in theory at least, sought to deal honourably with the ‘Indian problem’, but who were forced to deal with state and territory governors. In this she rediscovered the two imperatives of expansion—racial intolerance and land-hunger—first described by Hildreth. Above all, Abel revealed a betrayal of the principles enshrined in the founding documents of the United States. As she noted at Yale, these documents had an ancient and venerable lineage, but when it came to dealing with a ‘subject race’, bribery and corruption appeared to be the norm across both time and space. When that didn’t work, brute force was employed and Abel’s research exposed the providential rhetoric for what it was, a mere excuse for Americans at the settler, corporate, territorial, state and federal levels to grab more land, not just for lebensraum, but for the profit in land speculation and the exploitation of natural resources. The Indians simply got in the way.
In 1905, having had her thesis accepted by Yale and with the recommendation of her faculty for its publication, Abel sought the good offices of the Smithsonian Institution.\textsuperscript{197} That body’s secretary passed her letter on to the assistant secretary in charge of library and exchanges who passed it on to the chief of the Bureau of American Ethnology (BAE) with a concerned covering letter:

> It would be a very dangerous business to [publish her thesis], and as a matter of general policy I think it should be refused, although I know that in a specific instance the Museum did publish a scientific treatise which was used as a thesis for a Doctor’s degree.\textsuperscript{198}

This sentiment was obviously not communicated to Abel because a little more than a week later she again wrote to the secretary, this time including an original copy of her thesis and hoping it would be met with approval, claiming it to be:

> as far as it goes, an amplification to a very large extent of Mr. Royce’s ‘Indian Cessions’ published by your office, and therefore I am in hopes that it may fall within the line of your publication.\textsuperscript{199}

The secretary simply passed this on—together with a somewhat officious note—to the BAE chief and, as far as the Smithsonian was concerned, that was the end of the matter.

The following year, however, at the AHA’s meeting at Providence, Rhode Island, Abel’s monograph was pronounced the winner of the Justin Winsor Prize.\textsuperscript{200} Abel was the seventh recipient of this, the AHA’s first ever award, which had been created in 1896 in honour of the association’s third president ‘to encourage and acknowledge previously unpublished authors and young scholars without an established reputation in the profession’.\textsuperscript{201} Despite the fact that she had been published and, at age thirty-three would perhaps not have been considered young, Abel became the second of only four women out of a total of twenty recipients of the prize, which was awarded until 1938.

At the Providence meeting, the association also voted to accept the prize committee’s recommendation that the award be doubled to $200 and, in addition to the money, the award brought with it publication of the thesis in the AHA Annual Report for 1906. Yet the anonymous reviewer of that report in the July 1908 issue of AHR was not very complimentary. He (and it can be safely assumed it was a he) complained somewhat grumpily that ‘rather more than half’ of the first volume of the
Report was taken up by Dr Abel’s dissertation—a paper he described as being ‘marked by the fullest and most patient research, abounding in detailed information and written with every effort to be fair, but not with much literary skill nor with great insight into the political affairs of men’. 202
Notes

5 ibid., p. 40.
10 John Higham, op. cit., p. 3.
15 Cited in ibid., p. 249–50.
16 Novick, loc. cit. For a discussion of this term in two German formulations, see Anthony Grafton, The Footnote, a curious history, Faber & Faber, London, 1977, p. 69.
17 Novick, ibid., p. 28.
18 ibid., p. 29; Bourne, op. cit., p. 259.
23 Saveth, ibid., p. 18.
25 Saveth, ibid., p. 25, fn. 35.

Peter Novick, op. cit., p. 84.

Edward Gaylord Bourne, op. cit., p. 245.

ibid., p. 253.


Higham, ibid., p. 39.

ibid., p. 59.


These notebooks are numbered VI, VII and VIII, and range from 1902 to 1905; WSU MASC, 15/83–5.

Abel meant, perhaps, ten Celtic legal terms.

Abel to Bourne, 1904; Bourne Letters, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, 6/47. This letter is undated, but from internal evidence it just precedes a letter that Abel wrote to Bourne in September 1904.

ibid.

William MacDonald (ed.), Select Charters & other Documents Illustrative of American History 1606–1775, MacMillan, New York, 1899. This copy is now in the George Henderson Collection, Adelaide University, South Australia. One could speculate whether George and Amelia Abel, in naming their eldest daughter, were aware of the famous medieval lovers to which Annie is here referring.

Max Farrand, ‘Compromises of the Constitution’, AHR, IX, 3, April 1904, pp. 479–89.

The resistance campaign led by the Wampanoag leader Metacomet (Philip) against New England settlers, 1675–76; see Alan Axelrod, Chronicle of The Indian Wars from Colonial Times to Wounded Knee, Konecky & Konecky, New York, 1993, pp. 23–37.


To which she might have added Frank Heywood Hodder, her mentor from the University of Kansas.


Abel to Bourne, 1904; Bourne Letters, op. cit.


Abel to Bourne, 20 September 1904; Bourne Letters, op. cit. Henry Cabot Lodge had been a graduate student of Henry Adams.

ibid. It is interesting to note that in this letter, Abel mentioned making the acquaintance in Washington of the noted historian UB Phillips who was then working on his own doctoral thesis, The Plantation System of the South. ‘He is very pleasant and we have found it quite profitable to compare notes’, she wrote.

Annie Heloise Abel, The History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi, AMS Press, New York, 1972 (1908), p. 235. After its publication in the AHA report, this work (hereinafter Indian Consolidation) was published two years later as a separate monograph by the Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.

ibid., p. 236.

ibid., p. 237.

ibid., p. 241.


ibid., p. 243.

ibid., p. 244. In a different but related context, one Australian indigenous leader has noted the irony of Aboriginal people being mythologised as nomads, whereas ‘those inveterate wanderers [the

ibid., p. 249. Drinnon, op. cit., p. 84, fn. *, described this as ‘still far and away the best study’ of Jefferson’s proposed amendment.

ibid., p. 252.

ibid., p. 253.

ibid., p. 255.

ibid., p. 259. Abel later noted that in 1809, when ‘war with Great Britain seemed daily imminent’, Jefferson threatened not only removal upon any Indians that attempted an alliance with the British, but ‘to extirpate [them] from the Earth or drive to such a distance as they shall never again be able to strike us’; ibid., p. 268.

ibid., pp. 264–5.

ibid., p. 265.

ibid., p. 266.

ibid., p. 267. The practice of seeking to treat with individuals or factions was to continue until the final abandonment of treaty making with Indians after the Civil War.

ibid., p. 269. The Ottowa chief Pontiac (1720–1769) led a war of resistance against the British in 1763–64, an episode that was the subject of Francis Parkman’s Conspiracy of Pontiac (1870). Thayendaneega (1742–1807), also known as Joseph Brant, was a Mohawk leader and ally of the British in the American Revolutionary War. Abel here cited ‘Avery’, a source that does not appear in her bibliography but probably refers to Elroy McKendree Avery’s A History of the United States and Its People that she later reviewed; see chapter three.

ibid., p. 272.

ibid., p. 275. Emphasis added.

ibid., p. 276.

ibid., p. 277.

ibid., p. 278. Although it was not clear from Abel’s account, Tecumseh’s call for the Creeks join his uprising in fact engendered a civil war within the Creek nation between the Red Sticks—who supported Tecumseh—and the White Sticks who sought an accommodation with the United States.


ibid., p. 281.

ibid., p. 283.

ibid., p. 284.

ibid., p. 284, fn. g.

ibid., p. 289. Curiously, Abel did not explain the Senate’s attitude at this time for, as she had already shown in her Kansas piece, it would be individual allotment that would be used to destroy tribal power.

ibid., pp. 289–90.

ibid., pp. 294–5.

ibid., p. 295.

ibid., p. 296.

ibid., p. 298. Dr Jedidiah Morse was considered by some to be the father of American geography. His son Samuel was the inventor of the telegraphic code that bears his name.

ibid., p. 299. The United States Indian Industrial School at Lawrence, Kansas, was opened in 1884 on the plains below Abel’s alma mater, the University of Kansas. Over the next one hundred years it developed into the Haskell Indian Nations University.

In her next published work, Abel herself considered the history of the idea of an Indian state; see below, chapter three.

ibid., p. 301.


ibid., p. 305. The Iroquois or Hodenosaunee League comprised the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscarora tribes.

ibid., p. 307. Eleazar Williams spoke fluent Oneida and claimed descent from a Mohawk chief and a white woman, an alliance that had come about following the Deerfield massacre in western Massachusetts in 1704. He later claimed to be the lost Dauphin of France; see ‘Appleton History’, viewed March 2005, <http://www.apl.org/history/dauphin.html>.

ibid., p. 311. A Seneca sachem, Colonel Eli Parker, would serve as General Ulysses S Grant’s secretary on the occasion of General Robert E Lee’s surrender at Appomattox in 1865.

ibid., p. 323. See also, ‘Message of President Monroe on Indian Removal’ in Francis Paul Prucha (ed.), Documents of United States Indian Policy, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1975, p. 39.

ibid., p. 324. Abel is here referring to and citing from American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, pp. 468–73.

ibid., p. 325.

ibid., p. 326.

ibid., p. 329.

ibid., p. 330.

ibid., p. 331.

ibid., p. 335. Of Big Warrior—a leader of the Red Sticks—Abel wrote that he ‘was supposed to be a wily and treacherous savage, but that was from an American point of view’. She described the position of Little Prince as ‘neither actively friendly nor actively hostile towards the US’.

ibid., p. 336, fn. d. Italics in the original. Abel sourced this quote from an article published in the Montgomery Republican and reprinted in Niles’ Register, XXVII, 4 December 1824, pp. 223–4.

ibid., p. 337.

ibid., pp. 337–8.

ibid., p. 339.

ibid., p. 340. There are several variants to the English spelling of this chief’s name and he figures prominently in Slaveholding Indians; see below, chapter four.

ibid., p. 340, fn. d.

Cited in ibid., p. 340.

ibid., p. 341.

ibid., p. 344.

ibid., p. 345.

ibid., p. 345, fn. b. Indian political gatherings were also occasions for games, hence the reference to ball play.

ibid., p. 345–6.

ibid., p. 346. Abel also suggested that since McIntosh was fully cognisant of the Creek law and fearful for his life, he was prepared to affix his signature to the fraudulent treaty only in the privacy of his own home and not at the Council Square. During later investigations, it was claimed that McIntosh had sold his country as an act of revenge for having been ‘broken as Speaker’ in Council and that although McIntosh’s son Chilly had pleaded with Troup for protection for his father, help was not forthcoming, fn. f.

ibid., p. 347, fn. f.

ibid., p. 348.

ibid., p. 349.

ibid., p. 350.

ibid., p. 352.

ibid., p. 353.
American State Papers, Indian Affairs, II, 374, cited in ibid., p. 354.

ibid., p. 355.

ibid., p. 356. Abel here noted the discrepancy between the Treaty of Indian Springs by which the Creeks surrendered their Alabama land and the Treaty of Washington by which they got it back again.


ibid., pp. 357–8.

ibid., p. 358. Abel here noted the discrepancy between the Treaty of Indian Springs by which the Creeks surrendered their Alabama land and the Treaty of Washington by which they got it back again.


ibid., pp. 357–8.

ibid., p. 358, fn. A. Abel surely would have recognised this as a syncretised version of the Old Testament story in Genesis, chapter 27, of Jacob’s deception of his blind father, Isaac.

ibid., p. 359.

ibid., p. 360. Here Abel is making an oblique reference to the remarkable Sequoyah who, in 1820, invented a syllabary by which the oral Cherokee language could be written.

ibid., p. 360.

Cited in ibid., p. 361, fn. a. Emphasis in the original.

ibid., p. 362.

ibid., p. 364. Abel gives no explanation for her use of these adjectives.

ibid.

ibid., p. 365–6. In an elaborately technical footnote, Abel suggested that the Bill’s provenance was unsure and could not necessarily be attributed to Barbour, p. 365, fn. g.

Cited in ibid., p. 366. Emphasis in the original.

ibid., p. 367, fn. a. Here Abel draws attention to a similar plan incipient in the treaties of Fort Pitt, 1778, and Hopewell, 1785.

ibid., p. 368.

ibid., p. 369.

ibid., p. 370.

Niles’ Register, XXXVI, 231, cited in ibid., p. 370. Abel identified two of these agents as Generals Carrol and Coffee, ‘political friends of Jackson’, p. 371, fn. a.

ibid., p. 372. This speech, made on 7 November 1829, was published in the Missionary Herald, August 1830, together with an explanation of the title ‘mingo’.

ibid., p. 373, fn. a.

ibid., p. 374.

This draft was said ‘to occupy “sixteen sheets of foolscap paper ... in the handwriting of ... the most prominent of the Methodist missionaries”’ but despite this claim, Abel cited other evidence for this document originating from the Indians themselves, ibid., p. 375 fn. b.

ibid., p. 375. Much of this was sourced to the Missionary Herald whose language may be perceived in Abel’s own account.

ibid., p. 375. Abel here must mean ‘commenced’ rather than ‘resumed’ since she has just reminded the reader that negotiations had yet to begin.

ibid., p. 375.

ibid., p. 376.

ibid., p. 377.

ibid., p. 377, fn. d.


ibid., p. 379.

ibid., p. 380.

ibid., p. 381. Emphasis added.

ibid., p. 382. As Abel remarked, this provision was outlined in the ‘notorious’ fourteenth article. In 1843, an investigation was held into alleged frauds against the Choctaws, which Abel illustrated with Leflore’s deposition to that inquiry, fn. j.

ibid., p. 383.

ibid., p. 385.
Abel here footnoted Jackson’s personal feelings, citing a letter to Secretary of War Lewis Cass: ‘... the North American Indian tribes, east the Mississippi [sic] are a conquered & dependent people ... There they are dependent, not on the Federal power in exclusion to the State authority where they reside within the limits of a State, but to the sovereign power of the State within whose sovereign limits they reside ... An absolute independence of the Indian tribes from State authority can never bear an intelligent investigation and a quasi-independence of State authority when located within its Territorial limits is absurd’. Cited in ibid., p. 386, fn. b. Emphasis in the original.


Abel, op. cit., p. 389.

Abel, p. 390.

Abel, p. 391.

James Gadsden (1788–1858), politician and railway entrepreneur who, in 1852, negotiated the purchase of over 45 thousand square miles of territory from Mexico for $10 million—known as the Gadsden Purchase.

Abel noted that the 1830 Chickasaw Treaty, like that of Payne’s Landing, was to be binding upon the tribe only if it found suitable country. She also mentioned that under the Chickasaw Treaty ‘... some of Jackson’s friends ... were beneficiaries ... for a lease of the valuable Salt Lick’. She further noted that the Chickasaws sold all their land under the Treaty of Pontitock Creek in October 1832, but it was not until 1837 that the Chocotaws received them, fnn. c & e.

The Second Seminole War was a seven-year campaign of resistance under Chief Osceola that ended in 1842 with the removal of most of them westward.

Later, northern Nebraska.

Abel added that ‘... this does not signify that three whole tribes emigrated. Particular bands of each had confederated together and now negotiated as a “nation”. As a matter of fact, nearly all the tribes of the North-west emigrated in detachments’; fn. c (1).

Having introduced this case in her main text, Abel then abandoned it to a series of very lengthy footnotes comprising quotations from the Missionary Herald. Worcester and Butler were finally released under a governor’s proclamation in January 1833. A full account of Worcester v. Georgia can be found in William G McLoughlin, Cherokees and Missionaries 1789–1839, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1984.

Abel noted that although the facts of this episode were brought out in Royce’s History of the Cherokee, he failed to include the correspondence of Schermerhorn and Superintendent Curry, which ‘hint at much that was never intrusted to paper and the story is a very dark one’; p. 403, fn. a. This no doubt was one of the episodes that Abel hoped one day she would be able to explicate more fully.

185 ibid., p. 289; cf. Abel’s remarks on the advance towards civilisation among the Cherokees; see below, chapter four.
186 ibid., p. 296.
191 ibid., p. 426.
192 ibid., p. 413.
193 ibid., p. 432.
194 ibid., p. 436. Textor had gained her doctorate at Yale in 1905, the year before Abel. Her dissertation concerned an émigré colony in Canada.
195 ibid., p. 414.
196 ibid., pp. 426, 428–9.
197 Abel to SP Langley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, 9 November 1905; records of the Bureau of American Ethnology (BAE), file of Letters Received, Smithsonian Institution, 1905–07, Box 3.
198 Cyrus Adler to WH Holmes, 13 November 1905, ibid.
200 ‘The Meeting of the American Historical Association at Providence’, *AHR*, XII, 3, April 1907, p. 503.